P40 Review of Erlich's industrialization book

Problems of COMMUNISM

Housing, Farming, and Consumer Goods in the USSR

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The Importance of Being Albania

By T. Zavalani

EDITORS' NOTE: The title of this article may seem somewhat whimsical, but its purpose is not. "Why," asks Mr. Zavalani in discussing Khrushchev's visit to Albania in May 1959, "was the all-powerful and heavily-burdened ruler of the mightiest Communist state paying such a prolonged visit to tiny Albania?" The same "why" may be asked about the flow of important Chinese Communist visitors to this "tiny" country, the frequent references to it in Moscow's and Peking's newspapers, the curious rumors that have been circulated in the non-Communist press—in brief, the peculiar importance that Albania has now assumed within the Communist bloc at large, and in Sino-Soviet relations in particular. The answers to these questions form the substance of Mr. Zavalani's article.

ON APRIL 12, 1957, *Pravda* published a photograph of Nikita Khrushchev and Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Workers' (Communist) Party of Albania, facing each other at the head of a long table in one of the historic halls of the Kremlin. Hoxha and Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu were in Moscow on an official visit which was one of a succession of pilgrimages to the Soviet capital by Central and East European Communist leaders, evidently arranged in order to reaffirm before the world the monolithic unity of the Communist bloc. Such a concerted demonstration of bloc solidarity had become vitally necessary in the wake of the upheavals of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, which had laid bare the burning hatred of Soviet Russia and of communism prevailing among the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Albanian Communist leaders were the last to perform their part in this carefully organized show. Their stay in the USSR was marked by the same set speeches, the same stage-managed demonstrations of solidarity and eternal friendship, the same lavish entertainment as had attended the visits of the other Communist leaders. In all their public appearances, the Albanian guests dutifully maintained a facade of complete unanimity with their Soviet hosts on all issues of general policy. Only once did a muted note of discord infringe upon the outward display of harmony. Addressing a reception held at the Albanian Embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev seized the occasion to underline the strenuous efforts exerted by the Soviet Union to improve relations with Yugoslavia on both the government and party levels. Then he went on to say:

There are still difficulties as far as Albanian-Yugoslav relations are concerned. We desire most sincerely that these difficulties be overcome and that relations between Albania and Yugoslavia be established on a basis of good-neighborliness. I am sure that this can be brought about as the Yugoslav leaders desire the same thing. Much will have to be done, particularly to overcome ideological differences, but it must be done.[1]

Mr. Zavalani is an Albanian journalist, writer and translator now living in London. He is the author of History of Albania *(in Albanian), published by DRINI Publications Ltd. (London) in 1958, and of* How Strong Is Russia? *(Hollis and Carter, London, 1951).*

[1] *Zeri i Popullit,* April 15, 1957.

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Premier Mehmet Shehu, in his reply, discreetly concurred with the Soviet leader's wish but confined himself to vague generalities: he deplored the deterioration of relations between Communist parties within the bloc and the Yugoslav League of Communists and promised to work toward a renewal of the old friendship between the Albanian and Yugoslav peoples. Thus, the deep cleavage dividing the Communist regimes of Albania and Yugoslavia was glossed over, and the visitors from Tirana went on to discuss economic matters with their hosts behind closed doors.

Khrushchev in Tirana

Two years later, in May 1959, Premier Khrushchev returned the Albanian leaders' visit, taking with him to Tirana Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky and a large delegation. This and the fact that Khrushchev's announced schedule called for a stay of twelve days in Albania gave rise to a flurry of puzzled speculation in the non-Communist press. Why was the all-powerful and heavily-burdened ruler of the mightiest Communist state paying such a prolonged visit to tiny Albania? Observers could find no satisfactory explanation. (Khrushchev later shortened his visit by three days in response, he explained, to an urgent request by Hungarian Premier Kadar that he visit Budapest on his way back to Moscow.)

The Albanian Communists' reaction to Khrushchev's coming was one of flattered exultation. The arrival of the Soviet delegation in Tirana signalled the start of a marathon of demonstrations and speech-making in which the familiar themes of the indissoluble unity of the socialist camp, of eternal Communist solidarity based on allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, and of Albania's undying gratitude for the generous aid of the Soviet Union were endlessly repeated. The distinguished Soviet guests were taken to see the showpieces of socialist construction in the capital and major outlying towns: the Stalin textile combine, the Stalin settlement at the Kuchova oil fields, the Karl Marx hydroelectric power station, the Cerrik oil refinery, and so on. Wherever he went, Khrushchev spoke glowingly of Hoxha as a worthy son of the stalwart Albanian people, and he in turn was hailed by his hosts as the great statesman and wise leader of the mighty Soviet Union.

The true purpose of Khrushchev's visit was soon made plain by a speech which he delivered before a huge gathering in Tirana's main square on May 31. The Soviet leader denounced the Italian government for agreeing to the establishment of American rocket bases on Italian territory, and he warned Greece that it was taking great risks in negotiating with the United States for a similar purpose. He went on to recall the proposal made two years earlier by Rumanian Premier Stoica for a Balkan conference, asserting that it had proved fruitless because the capitalist powers put their own class interests before the cause of peace. Then, after paying tribute to Albania's role as the foremost bastion of the socialist camp in the Mediterranean basin, Khrushchev unveiled his famous proposal for transforming the Balkans into a "zone of peace" free of nuclear weapons. If this proposal was not accepted, he warned, then the Soviet government would have to arrange with the Albanian People's Republic for the construction on its territory of launching sites for medium-range rockets directed against Italy and Greece. He went on to remark, half jokingly, that Albania's high mountains and deep gorges suited the country admirably for the installation of rocket bases. Khrushchev this time did not mention Yugoslavia at all, and it was left to Hoxha, who also spoke on the occasion, to say rather unconvincingly that the Albanian government desired good relations with that country.[2]

By a strange coincidence, Marshal P'eng Te-huai, Communist China's Defense Minister and a member of the CPC Politburo, paid a visit to Albania while Khrushchev and his party were there. P'eng was received by his Albanian opposite number, General Beqir Balluku, and accorded a warm official welcome. The new slogan of Albanian-Chinese friendship, cemented by the common struggle against imperialism, was heavily played up, with particular stress on military solidarity. But, curiously enough, the Soviet and Chinese delegations were kept apart as if in separate watertight compartments—a straw in the wind whose significance was to become apparent later.

Back in Moscow again, Premier Khrushchev addressed a huge gathering at the Lenin Stadium on June 7 regarding his visit to Albania. He described that country as the future beautiful orchard of the socialist camp, where not only oranges and lemons but even bananas could grow (an exaggerated compliment as the Albanian climate is not warm and humid enough for bananas); and he lauded the achievements of the Albanian Communist regime as simply astonishing. Albania, Khrushchev emphasized, had nothing to worry about as long as it belonged to the Warsaw Pact: if the necessity should arise, the Communist regime there would be provided with the nuclear weapons needed to defend itself against any attack.[3]

[2] Both speeches reported in *Pravda* and *Zeri i Popullit*, May 31, 1959.

[3] *Pravda*, June 7, 1959.

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Khrushchev's visit to Tirana marked the acme of close relations between the Soviet and Albanian Communist leaders. Yet the various gestures of harmony exchanged from 1957 to 1959 were soon to be revealed for what they had been all along—a brief attempt at an impossible rapprochement, covering up fundamental differences and resentments which have existed ever since Khrushchev assumed the mantle of leadership.

Seeds of Conflict

The origin of the basic disagreement between Moscow and Tirana dates back to 1955, when Khrushchev embarked upon policies of limited political liberalization designed to attenuate the most damaging excesses of Stalinism. From that time onward the Albanian leaders fell increasingly out of step with their colleagues in the Kremlin, and the dissonance was accentuated by the further Soviet liberalization moves that followed Khrushchev's "secret" denunciation of Stalin and the cult of personality at the 20th CPSU Congress. The Albanian Communists persistently failed to follow the Soviet example: they took no steps to curtail the powers of the secret police, to end arbitrary arrests and summary trials, to close the concentration camps, or to allow a "thaw" in the field of literature and the arts. Stalin was kept on his pedestal, and the totalitarian dictatorship went on as before, with the regime paying nothing more than lip service to the evils of the personality cult. From Enver Hoxha's point of view, Comrade Khrushchev was setting the wrong example by deviating from the path of Stalin.

The Albanian Communists were particularly upset by the steps taken by Khrushchev in 1955-56 to patch up Stalin's conflict with Yugoslavia. Although these moves failed to bring Tito unreservedly back into the socialist camp, Khrushchev persisted in trying to preserve normal relations with Yugoslavia on the state level; he played down ideological disagreements as much as possible and generally went out of his way to keep Tito from cutting himself loose once again from the Communist bloc. But the Albanian Communist leaders were utterly antagonistic to a reconciliation with Tito, against whom they harbored more serious and bitter grudges than did Khrushchev. They accused him of having conspired before 1948 to absorb Albania into the Yugoslav Federation, and of trying hard thereafter to bring about the replacement of Hoxha and Shehu at the helm of the Albanian party and government by stooges subservient to Tito's own ambitions.

This antagonism was sharpened by the visible contrast between conditions in Albania and in neighboring Yugoslavia. While Tito's more liberal policies seemed to be providing the Yugoslav people with a better and relatively freer life, the Albanians, living next door, suffered intolerable hardships under a regime of undiluted Stalinist oppression. This fact was not lost on the Albanian public, and it led to comparisons that were extremely awkward for the regime. From the viewpoint of the Albanian Communist leaders, Tito was doing an even more effective job than Khrushchev in demonstrating that anti-Stalinism works wonders. Consequently, in spite of Khrushchev's pressing recommendations for an Albanian-Yugoslav rapprochement and notwithstanding their own halfhearted promises to work toward a reconciliation, the Albanian Communists carried on a relentless campaign against the Yugoslav "revisionists," branding them as lackeys of Western, and particularly American, imperialism.

Albania's geographic isolation from the rest of the Communist bloc has been an important factor in its disagreement with Khrushchev's policies. Outwardly, the Albanian Communist leaders claim that their country is secure behind the shield of the Warsaw Pact; yet they cannot help feeling inwardly apprehensive, surrounded as they are by hostile governments (which they do their best to turn against themselves). This fear is reflected in constant appeals to the Albanian people to show revolutionary vigilance, to work with spade in one hand and rifle in the other. The fact that they are physically cut off from the socialist camp impels the Communist rulers of Albania to oppose strongly any plans for a détente in Central and Eastern Europe which might pave the way for making that area a demilitarized zone.

Tirana-Peking Axis

For some time the latent disagreements between Moscow and Tirana were kept under cover and could only be inferred from differences of emphasis in official speeches and newspaper articles. More and more frequently, however, the Albanian Communists gave evidence of taking China's side on issues of international policy. While Khrushchev and the leaders of the East European Communist regimes were putting the accent on peaceful coexistence and the possibility of Communist expansion without war, the Albanian Communists were indulging in violent attacks on Western imperialism and United States "aggression" against China. While Khrushchev persisted in trying to lure Tito into the Communist fold, Hoxha and his clique, echoing Peking, were assailing the Yugoslav leader in the most violent and offensive language, and implying that no

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rapprochement with Yugoslavia was possible as long as Tito remained in power. Tirana showed its partiality for Peking in another area as well: while the Soviet leaders manifested tacit disapproval of Communist China's agricultural communes, the Albanian Communists hailed them not only as consistent with Marxism-Leninism but as constituting a short cut to the achievement of communism.

The deterioration of Soviet-Albanian relations reached a new stage when Khrushchev chose to utilize the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party, held in Bucharest in July 1960, as a forum for proclaiming the endorsement of his policies by the party leaders of all the Communist bloc countries of Europe. With this objective in mind, the first secretaries of the Central and East European Communist parties were summoned to the Rumanian capital. Hoxha, however, failed to appear and instead sent one of his underlings, Hysni Kapo, a member of the party Politburo. At the congress Khrushchev delivered an address which had all the earmarks of a general directive on bloc policy. In Moscow *Pravda* published it in full, but the party leaders in Tirana took it upon themselves to censor the pronouncement by the supreme leader of the Communist world. The version published by *Zeri i Popullit,* the central organ of the Albanian party, conspicuously left out the crucial passage in which Khrushchev had argued his thesis that some of Lenin's views on imperialism and the inevitability of war were obsolete. By publishing the speech without this passage, Hoxha and his colleagues served notice that it set forth an interpretation with which they could not agree.[4]

Albanian opposition to Soviet bloc policies was again evidenced at the UN General Assembly session in New York in September 1960. Premier Mehmet Shehu and Foreign Minister Behar Shtylla led the Albanian delegation. On September 28 Todor Zhivkov, representing Communist Bulgaria, submitted a proposal to the General Assembly for a reduction of the armed forces of the Balkan states to the levels required for guarding their national frontiers, with a view to making these countries the first to implement Soviet-sponsored plans for general and complete disarmament. This proposal was criticized in the UN Political Committee by Foreign Minister Shtylla, and Premier Shehu, upon his return to Albania, rejected it in still stronger terms. Reporting to the Albanian National Assembly on October 25, Shehu declared:

The Albanian government can never accept the idea of local and complete disarmament. . . . To apply such a plan . . . in the Balkans only, at a time when NATO bases have been established in Italy for the launching of rockets and the American Sixth Fleet cruises within the limits of our territorial waters like an open-mouthed dragon, is absurd and dangerous for every socialist state in the Balkans. General disarmament must be carried out simultaneously in all countries and regions of the world under the conditions proposed by the Soviet Union.[5]

The Albanian premier also assailed a proposal that had been made at the UN session by Polish party leader Gomulka, calling for an agreement to prohibit the building of new military bases on the territory of other countries. Shehu declared that his government was against the proposal because it would mean accepting the existence of hundreds of Western military bases already encircling the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist camp. Were this plan to be carried out, he said, it would only encourage the imperialist powers to embark upon military adventures.

Moscow Parley Fiasco

By the end of 1960 Khrushchev had evidently decided that it was imperative to make another attempt to stop the drift that was threatening the unity of the Communist world. Consequently, in November, a conference of the highest representatives of 81 Communist parties was convened in Moscow to take stock of the international situation and work out a common program of action that would have the ring of a new Communist Manifesto. The deliberations were held in strict secrecy and lasted much longer than usual.

According to some reports, there was a violent clash between the Soviet and Chinese Communist viewpoints, with Hoxha, speaking for the Albanian party, taking the side of the Chinese delegates. This was said to have caused a stormy argument between the Albanian and Soviet party chiefs. Rumor had it that Hoxha called Khrushchev a "revisionist," to which the latter retorted, "You have emptied a bucketful of dirt in my face, and you will have to wash it off one day!" That evening Hoxha reportedly left the villa assigned to the Albanian delegation and spent the night at the Albanian Embassy.

[4] The full text of Khrushchev's speech was published in *Pravda* on June 22, 1960, and the abridged Albanian version in *Zeri i Popullit* on June 23. In the suppressed passage, Khrushchev ridiculed those who "repeat mechanically what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said about imperialism many decades back, and who reiterate again and again that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism has triumphed all over the world." Lenin's tenets, he said, must be "creatively applied" in the light of present conditions and "the change in the correlation of forces in the world."

[5] *Zeri i Popullit,* October 26, 1960.

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The next day he took off by plane for Tirana without waiting for the end of the conference.[6]

Despite the fireworks in Moscow, the Albanian press published the declaration of the 81 Communist parties and hailed it as a historic document, as if nothing had happened. Actually, the declaration was an eclectic collection of Marxist-Leninist views and militant Communist slogans which could serve to justify both the Soviet and the Chinese Communist positions; and the way in which it was variously interpreted in Moscow, Peking, and Tirana made it clear that behind the facade of unity the old ideological disagreements still remained.

In fact, the ink had scarcely dried on the Moscow declaration before intra-bloc conflict broke out anew. As Khrushchev could not very well strike directly at his Chinese Communist rival, he decided to denounce Mao Tse-tung's supporters within the Soviet European orbit—*i.e.*, the Albanian Communist leaders. The attack was delivered through the East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht, who specifically accused Hoxha of dogmatism and sectarianism. The charges were made at a meeting of the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party's Central Committee and published in *Neues Deutschland* on December 20, 1960. This marked the first time that the leader of one bloc Communist party had levelled such accusations against that of another, and it indicated how serious the situation had become. Khrushchev himself showed his anger at Hoxha and Shehu by failing to address them as "Dear Comrades"—the traditional wording—in his message of New Year greetings for 1961, and he made the slight even more conspicuous by sending his personal greetings to Tito on the same occasion.

The increasing Soviet pressure on the Albanian party after the summer of 1960 did not induce Hoxha to change his attitude. On the contrary, he carried out a ruthless purge of those in the party leadership who did not agree with him. In September a curt announcement from Tirana stated that Liri Belishova had been expelled from the party Central Committee and the Politburo; and Kocho Tashko, in charge of party and state control, from the party itself. Belishova, one of the founders of the party and heroine of partisan warfare, was accused of grave deviations from the party line; Tashko, who had had Marxist-Leninist training in Moscow in the 1930's after serving as Albanian consul in New York, was alleged to have engaged in hostile activities against the regime. No further explanations were given as to what their offenses had in fact been, and they just faded from the political scene. There were strong rumors that a thorough purge of subordinate party and state officials was carried out all over the country, and that many were arrested and, in some cases, executed. Later developments have given substance to these rumors, lifting the curtain on a truly appalling situation.

Hoxha on the Warpath

The deadly struggle waged among the top-ranking leaders was undoubtedly the reason why the Albanian party's Fourth Congress was twice postponed. It finally convened on February 13, 1961, and lasted eight days, with 800 delegates attending. The proceedings testified to Hoxha's victory in the inner-party struggle, proving to be a stage-managed demonstration of the personality cult in the best Stalinist tradition. Newspaper accounts made the congress seem like a grotesque apotheosis of Hoxha, who was extolled by the delegates as the accomplished Marxist-Leninist, the founder and unerring leader of the party, the beloved son of the Albanian people, and so on. Every single speaker began by praising his leadership; women brought hand-made presents to offer him; children recited dithyrambic poems composed in his honor.

In this atmosphere of adulation, Hoxha felt that he could afford to be defiant. He began his lengthy report to the congress [7] with a fierce attack on the "Western imperialists" and their "lackeys," the Yugoslav Communists. He singled out the United States in particular as the gendarme of world reaction, the opponent of liberal movements everywhere, and the seeker of new colonies. Charging that the new administration in Washington is pledged to a continuation of the arms race and of policies of aggression, cold war, and blackmail, he

[6] Just before this article went to press, *The Guardian* (Manchester) on June 9 carried a report by its Soviet affairs expert, Victor Zorza, giving the gist of an unprecedentedly bitter attack on the Soviet party leadership purportedly delivered by Hoxha on November 16, 1960, at the Moscow conference. According to the report, said to be based on a first-hand account of the speech obtained from a most reliable source, Hoxha accused the Soviet leaders, and Khrushchev in particular, of having maneuvered at the Bucharest party congress of July 1960 to force the bloc parties into a condemnation of the Chinese Communists as "dogmatists," and of having exerted further pressure on the Albanian party leadership by cutting down promised Soviet grain shipments last autumn at a time when Albania was facing famine. He further accused Soviet representatives in Albania of trying to foment rebellion against the party leadership within the Albanian army, and charged that Soviet military leaders (Marshals Malinovsky and Grechko) had threatened the expulsion of Albania from the bloc and the Warsaw Pact.

[7] The text of the report took up fourteen pages in *Zeri i Popullit*, February 14, 1961.

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denounced President Kennedy on the ground that he had gone farther than his predecessor in promising liberation from communism to the "people's democracies." The "imperialist warmongers" can never become peace-loving, he declared, but a new war will end in the total collapse of imperialism and the final liquidation of the capitalist system.

Shifting his attack to Tito and the Yugoslav Communists, Hoxha was able to quote the Moscow declaration of December 1960 to the effect that the Yugoslav "revisionists" were neither for peace nor for socialism. He accused them of being militarily associated with the NATO powers through the Balkan Pact and of working hand in hand with the imperialists to undermine the unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement. Tito and his party, Hoxha alleged, had shown implacable hostility towards the Albanian People's Republic and were making systematic efforts to liquidate its present regime and destroy the Albanian Workers' Party and its leaders. Facts and figures were cited at the congress purporting to show the activities of Yugoslav diversionists, saboteurs, and spies on Albanian territory, and Hoxha himself announced that the secret police had discovered a plot, organized by Yugoslavia and Greece, to overthrow the Communist regime and restore capitalism in Albania. The plot was alleged to involve some Albanian emigres as well as traitors inside the country, and to have had the cooperation of the United States Sixth Fleet. Hoxha's further statement that the traitors within Albania had been arrested and the relevant documents placed in the hands of the judicial authorities suggested that preparations were under way for the staging of a big show-trial.[8]

In the ideological sphere, Hoxha placed heavy emphasis on the Albanian party's consistent adherence to Marxist-Leninist policies in building socialism and fighting revisionism. That his own party's brand of Marxism-Leninism is at variance with the current Moscow version, however, was plainly evident from the fact that Hoxha quoted Stalin three times to make his points while failing to mention Khrushchev's name even once. Premier Shehu, in reporting to the congress on the Third Five-Year Plan, went even farther than Hoxha: at least by implication, he accused the Soviet party leader of mistakenly trying to revise Lenin's theory on imperialism.[9]

Party Congress Polemics

It was left to the "fraternal delegates" from the Soviet and other bloc Communist parties to redress the balance. P. N. Pospelov, delivering the greetings of the CPSU, centered his speech around the personality of Khrushchev, the builder of communism in the Soviet Union and the organizer of the Moscow conference of world Communist leaders. He emphasized that Communists have the role not only of fighters against misery and exploitation, but also of saviors of mankind from the calamity of a new and devastating war. The choice, he declared, lies between peaceful coexistence and a new conflagration which no sane person could envisage in cold blood.

The Polish delegate was even more outspoken in upholding the Soviet position. Those who stick to outworn ideas about the inevitability of war, he declared, jeopardize the success of the policy of peaceful coexistence promoted by Premier Khrushchev and other Communist leaders, and anything going counter to that policy does great harm to the cause of peace and socialism. The Polish spokesman stressed that the struggle within the international Communist movement must be waged equally against revisionism and dogmatism, considering that the latter deviation could become most dangerous if not unfailingly denounced. "It is the economic and military power of the Soviet Union," he concluded, "that keeps the imperialist aggressors at bay."[10]

From the Chinese, however, Hoxha received a pat on the back. Conveying to the congress not only the greetings of the CPC but also the personal felicitations of Mao Tse-tung, the delegate from Peking expressed gratification at finding the heroic Albanian people united around its beloved leader, Enver Hoxha. He warmly praised the Albanian party for its steadfast fight against the "imperialist warmongers" and "American aggressors," as well as for its valuable contribution to the preservation of the purity of Marxism-Leninism through its struggle against Yugoslav revisionism. The Moscow declaration of December 1960, he declared, had dealt both the Yugoslav revisionists and the imperialists a heavy blow—a blow that was vitally necessary because

[8] The trial finally took place in Tirana during the latter half of May and proved to be a stage-managed parody of justice in the Stalinist tradition, obviously designed to stir up popular hostility towards Yugoslavia, Greece, and the United States. A special tribunal for crimes against the state, after twelve days of testimony, found the principal accused, Rear-Admiral Teme Sejko, and nine other defendants guilty of a criminal conspiracy against the present regime, allegedly "hatched in cooperation with the Yugoslav revisionists, the Greek monarcho-facists, and the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean." Sejko and three others were sentenced to death and executed, and the remaining six received prison sentences of 15-25 years. The trial was conspicuously ignored by the Soviet press and radio.

[9] *Zeri i Popullit,* February 18, 1961.

[10] *Ibid.,* February 17, 1961.

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of the still very real danger of a war unleashed by the United States.[11]

The split which some Western observers had thought might develop at the congress as a result of Soviet instigation failed to materialize, and the proceedings ended in a complete triumph for Hoxha. He was unanimously re-elected first secretary of the party, and all his nominees were similarly elected to the Central Committee. Except for those who had already been purged, it was the same old gang who retained command of the party.

His grip on the party leadership strengthened, Hoxha has continued his defiant attitude towards Moscow. He failed to attend the March 1961 Warsaw Pact conference in the Soviet capital, in which the party first secretaries of the other pact signatories participated. According to some reports, Khrushchev intended to make the attitude of the Albanian Communists a subject of discussion at the conference. There has been no corroboration of these reports, but it is perhaps of some significance that the final communique of the conference was published in the Albanian party organ, *Zeri i Popullit* (March 31), without editorial comment.

Economic Achilles' Heel

But however important the ideological and political differences between Moscow and Tirana may be, economic factors in the last analysis will probably be decisive. Ever since taking power sixteen years ago, the Albanian Communists have blindly followed the Soviet model of rapid industrialization and total collectivization of agriculture. So far, however, the industrialization program has been haphazard and economically unsound. A number of enterprises have been built as show-pieces —a textile combine, a hydroelectric power station, an oil refinery, a short railway line, and some cement, sugar, and other small factories. But Albania's greatest economic asset lies in its mineral resources: iron, copper, chromium, bitumen, oil, etc. The Russians have been very much interested in obtaining Albanian metal ores (except iron) and have made great efforts to promote increased production by supplying Albania with the necessary machinery and equipment as well as with engineers, technicians, and even skilled workers. Everything was furnished on credit, and the Albanians have not been in a position to repay these Soviet loans.

When Hoxha and Premier Shehu visited the USSR in April 1957, Khrushchev made a grand gesture by cancelling Albania's accumulated debt and arrears of interest to the amount of 420 million rubles, announcing that the Soviet Union made a gift of all the industrial machinery and equipment that had been furnished to Albania up till then. The Soviet government simultaneously agreed to supply 31 million rubles worth of wheat, vegetable oils, rice, and other food products during the first part of 1958, again on a deferred payment basis, in order to enable Albania to abolish food rationing.

Further Soviet aid was extended to Albania in July 1959, three months after Khrushchev's return visit to Tirana. Besides offering to build a Palace of Culture as a gift to the Albanian people, the Soviet government entered into a financial and trade agreement granting Albania a new long-term credit of 300 million rubles, to be used mainly for purchasing additional Soviet machinery and equipment that would be needed under Albania's third Five-Year Plan starting in 1961. A large number of Soviet experts in economic planning and industrial management and technology were sent to Albania to take part in drawing up the plan itself and preparing for its fulfillment. Although no further information is available as to how the loan is being used, there is no question that it increases Albania's economic dependence on the Soviet Union.

This dependence is clearly evidenced by Soviet foreign trade statistics for 1959, the latest year for which they have been published. Soviet exports to Albania in that year reached a value of 195 million rubles as against imports from that country of only 59 million rubles, *i.e.*, a ratio of more than 3:1 in Albania's disfavor, resulting in a trade deficit of 136 million rubles. Among the items imported into Albania were 94,300 tons of wheat, which in itself sheds light on the disastrous effects of the regime's Soviet-dictated economic policies. Albania was and still is essentially an agricultural country, and it could easily have achieved self-sufficiency in food supplies within a few years if there had been a modest effort to modernize methods of cultivation, to introduce selected seeds and chemical fertilizers, and to provide adequate flood control. But the regime's imposition of compulsory Soviet-style collectivization had the opposite effect; it brought chaos to the countryside and drove thousands of peasants to flee the villages and even the country.

ON THE NEWLY-FORMED collective farms, incompetence, neglect, disorganization, and the squandering of precious property inevitably produced poor economic results. At the same time, the Communists encouraged the production of industrial raw materials by offering

[11] *Ibid.*, February 16, 1961.

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high prices and other inducements, with the result that an increasing proportion of total cultivated acreage was sown to cotton, tobacco, and sugar beets at the expense of food grains. Hoxha himself documented this by telling the Fourth Party Congress in February that, between 1955 and 1960, the production of bread grains increased by a mere 3.2 percent as against increases of 70.8 percent for cotton and 87.3 percent for tobacco. After having solemnly promised long ago that Albania would become self-sufficient in grain production by the end of 1960, he had to admit that this target not only had not been reached but still remained a long way off.

In spite of these deplorable results, there are no signs of a change in economic policy. Collectivization having been practically completed, the regime's next step will apparently be to amalgamate the collective farms into larger units. Industrial development is to continue at more or less the same pace, with the accent still placed on heavy industry. The third Five-Year Plan also sets very high targets for the production of metal ores, although the target for petroleum is not very impressive (an annual output of 1.1 million tons by 1965). In agriculture, the plan calls for production increases of 95 percent in grain, 65 percent in cotton, 112 percent in tobacco, and 75 percent in sugar-beets over the period of the plan.

No less than 400 new construction projects are scheduled under the plan, including mining installations and metallurgical, chemical and other industrial plants to be built with the help of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China. Although Premier Shehu told the party congress that the financing of these projects was assured, no new credit agreement appears to have been reached so far with the Soviet Union. In January and February, however, the government announced the conclusion of a series of new trade and financial agreements with Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany providing for exchanges of goods during the current year as well as for the opening of credits in those countries for Albanian purchases of machinery and equipment needed to carry out scheduled projects under the new Five-Year Plan.[12] Of still greater significance was the conclusion of a similar agreement with Communist China, signed in Peking on April 23 by an Albanian delegation headed by the Minister of Trade. By this agreement, Communist China undertook to supply Albania with capital equipment and technical assistance for a number of planned industrial projects and to grant a loan of 500 million old rubles (112.5 million new rubles) to be used for this purpose.[13]

The Path Ahead

These developments, particularly the aid agreement with Communist China, suggest that the Albanian Communist leaders are trying to emancipate themselves from Soviet economic domination and thereby place themselves in a better position to defy any efforts by Moscow to make them toe the Khrushchev line on peaceful coexistence, "Western imperialism" and Yugoslav revisionism. As far as can be seen at present, the Soviet leadership is refraining from any drastic and resolute measures to force a change in Hoxha's policy or his replacement by a more docile stooge. By an irony of history, the geographical isolation of Albania, instead of exposing the country to danger from the capitalistic West, is serving as a protective shield against the Communist bloc.

Khrushchev must feel frustrated indeed at his inability to employ in Albania the tactics of subversion which his underlings are utilizing with such effectiveness and impunity in Laos and southern Vietnam. But if such methods are not open to him, neither can he afford to resort to a more direct and extreme form of intervention which might impel the Albanian Communist leaders to turn towards reconciliation with the West. The last thing that Khrushchev would like to have happen would be for Albania to become another Yugoslavia, especially since it would mean the loss of the Valona naval base which gives the Soviet fleet an outpost on the shores of the Mediterranean. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that Hoxha and his followers may well be able to go on playing their present game vis-à-vis Moscow, at least so long as the rift between Moscow and Peking continues.

[12] For announced terms of these agreements, see *Zeri i Popullit*, January 13, 15, 24, and February 8, 1961.

[13] *Ibid.*, April 26, 1961.

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The Soviet Economy: Three Aspects

EDITORS' NOTE: "Now we consider our heavy industry as built," declared Premier Khrushchev last May. "So we are not going to give it priority. Light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same pace." This, after 43 years of drastic exploitation of the Soviet civilian population for the benefit of heavy-industry construction, is news indeed; the good faith of the promise will be tested soon, at the 22nd CPSU Congress meeting in Moscow this October. Obviously, the continuing deficiencies in the supply of food and consumer products and the appalling housing conditions that continue to plague Soviet consumers have been serious enough to elicit from the party leadership a spate of new promises. The three articles below deal with some of the problems awaiting Mr. Khrushchev's attention: Mr. Ballard presents in his paper an analysis of the current drive to transform the institutional structure of Soviet agriculture; Professor Balinky's article focuses on some of the official policies that have impeded progress in Soviet housing development; and Mrs. Erro, finally, puts under careful scrutiny the Soviet statistics—and promises—on consumers goods, by comparing Soviet and American figures in this field.

An End to Collective Farms?

By Allen B. Ballard, Jr.

IN THE PAST THREE YEARS, Soviet journals have been full of articles discussing the means by which public property and "*kolkhoz*-cooperative" property can be merged. At the base of these discussions lies the question of how to put an end to the anomalous situation whereby an avowedly socialist state, supposedly on the verge of entering the higher stage of communism, still tolerates a farm organization, the *kolkhoz,* which combines features of both communal property and private property.

A grasp of this situation requires, at the outset, an understanding of the difference between the *kolkhoz*—still the basic form of organization of agricultural production in the Soviet Union—and the *sovkhoz,* or state-owned farm, on which the regime has laid increasing emphasis in the post-Stalin period. The *kolkhoz,* by formal definition, is a voluntary association of peasants who have agreed to pool their resources in order to obtain the benefits of group cultivation of the soil. By law, its ruling body is a general assembly of the collective farmers, which is empowered to elect a chairman and board of managers to administer the affairs of the

Mr. Ballard, who will join the Department of Government at City College, New York, this coming fall, has for the past few years specialized in administrative problems of Soviet agriculture. In the academic year 1959-1960, he was an exchange graduate student at Moscow's Timiryzevskaia Agricultural Academy and was allowed to spend one month on a sovkhoz *for the purpose of observing the administration of the farm.*

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farm. In practice, however, most aspects of the economic and political life of the collective farms are under the control of local party and state organs. The collective farmers have two sources of income: the sale of the produce of their private plots, which range in size from one-quarter to a full hectare; and a share of the income of the collective sector of the farm, after deliveries to the state and other compulsory deductions have been made.

During most of the history of the *kolkhozy,* collective farmers have been paid yearly on the basis of accumulated "workdays," a unit of measure calculated to gauge the amount of labor which the individual peasant contributed to the communal sector of the farm. The payment received was usually both in money and in kind. Recently, however, there has been a trend toward paying the peasants "advances" at regular monthly or quarterly periods. This has been accompanied by efforts to substitute money payments for payments in produce. In addition, some *kolkhozy* have begun to transfer to a system of "norming" labor on the basis of monetary rather than workday standards. These new developments mark an approach to the method of payment on the state farms, where the workers are guaranteed monthly cash wages provided norms are fulfilled.

State farms, as the name implies, are governmental establishments, and they have long been regarded as the highest form of the socialist organization of agriculture. Here, there has been no pretense at democracy, for the director and his chief specialists are appointed by the state, and *sovkhoz* workers are subjected to the same discipline and rules as those which exist in factories. Indeed, in the early 1930's the state farms were known as "grain factories."

THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE recent statement of the regime's view of the *kolkhozy* was provided by Nikita Khrushchev at the 21st Party Congress in January 1959, when he declared that the *kolkhozy* would be raised to the level of public property in four ways: (1) through the growth of the indivisible funds of the collective farms (to be explained); (2) through increased participation by collective farmers in the work of the communal sector of the *kolkhozy;* (3) through the development of inter-*kolkhoz* unions; (4) through greater mechanization and electrification of the countryside. He denied, however, any intention of converting *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy:*

The historically inevitable merger of cooperative-collective farm and public forms of property will occur in the future not as a result of the curtailment of cooperative-*kolkhoz* property, but by means of a raising of its level of socialization with aid and support from the state.[1]

Khrushchev's assurance notwithstanding, there has been a steady trend toward the "sovkhozization" of collective farms since 1954. A recent move in this direction took place in March 1960, when the CPSU Central Committee ordered the transformation of 365 of the Moscow Oblast's 615 *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy.* At the time this writer was in Moscow and personally witnessed the excitement caused by the announcement in the Department of the Organization of Socialist Agriculture of the Timiryzevskaia Academy. Many of the faculty members felt that the move was ill-timed since it would disrupt the organization of the farms just before the start of the spring planting;[2] nevertheless, the conversion was accomplished within a month. The chairman of one of the collective farms affected described the mechanics of the process to the writer. On the first of March, he received a directive informing him that his collective farm, along with four others, was to be formed into a new *sovkhoz.* Four days later, a party representative of the *oblast* (region) addressed a meeting of the collective farm workers and emphasized that they would not be deprived of their private plots upon entry into the *sovkhoz.* Thereupon, a vote was taken and the farmers unanimously agreed to become state farm workers. As the chairman said, "there was nothing else for them to do, it was a party order." Later, reports of similar conversions came into the Academy from places as diverse as the Yakutsk, Krasnodar, and Yaroslavl regions.

The sovkhozization which occured in 1960 was the latest manifestation of a drive that in the last seven years has brought about a major change in the relative share of *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy* in Soviet agricultural production. Land sown to grain offers an example: in 1953 *kolkhoz* fields accounted for 89.5 percent of such acreage, compared to the *sovkhozy's* 8.7 percent; by 1959 the *kolkhoz* share had diminished to 66.8 percent while the *sovkhoz* proportion had risen to 32 percent.[3] Part

[1] Stenographic report of the 21st CPSU Congress, Jan. 27-Feb. 5, 1959, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1959, Vol. I, p. 102. (All footnote references are in the Russian language unless otherwise noted.)

[2] That they might have been correct is indicated by Khrushchev's later quotation of a letter from an official on one of the farms affected, reporting that: "The milk yield per cow dropped 550 liters in a year. In 1959 the collective farm produced 591,000 eggs, but in 1960 the state farm produced only 280,000." See Khrushchev's speech to the party Central Committee, Jan. 17, 1961, published in *Pravda,* Jan. 21.

[3] See table in *Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR,* Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1960, p. 130.

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of this increase was due to the expansion of state farms into the new "virgin lands," but well over half of the additional state farm land has been taken from collective farms. A brief examination of the past history of the *sovkhozy* will shed some light on the significance of the present development.

The State Farms in Soviet History

The first move to create state farms came in April 1917, when Lenin called for "the creation from each large estate . . . of model farms under the control of *batrak* deputies, at the expense of the community."[4] However, attempts to form such establishments in 1918 and 1919 proved extremely unpopular among the peasantry, who could see no difference between the new *sovkhozy* and the old landlord estates. Given this situation, Lenin in December 1919 limited the number of state farms to be created:

Otherwise we won't obtain an alliance with the middle peasantry and this alliance is indispensable to us. . . . Do we need an alliance with the Ukrainian peasantry? I say "yes," and therefore we must give up a number of state farms for what is, in fact, a *razdel*.[5]

In the period of the New Economic Policy after 1921 (marking a general retreat from socialization), the *sovkhozy*, neglected by the state and despoiled of their land and inventory by local soviets and peasants, were almost liquidated. But as collectivization approached, the party thrust upon them the role of leading the countryside into socialism. At first the party moved cautiously: a resolution of July 1928 ordered the development of a network of new "giant" *sovkhozy*, but specified that they be located in sparsely populated areas, meaning in effect regions of submarginal soil and low rainfall—an indication of the degree to which the regime was still sensitive to peasant dislike of the "grain factories."

However, as the tempo of collectivization rose towards the end of 1929, the party suddenly decided on an effort to create "in all possible cases, under the direction of industrial establishments and *sovkhozy*, mixed *sovkhoz-kolkhoz* unions with common economic plans, a common technical base (tractor columns, repair shops, *etc.*) with a common factory for the processing of agricultural produce."[6] Although there are no statistics on the number of such unions formed in the early months of 1930, one contemporary writer reported that the authorities had engaged "in a mass confiscation of land from . . . *kolkhozniki* [collective farmers] and from individual poor and middle peasant farms for the *sovkhozy*," undertaken over a widespread area.[7]

The party's sponsorship of such unions ended with Stalin's "Dizzy from Success" speech in March 1930, after it became clear that the peasants still looked upon the *sovkhozy* as landlord estates, staffed with "new masters from the city." Indeed, by 1930 one newspaper termed the forced merger of *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy* as a "most evil 'exaggeration' which only feeds *kulak* agitation directed against the destruction of the *kolkhoz* movement."[8] The Sixth Congress of Soviets virtually repudiated the party's 1929 decision by declaring that:

All attempts of any nature to identify *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy*, to create premature *sovkhoz-kolkhoz* unions, not to speak of subjecting the *kolkhozy* to the *sovkhozy*, this conference views as a gross violation of Soviet power.[9]

In later years of the Stalin era, this abortive campaign was rarely mentioned—or if it was, an attempt was made to blame the plan on Trotskyite inspiration. As late as 1952 one account asserted:

According to this counterrevolutionary theory, it was proposed to unite *kolkhozy* with *sovkhozy* . . . , and the peasants, by means of nationalization of their means of production, were to be transferred into workers of a *sovkhoz*.[10]

Thus the party's own program, sanctioned by Stalin, had by some strange Bolshevik alchemy been transmuted into an anti-party heresy.

Post-Stalin Policy

The new swing toward sovkhozization in the post-Stalin era—once again legitimized, of course, in ideology—thus represents the third major effort of the Soviet regime to expand the state form of farm organization. The most valuable source of information on *sovkhoz*

[4] V. I. Lenin, *On the Union of the Working Class and the Peasantry*, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1954 ed., p. 340.
[5] Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 4th ed., *Moscow*, 1950, Vol. 30, pp. 171-72.
[6] Decision of the CC Plenum, November 1929; text in *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh* (CPSU Resolutions), 1954, Part II, p. 651.
[7] P. Samoilovich, "On the Struggle against Bourgeois Tendencies in State Farms," *Partiinoe stroitelstvo*, No. 24, December 1931, p. 20.
[8] *Selskokhoziaistvennaia gazeta*, May 20, 1930.
[9] Text of the Congress resolution in *Na agrarnom fronte*, No. 2, February 1931, p. 106.
[10] V. E. Turchin, *The Role of the Political Section in the . . . Strengthening of State Grain Farms during the . . . Second Five-Year Plan*, unpublished dissertation for the Candidate Degree in Historical Sciences, Moscow State University, Moscow, 1952, p. 23.

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development since 1953 has been provided by one S. M. Kitabova, in a dissertation entitled *The Experience of the Work of Sovkhozy Created On the Base of Economically Weak Kolkhozy,* dated 1959.[11] According to Kitabova, some 1,039 new *sovkhozy* were created from *kolkhozy* during the period 1954-58. Moreover, 1,184 *sovkhozy* already in existence were expanded by attaching *kolkhozy* to them. In all, writes Kitabova, 73.978 million hectares of collective farm land (including 20.986 million hectares of plowed land) as well as the inventory of 6,233 *kolkhozy* and 670 Machine Tractor Stations, were transferred to *sovkhozy* in this period.

According to another official source, the amount of *sovkhoz* plowed land increased from 15.515 to 52.541 million hectares between 1953 and 1958.[12] If as Kitabova states, 20.986 million hectares of this increment were transferred from *kolkhozy,* only 16.307 million hectares came from *sovkhoz* expansion into the new lands. In other words, well over half of the plowed acreage accruing to the *sovkhozy* was taken from *kolkhozy.*

The first conversions of *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy* were undertaken from 1954 to 1956 in the western regions of the USSR, where the ravages of war had drastically reduced peasant manpower, accounting for a disastrous drop in *kolkhoz* productivity. Thus, in 1952 and 1953, the average grain yield on 102 *kolkhozy* of the Kaluzhskaia Oblast was 3.2 centners a hectare as compared with a prerevolutionary yield in the same region of 6.6. centners a hectare.[13] It was felt that crop yields on *kolkhozy* in such areas could be considerably increased if the collective farms were merged to form *sovkhozy.*

The second wave of sovkhozization came primarily in the virgin lands where, between 1954 and 1956, Machine Tractor Stations upturned a total of 20 million new hectares of land. Initially this land was added to the acreage of existing *kolkhozy* in the region; only later were *sovkhozy* formed. As Kitabova explains:

The sown land of a number of *kolkhozy* in Kazakhstan, Siberia, and the Urals was increased many times, while at the same time, the number of able-bodied *kolkhozniki* remained constant and the load on each collective farmer rose sharply.

As an extreme example, he cites one collective farm where the amount of land per *kolkhoznik* increased from 18 to 65 hectares in two years.[14] Consequently, it was found on some farms that MTS employees and imported seasonal labor were contributing far more labor than the *kolkhozniki* themselves. Since the state's contribution to the productive activities of such farms was so large, it was decided that the *kolkhozniki* were receiving undue benefits; therefore, in 1956 and 1957, many new-lands *kolkhozy* were formed into *sovkhozy.*

That the welfare of the farmers was not an overriding consideration in such transformations is clear from a transparently-doctored description in *Partiinaia zhizn* of the incorporation of the *kolkhoz* "Krasnaia Zara" into a *sovkhoz.*[15] Here, it was said, the collective farmers lived well: "they received for every labor day three kilograms of grain and 23 rubles of money." But the *kolkhozniki* knew themselves to be parasites because much of the work on the farm was performed by a Machine Tractor Station. Ashamed of themselves for living off the labor of the MTS, they pleaded that the state either "take the land away from us or unite us with a *sovkhoz.*"

Recent Developments

The past three years have witnessed a third stage in the transformation of *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy*—though one of relatively minor proportions compared to the major drive between 1954 and 1958.[16] This newest phase has been impelled by two factors: on one hand, a plan sponsored by Khrushchev to develop specialized state farms around urban centers; and on the other, pressures from *raion* and *oblast* (district and regional) authorities to have *kolkhozy* under their jurisdictions amalgamated into *sovkhozy.* Interestingly, the regime, while pushing its own plan, has shown resistance to the latter pressures; its attitude is reflected in the following statement of an RSFSR official at the January 1961 plenum of the Central Committee:

Unquestionably we shall set up specialized state farms to improve the supply of milk and potatoes and other vegetables to the public . . . , particularly in the environs of large cities and industrial centers. But this should by no means lead to the mass conversion of collective farms into state farms. . . . Those who seek to convert [collectives]

[11] S. M. Kitabova, unpublished dissertation for the Candidate Degree in Economic Sciences, Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU, Moscow, 1959, pp. 56-57.

[12] Both figures from *Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR, supra,* p. 128.

[13] Kitabova, *op. cit.,* p. 45.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 50.

[15] I. Korshunov, "Restless Duty," *Partiinaia zhizn,* No. 6, 1957, p. 45.

[16] In 1958-59, 494 new *sovkhozy* were created and total state farm plowed acreage increased by 1.5 million hectares. The number of *kolkhozy* dropped from 69,129 to 54,596, but their total sown acreage decreased only 1.14 million hectares. The reduced number of *kolkhozy* was due both to mergers among collective farms themselves and to their incorporation into *sovkhozy,* though in what ratio is not clear. For figures see *Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR,* pp. 492 and 128.

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into state farms are actually trying to avoid the troubles of strengthening the collective farms and want to make life easier for themselves.[17]

This theme was sounded earlier in an article in *Nash sovremennik* which stated that many local officials, in asking that *kolkhozy* be merged into *sovkhozy,* are trying to gain "deliverance from economically weak collectives, and sometimes simply to lighten their work in the administration of agriculture. . . ."[18] A high official in one area (Stavropolskii Krai) has been quoted as saying that the formation of state farms from collectives had "greatly simplified the administration of the farms" in his region. He explained:

The establishment of 45 new *sovkhozy* freed about 3500 men formerly occupying different administrative posts in the MTS and the *kolkhozy*. . . . This is one of the means of solving the problem of the relationship between the Machine Tractor Stations and the *kolkhozy*.[19]

Unfortunately, Soviet comments on the subject of local pressures give no real reason why the conversion of *kolkhozy* should lessen the problems of control or administration. There are, however, three possible explanations, each of which will be considered in turn.

FIRST, historically the *sovkhozy* have been under a much higher degree of centralized control than the collective farms. Until 1943, the party organizations of the state farms (*polit-otdels*) were directly responsible both to the political administration of the central Ministry of State Farms and to *krai* (territory) and *oblast* party units, but they were not subordinated to *raion* party committees. This resulted in a situation in which some "*raikoms* [district party committees] regarded the *sovkhozy* as alien and strange establishments having no relation to them."[20] Although *raikoms* are now supposed to direct the activities of *sovkhoz* party organizations, there is evidence that some still look upon the state farms as being the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and not that of the *raion*. A 1958 study referred to a complaint of party authorities in the Krasnodar Krai that "some secretaries of the *raikoms* of the partly incorrectly thought that *sovkhozy,* as state establishments, could cope with . . . problems without special interference by party organs, and therefore displayed only a cursory interest in the *sovkhozy*."[21] A more recent article in *Sovetskaia Moldavia* (April 7, 1961) quotes the director of a *sovkhoz,* newly formed from collectives, as complaining that needed supplies are not received because "the *raion* organization sends us to the trust of *sovkhozy* and other republican organs, and they [send us back] to the *raion*." Thus, one possible explanation behind local pressure for sovkhozization is the belief of some officials that they will be relieved of some of the responsibility for the economic performance of the state farms—or at least given the opportunity to shift blame onto the Ministry of Agriculture in case of failure to meet planned goals.

A second explanation was advanced to this writer by a Soviet professor who specialized in agriculture. It was his contention that the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations, along with Khrushchev's reforms granting the collective farms greater autonomy in internal administration, had had two results: (1) The *raion* secretaries suddenly found themselves deprived of the buffer formerly provided by the MTS party secretary and therefore became personally responsible for *kolkhoz* affairs; (2) Some collective farms mistakenly took the reforms to mean that they were no longer answerable to *raion* authorities. Thereupon, according to the professor, *raion* officials began to exert pressures for the transformation of the *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy,* since this would again interpose a responsible party secretary (the head of the state-farm party organization) between the *raikom* and the farms, while at the same time subjecting the agriculture of the district to tight centralized control.

The third possible reason for the attitude of local officialdom resides in the fact that the *kolkhozniki* still show great reluctance to engage in work on the communal sector of the farm. A constant theme of conversations with my colleagues—all former *kolkhoz* and MTS officials—at the agricultural Academy was the difficulty encountered in making the collective farmers live up to resolutions taken at general meetings of a *kolkhoz*. One former *kolkhoz* chairman, whose farm had become part of a *sovkhoz* remarked: "It served the rascals right. Now they'll have to work." That state farm officials are expected to exert more authority than their *kolkhoz* counterparts is underscored, if by negative example, by a complaint concerning *sovkhoz* organization in Kazakhstan: "Many specialists from among the former workers of the MTS and the *kolkhozy* . . .

[17] Report by D. S. Polianski, Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, *Pravda,* Jan. 12, 1961, pp. 1-3.
[18] V. P. Roshin, "The Situation of Weak *Kolkhozy* and How to deal with Them," *Nash sovremennik,* No. 5, 1960, p. 177.
[19] Ivan Vinnichenko, "The Times Don't Wait," *Oktiabr,* No. 11, November 1957, p. 220.
[20] *Sovkhoznaia gazeta,* April 3, 1935, p. 2.
[21] F. E. Ermakov, *The Communist Party in the Struggle for the Further Rise of Sovkhoz Production, 1953-56,* unpublished dissertation for the Candidate Degree in Historical Sciences, Moscow Pedagogical Institute, Moscow, 1958, p. 79.

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still do not feel themselves "bosses" in their field of activity and continue to remain in the role of advisors, as they were on the *kolkhozy*." [22] What ever variations in discipline there may be, Kitabova makes a major point of demonstrating the increase in the number of days worked, once collective farmers are transformed to the "higher" status of *sovkhoz* laborers.[23] Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that some local party organizations feel that there will be more assurance of plan fulfillment if the collectives are merged into state farms.

Problems of Conversion

One of the first major problems that the party had to decide upon in converting *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy* was the disposition of the indivisible funds of the collective farms. These funds—which include both money and the capital equipment of the farms—are supposed to constitute communal property, although the fund cannot be distributed among the peasants. Legally the indivisible fund belongs to the *kolkhoz* and not to the state.

In the first phase of post-Stalin sovkhozization, *kolkhozy* scheduled for merger were theoretically compensated by the state for their indivisible fund (including agricultural inventory, seed fund, draft animals, feed reserves and buildings); in addition, the *kolkhozniki* were paid for all workday credits due them. In practice, however the money compensation paid for the fund was also treated as indivisible and was not distributed among the peasants; thus it was ultimately transferred to the new *sovkhoz*. In effect, the payment was a symbolic act, which resulted merely in double-counting.

In May 1957, a joint decree of the USSR Council of Ministers and the party Central Committee declared that henceforth *kolkhozy* undergoing conversion would receive no compensation except the payment of workday credits due the collective members.[24] That three years passed before this decision was taken probably reflects the regime's uncertainty as to peasant reaction over this open confiscation of their property. On at least one *kolkhoz* the farmers reacted to the decree by protesting that they would sell the collective property, divide up the money, and only then go into the *sovkhoz*.[25] Nevertheless, the main line since propounded asserts that the *kolkhozniki* have come to regard the indivisible funds as public property and have "willingly" transferred them to the state. This view was first sounded by Khrushchev himself in a speech of March 27, 1958, through his habitual device of quoting with approval a letter from a *kolkhoz* chairman proclaiming: "The time has come to consider that indivisible funds properly belong to the whole people." [26]

A second problem confronting the regime has been the fate of the private plots of the collective farmers. Here Khrushchev seems to have moved carefully, for *kolkhozniki* entering a *sovkhoz* have been promised that their plots would not be diminished in size. Nevertheless, by 1959, there was a drive in at least one region (Kaluzhskaia Oblast) to reduce the private gardens of the new *sovkhoz* workers to 0.15 hectares, the land area regularly alloted to state farm laborers.[27]

Closely tied to the question of the private plots has been the problem of eliminating the numerous settlements—many unchanged since 1918—where the collective farmers live. In the Smolensk Oblast, for example, 26 new *sovkhozy* formed on the base of *kolkhozy* contained a total of 890 hamlets and small villages, in contrast to the usual location of all *sovkhoz* workers in five or six large settlements.[28] There have been complaints that the great distance between these villages and the administrative centers of the *sovkhozy* has made the rational organization of labor impossible.[29] Furthermore, some residents of the more remote settlements have apparently continued to concentrate on the cultivation of their private plots, giving only token attention to the work assigned them by the *sovkhoz* administration.[30] Efforts are being made to move such workers into more centrally located areas.

One means of breaking down the peasant's sense of identification with his *kolkhoz* has been through a gradual increase in the size of the divisions of the new *sovkhozy*. In the Kaluzhskaia Oblast, for example, 23 state farms created in 1954 originally had 101 divi-

[22] *Problems of the Economics and Organization of Agricultural Production in Sovkhozy of Kazakhstan*, Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazakh Republic, Alma-Ata, 1958, p. 142.
[23] Kitabova, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-38.
[24] On the background and issue of indivisible funds, see *ibid.*, pp. 60-62.
[25] Korshunov, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[26] N. S. Khrushchev, report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, *Pravda*, March 27, 1958. This view was elaborated by A. Chesnokov in an article in *V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniiu*, No. 4, 1958, p. 70. For a more recent, opposite view of the indivisible funds, however, see N. D. Kolesov and K. I. Kolesova in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 1, 1960, p. 13.
[27] Kitabova, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 135.
[29] *For a Mighty Upswing of Agriculture in Kazakhstan*, Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazakh Republic, 1958, p. 104.
[30] Kitabova, pp. 156-57.

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sions corresponding exactly to the incorporated *kolkhozy*, but were reorganized over three years in 57 divisions.[31] It can be assumed that this move was directed both at the more rational organization of labor and at the elimination of any lingering feeling that the peasants belonged to a particular collective farm.

IN ORDER NOT TO PAINT an entirely bleak picture of sovkhozization, it is necessary to point out some of the benefits that fall to the *kolkhozniki* upon entry into the ranks of the rural workers. First, they receive state pension rights, retroactively dated so as to include all years worked in the collective farm or other establishments since 1939 (excluding years in which they did not meet the minimum number of workdays).[32] It also appears that some new *sovkhoz* workers receive a greater total income than they did in the collective farms. A dramatic case is offered in the Kaluzhskaia Oblast, where members of 76 collective farms in 1954 earned an average income of 56 rubles a month in money and in kind (excluding private plots); by 1958 workers on the same land, reorganized in 16 *sovkhozy*, averaged 427 rubles monthly.[33] Even this exceptional figure, however, is well below the average wage of an industrial worker; indeed, the low level of farm wages goes far towards explaining why there has been no precipitous attempt to reduce the size of the private plots of the former *kolkhozniki*.

The possibility should not be excluded that some *kolkhozy* wish to have their farms amalgamated with state farms. This is particularly true in instances where a good *sovkhoz* is surrounded by average or poor collectives. Workers on the *sovkhoz* "Kuban," one of the best state farms in the Soviet Union, told this writer that a *kolkhoz* nearby had been pleading for some months to be amalgamated into the "Kuban" with the object of sharing the high standard of living there. Not unnaturally, the "Kuban" workers expressed some discontent at the prospect of sharing the wealth with their neighbors.

Accelerating and Retarding Factors

One of the primary accelerating factors in the drive to transform *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy* has been the belief that state farm grain is cheaper than collective farm grain. An article in a recent number of *Voprosy ekonomiki* states that during 1955-1958 the input of labor in man-day units for the production of grain was four times as much on collective farms as on state farms. Another source has stated that the *sovkhozy* use only half as much manpower as collectives for a given area of land.[34] This explains to some extent the drive to create state farms around urban centers, where the lure of higher wages draws many young peasants into the cities and greatly lowers the number of able-bodied workers on the *kolkhozy*. Members of the economics faculty at the Timiryzevskaia Academy were unanimous in the conviction that the rural labor pool left in such areas could be better utilized by state farms than by collectives. Unfortunately, there are no statistics which directly compare the performance of *kolkhozy* with that of the *sovkhozy* into which they were later merged.

It is difficult to assess the role played by ideology in the recent sovkhozization drives. According to an article in the party's theoretical monthly *Kommunist*, there are those in party circles who actively advocate the "transfer from the agricultural artel [collective] to the *sovkhoz* form, which would . . . in a greater degree correspond to the tasks of Communist construction since *sovkhozy* are based on national property."[35] It is probably true that the long-range aim of Soviet leaders, starting with Lenin, has been to organize the countryside, to whatever extent possible, into a system as susceptible of centralized control as the factories in the cities. The logical form of such organization, given the political and economic premises of Marxism-Leninism, is the state farm. Nevertheless, such authoritative party spokesmen

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 200. Statistics were not offered on 26 other collectives converted in the *oblast*. Elsewhere *Kitabova* points out that in contrast to farm members, tractor and combine operators transferred to *sovkhozy* from MTS units have experienced a drop in pay, leading to a considerable turnover and in some cases a shortage of such workers (p. 147).

According to another account, some peasants have complained of a drop in income from private plots due to the demand for more communal work on the *sovkhozy*, though to what extent this factor might affect the peasants' sum income is not clear. See I. Vinnichenko, *Thought on Communism*, Molodaia Gvardiia, Moscow, 1959.

[34] The first calculation excludes corn: see G. Kotov, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, February 1961, p. 31. The second calculation is from Roshin, *op. cit.*, p. 177. That the cheapness of producing *sovkhoz* grain may be exaggerated has been suggested by V. Semenov in *Finansy SSSR*, No. 3, March 1961: the fact that "two-thirds of the *sovkhozy* finished 1959 and 1960 with great losses" he attributes in part to the artificially low state prices paid for *sovkhoz* produce, and notes that some such prices were raised as of Jan. 1, 1961.

[35] I. Glotov, "The reorganization of the MTS and *Kolkhoz* Property," *Kommunist*, No. 5, April 1958 (Sic), p. 53.

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as Strumilin and Ostrovityanov have proclaimed that the *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy* will rise together to the stage of Communist forms of agricultural production, while Khrushchev—despite his policy of converting lagging collectives into state farms—has declared that the *kolkhoz* has not yet developed to its full potentialities.[36]

It is probable that much of Khrushchev's ideological hedging is caused by the fact that the state is not now in a position to finance the wholesale transformation of the collective farms into state farms. The cost of converting *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy* in the Moscow Oblast in 1960 was two billion rubbles, a sum equal to one-tenth of total state capital investment in agriculture during 1959.[37] In addition, the inclusion of backward *kolkhozy* in the system of state farms has had a debilitating effect on the overall performance of the *sovkhozy*. Matskevich, when still Soviet Minister of Agriculture, stated at the December 1959 Central Committee plenum that capital investment originally intended for "old" *sovkhozy* had been diverted to state farms formed from *kolkhozy*, creating serious production difficulties for both categories of *sovkhozy*.[38] He concluded with the declaration that an excessive amalgamation of collectives into state farms had resulted in a situation wherein "production of the most important types of agricultural produce [measured] per 100 hectares of land is on the whole now much lower [in the *sovkhozy*] than in the kolkhozy." In Lithuania such amalgamations caused the amount of mineral fertilizer used per hectare of state farm land to drop from 4 to 2 centners within a four-year period.[39] One director of a newly formed *sovkhoz* in the Stavropolskii Krai was quoted as saying:

Nothing is here, no house of culture, no communal *stolovaia* [dining hall]. And we don't have enough buildings for production purposes. . . . It would be a joke to tell you how many new *sovkhozy* have appeared in the *krai*. Will the state be able to allocate the necessary funds for construction? I doubt it.[40]

Finally, it is doubtful whether the state could afford to transfer all of the *kolkhozniki* to the system of guaranteed wages used in the state farms.

Summation

The overall trend in the past six years has been towards the substitution of state farms for collectives; these conversions have been accomplished without any great political upheavals on the part of the collective farmers affected. That Khrushchev was able to convert most of the *kolkhozy* in the Moscow Oblast into *sovkhozy* within a month's time is evidence of the extent to which the party's control has penetrated into the countryside. The drive, however, has for the most part been directed towards the amalgamation of backward *kolkhozy* into *sovkhozy;* it remains to be seen what peasant reaction would be to the changing of "millionaire" *kolkhozy* into state farms. It seems, however, that the primary brake on the precipitous transfer of collective farms into the higher form of state farms is economic, and not political.

Lenin shied away from large-scale construction of state farms out of a desire to maintain a political alliance with the middle and poor peasants. Stalin, after a short experiment with sovkhozization in 1939, avoided practically all mention of the subject. Khrushchev, however, seems undeterred by political considerations of peasant reactions to the confiscation of their property by *sovkhozy*.[41] In his case, the main bloc to a more ambitious program seems to be the economic cost of converting the collective farms into state farms. Thus he may yet be expected to seek the fulfillment of the long-time Soviet dream of turning the peasants into the rural counterparts of urban workers.

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[36] S. Strumilin, "Some Problems of the Further Development of the *Kolkhoz* System," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 5, May 1958, p. 40; K. Ostrovityanov, "Important Stage on the Road to Communism," *Pravda*, March 3, 1958.

[37] Roshin, *op. cit.*, p. 177. In 1959 state capital investment in agriculture was 19.8 billion rubles; *Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, p. 387.

[38] Stenographic report of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Dec. 22-25, 1959, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1960, p. 321.

[39] *Problems of the Economics and Organization of Production in the Sovkhozy of the Baltic Republic*, Latvian State Publishing House, Riga, 1959, p. 39.

[40] Vinnichenko, "The Times Don't Wait," p. 221. Another reason offered by some authorities for not pressing sovkhozization is the lack of democracy in state-farm organization. The aforementioned Matskevich has stated that the present *sovkhoz* would not be the model for farm organization under communism since "the director is not sufficiently dependent on the collective." He added that some aspects of *kolkhoz* democracy should be adopted in the *sovkhozy*, though so far no such trend has been in evidence. (See report cited in footnote 38.)

[41] An indication that a number of peasants have reacted negatively to the sovhozization program is offered by Vinnichenko in *Thought on Communism, passim.* See especially p. 148, where he quotes a *sovkhoz* foreman as remarking: ". . . have you heard, even once, [public] announcements that people are happy with the transformation into *sovkhozy* . . . ? Many, of course, dream of going back to the *kolkhoz*."

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Non-Housing Objectives of Soviet Housing Policy

By Alexander S. Balinky

THE HOUSING SHORTAGE in the USSR is that country's most critical single economic problem. Per capita living space in 1960 was barely over seven square meters,[1] or precisely what it had been in 1917. Most of the causes of this 44-year housing crisis are well known.[2] This article is concerned with one, however, that has not received the attention it merits, i.e., the dual character of Soviet housing policy.

Along with the obvious objective of providing people with dwellings, Soviet housing policy has pursued such non-housing objectives as encouraging higher labor productivity, strengthening the controls of the Communist Party, and shaping the contours of Soviet society according to party blueprints. It is the author's intent to indicate how the Soviet regime has exploited the housing shortage in the service of these special objectives and why such a policy has significantly handicapped every effort to eliminate the shortage, or at least ameliorate the housing conditions endured by the Soviet people.[3]

Housing under War Communism

The first step taken by the Bolsheviks upon inheriting an urban housing fund of 2,500,000 dwellings was to nationalize 17 percent of it, leaving 83 percent largely in the hands of social groups about to be "liquidated"—the nobility, clergy, and bourgeoisie.[4] As a result of this

[1] In his *Inside Russia Today* (Harpers, New York, 1958) John Gunther expresses this statistic in human terms: "Every citizen . . . is supposed to have nine square meters of floor space, but most do not have even half of this . . . people are crowded three, four, five or even more to a room, with disastrous social consequences. Young people cannot marry, because they can find no place to live. Scarcely any Soviet family is without a covey of in-laws living on the premises, and it is rare for any family to have its own private bath and kitchen . . . Sometimes a single doorway leads to a nest of stalls where a dozen people live . . . One reason why the streets are so thronged at night, even in the winter . . . is that homes are so unbelievably crowded, squalid, and uncomfortable."

[2] The Bolsheviks inherited a primitive and totally inadequate housing structure which reflected the semi-feudal character of Russian society (90 percent of the people prior to 1917 were engaged in agriculture, 7 percent in commerce and only 3 percent in industrial activity). Post-revolutionary chaos made new housing construction nearly impossible. The subsequent race to industrialize and build a military machine, under the Five-Year Plans (1928-1941), further aggravated the housing shortage. Industrialization forced people into urban centers at a faster pace than resources were made available with which to provide necessary housing. During World War II nearly one-half of the existing housing was destroyed or badly damaged, leaving the people worse off than before the revolution.

[3] For the limited purposes of this paper, housing policy includes the following four decisions: (1) who should have jurisdiction over the housing fund, (2) on what basis should rental rates be set, (3) on what basis should dwelling space be allocated and (4) which private property rights in housing should be protected and which denied.

[4] The number of home owners classified as "toilers" in 1917 was negligible. Some 425,000 dwellings were placed under the jurisdiction of the local soviets or municipalities. Article II of the Housing Law of August, 1918 provided that single homes and smaller apartment houses were to remain privately owned and managed and that only the "larger" ones were to be nationalized. Each local soviet was permitted to set the line of demarcation between "small" and "large" units. Moscow and Leningrad set the pattern by municipalizing all dwellings with more than five apartments. The same law, however, exempted from nationalization all dwellings in cities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants.

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policy, the private housing sector, comprising over three-fourths of the total, remained virtually unmanaged between 1917 and 1923 and deteriorated seriously. In some cases the owners fled the country, leaving their homes or apartments to be occupied by workers who simply moved in and who left the buildings entirely without repair for many years. Those owners who stayed lost the means and incentive to manage their property, for they received little, if any, rental income with which to provide for maintenance, repair and amortization (even if materials and labor had been available for this purpose). The class-inspired policy of "concentration" only made matters worse; owners were forced to live in one small section of their quarters, and the remaining space was filled to the brim with workers who had suffered the worst housing hardships under the Tsar and who unfortunately were the least able to take care of their new dwellings.

The nationalized housing sector did not fare much better. This was the period of emphasis on worker control and participation in management, and the administration of municipalized housing was allowed to fall into the hands of spontaneously-formed house management committees whose membership was mainly composed of self-appointed or elected tenants with experience in menial forms of house management but little if any administrative ability. Loosely organized, inexpertly staffed, preoccupied with the mechanics of "popular control," and short of funds for maintenance and repair, these committees concentrated on just one objective: herding the "non-working elements" into less space or ejecting them completely from municipalized housing.

The ideological basis underlying rent policy was another factor responsible for the deterioration of existing housing. Since rent was regarded as a capitalist device for the exploitation of workers, its abolition became the ultimate goal of Soviet housing policy. Short of that, the government began by declaring a moratorium on rent payments by the lowest-paid workers.[5] This was followed by the freezing of all rents and the institution of rent subsidies for those least able to pay, and by January 1921 rental payments had been abolished for almost the entire urban population.[6] Thus, rents became a weapon of class warfare rather than an instrument for the allocation of space and a source of revenue out of which to finance maintenance, repair and amortization. In short, the early policies of the Soviet regime destroyed the economic foundations of civilian housing in the USSR and were directly responsible for making the existing housing shortage far more acute than it need have been.

The NEP Period

With the advent of the New Economic Policy (NEP), five major steps were taken in an endeavor to check the mounting housing crisis: 1) Leasing of municipalized dwellings to private individuals was instituted.[7] 2) Limited permission to sell, mortgage, or bequeath housing property was reinstated. 3) Rents were reintroduced.[8] 4) Active participation by private capital in new housing construction was sought by offering free use of land[9] and other inducements. 5) Arbitrary evictions and compulsory "concentration" were abolished.

The principle behind these changes was sound, especially under the prevailing circumstances. In practice, however, improvement was meager. Denationalization was the chief feature of this period, but since only 17 percent of existing housing had been nationalized in the first place, the quantitative importance of this measure was small; and even within the nationalized sector, the results were disappointing because few individuals wished to lease to take back municipalized dwellings. Moreover, because of inordinate bureaucratic delay in the leasing procedures, some dwellings fell into such a state of disrepair that the local Soviets could not rent, lease or even give them away. There were other difficulties: property and occupancy rights remained too circumscribed to elicit much interest; the terms of leases and building rights were too short in

[5] The precise period referred to here is November 23, 1917 (first Bolshevik rent law) to July 18, 1921, when rent was reintroduced. Rent policy during this period pertained to private as well as municipalized housing.

[6] Rents were frozen at the level of July 1, 1919, by the decree of July 10, 1919. Another factor leading to a free rent policy was the collapse of the currency with its resulting inflation. Citizens were then beginning to receive wages in kind and "free rent" came to be considered such a payment.

[7] At first some of the municipalized dwellings were placed under the jurisdiction of enterprises, specially created housing trusts and other governmental agencies. However, the principal provisions of the Law of August 8, 1921, required the city soviets to compile lists of municipalized houses which, because of their size or unsuitability to municipal management, should be returned to private hands. Many of the homes actually returned turned out to be small units which had been seized by the local soviets in violation of the earlier law.

[8] It had become quite apparent that a "free rent" policy had made maintenance and repair financially impossible. The Law of July 18, 1921, which provided that occupants be charged for the cost of maintenance and repair in proportion to the space they occupied, became the entering wedge by which rent was reintroduced. By 1922 money rent was charged again.

[9] Law of August 14, 1922. Only use, but not ownership of land was offered.

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duration;[10] private owners were required to place from 10 to 30 percent of their dwelling space at the disposal of the local soviets;[11] rent scales remained tied to class considerations rather than maintenance costs;[12] and the enforcement of housing regulations by "bourgeois" owners against working-class tenants remained difficult. The effort to draw private capital into new construction proved particularly ineffectual because of the equivocal position taken by the Bolsheviks regarding the NEP. Their anxiety to assure everyone that the NEP did not really mean the resurgence of capitalism dampened much of the enthusiasm for long-range capital investment.[13] Thus the encouragement given to private initiative with one hand was taken away with the other, and the critical housing situation failed to improve.

By 1924 it was already apparent that the NEP was coming to an end and that a rebirth of the socialist spirit would follow. In a reversal of policy entirely unconnected with the housing problem as such, the regime began unilaterally liquidating privately-held leases,[14] placing most of the housing fund in the public sector.[15] The other feature distinguishing Soviet housing policy between 1924 and 1937 was the decision to place municipalized dwellings and new housing construction under the management of cooperatives.

The Cooperatives

This policy, like all the earlier ones, was not based on housing considerations *per se*. The idea of housing cooperatives was conceived and adopted because it was consistent with Leninist doctrine regarding the proper form of economic organization at that stage of socialist development. Lenin regarded cooperatives as a desirable transitional step from capitalism to socialism. He argued that workers and peasants could easily be induced to join cooperatives because that form of organization still embodied some elements of private property rights and was therefore not too revolutionary to be accepted by the masses. Lenin believed further that cooperatives could play a vital revolutionary role in teaching their members to work together for common social objectives, thereby helping the people to make the difficult transition from prerevolutionary to socialist values and modes of behavior. Accordingly, a law was enacted on August 19, 1924, formally providing for the establishment of house-leasing and dwelling construction cooperatives.[16] By 1937 almost 85 percent of all municipalized dwellings had, in fact, been handed over to cooperatives.

In view of the rapid rate of industrialization and militarization called for by the successive Five-Year Plans, no improvement in Soviet housing conditions could realistically have been anticipated. All that might have been hoped for at best was a holding of the line. In fact, however, the housing shortage grew progressively more acute during the cooperative period, and per capita living space fell from 6.45 square meters in 1923 to 4.17 in 1937. The continued application of a dual housing policy, within the cooperative framework, was again largely responsible for the decline.

An important element of this policy was the attempt to turn the housing cooperatives into an instrument for the further "liquidation" of the "parasitic" classes. The law provided that only those of working class origin or status—with one insignificant exception[17]—could join the house-leasing or dwelling construction cooperatives. This had the effect, first, of restricting the number of potential participants in a program that the government

[10] The law provided that after a certain number of years these dwellings, new or existing, were to revert to the state. Building leases, for instance, ranged from 20 to 49 years depending upon whether the building was constructed of wood or stone.

[11] Ten percent in the case of municipalized dwellings taken over by private individuals and 30 percent in the case of new houses constructed with private capital.

[12] Since the rent policy which began with the NEP was carried through into the period of the housing cooperatives, the details of that policy will be covered in the following section.

[13] Private capital tended to flow into commercial activity instead, because of the shorter period of turnover.

[14] It is common practice in the USSR to cancel an existing public obligation or contract by declaring that such a contract or obligation is contrary to the best interests of the state.

[15] By 1926, out of a total urban housing fund of 72.2 million square meters of living space, a negligible 1.4 million remained in private hands. The local soviets came to control (before the development of housing cooperatives) almost 60 percent of available housing, while the remaining 40 percent fell under the jurisdiction of the central government.

[16] The house-leasing cooperatives were set up by the simple expedient of having groups of workers take over municipally owned buildings. A housing cooperative would then be administered by a management committee elected by and responsible to the general membership. The construction and management of new dwellings, under the dwelling construction cooperatives, was to be carried on in much the same manner, except that the workers, with considerable government aid, were required to carry the cost of construction. Both types of cooperatives were made fully responsible for the upkeep and repair of their buildings, the collection of rent and the enforcement of prevailing housing regulations.

[17] There were actually two types of cooperatives: general and workers'. The former, which anyone regardless of class could join, were never numerically important. By the early 1930's they disappeared completely as members lost title because of inability to meet the heavy financial burdens and taxes imposed on them by the government.

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otherwise sought to encourage. More important, it created insecurity regarding occupancy rights. Often tenants were not immediately or clearly classified, but were allowed to remain temporarily in cooperative dwellings pending classification. The consequence was indifference towards the proper care of such quarters.

THE DUAL NATURE of Soviet housing policy also had a particularly disastrous effect on the attempt to encourage cooperative construction of new dwellings.[18] By 1937 cooperatives had been responsible for less than 10 percent of total new housing construction.[19] The most important reason for this lack of public response was the practice of allotting space in new cooperative dwellings as rewards to zealous and well-connected party members, even when they were not members of the cooperative.[20] Favoritism and patronage also prevailed in the allocation of space among the cooperative members themselves: those with party influence secured quarters within weeks of joining the cooperative, while others often had to wait for years.

The non-economic orientation of rent policy during this period was another factor responsible for the failure to hold the housing line. Recognizing the necessity of providing some rational means of financing housing costs, the Soviet government had reintroduced rent in 1922. Yet, by 1924, aggregate rental revenues amounted to only 25 percent of the estimated cost of maintenance and amortization.[21] The subsequent campaign to reduce the housing deficit was carried on within the very severe straitjacket of the class-warfare policy which sought to place the burden of deficit reduction on the "parasitic" classes. Thus, while all rents began to rise,[22] non-workers, depending upon a variety of considerations,[23] paid anywhere from 30 to 300 times the average rental paid by members of the working class.[24] The failure of these measures to produce sufficient rental revenue to cover the full cost of maintenance, repair and amortization—despite the high charges on some citizens—stemmed from the fact that there simply were not enough people left in the "parasitic" category [25] to make up for the housing subsidy given the workers.

In the fall of 1937 another major shift in Soviet housing policy took place. The law of October 17, 1937, in effect abolished the housing cooperatives and re-established the primacy of the local soviets in housing. The reasons given for this action were largely specious, the principal one being that the cooperatives had failed miserably in maintaining dwellings in a proper state of repair.[26] The truth of the matter was that the total economic controls required by the Five-Year Plans, coupled with Stalin's drive for a further tightening of political supervision, made even the relatively minor degree of autonomy enjoyed by the housing cooperatives troublesome and undesirable. Thus, the return to municipal administration of housing represented just another step in the manipulation of housing policy for the attainment of non-housing objectives.

[18] The government went to considerable lengths to stimulate the construction of housing (within the limits of resources made available) by cooperatives. Trade Unions were ordered to "agitate" workers into forming such cooperatives. Those interested were enabled to borrow up to 90 percent of the projected building cost. The loans were long-term, ranging from 45 to 60 years at ¼-2% interest. Local soviets were directed to provide construction sites on advantageous terms, free blue-prints were provided, and members were given a partial exemption from debt service for the first six years. The government even went as far as to raise rents on non-cooperative housing to encourage the cooperative form.

[19] In 1930 workers' dwelling-construction cooperatives had a membership of only 400,000 or about 4 percent of all Soviet workers. Between 1923 and 1937 a total of 81.7 million square meters of dwelling space had been constructed. Cooperatives contributed a mere 6.7 million square meters to the total.

[20] Theoretically, occupants were to enter new premises as co-owners, not lessees. Allocation of space in the new structures was to be related to the date of a member's joining the cooperative and to his personal need as determined by the general assembly of members.

[21] In 1924 monthly revenue per square meter of dwelling space for urban housing as a whole averaged 11 kopeks. The estimated cost of maintenance, current and capital repairs was 44.4 kopeks.

[22] By the mid-1930's the average monthly rate per square meter charged workers came to 35-37 kopeks. Workers paid more or less depending upon income and other circumstances.

[23] In 1923, in the RSFSR, workers paid from 2.2 kopeks to 26.4 kopeks per square meter of dwelling space per month, depending on their income; artisans and professionals (not employing hired labor) paid from 22.2 to 44.4 kopeks; those living on unearned income paid from 66.6 kopeks to 2 rubles. In 1928 in dwellings run by Moscow housing trusts, rents paid by non-working class elements compared to the rents charged workers as follows (workers' rents=100): employees—128; artisans—276; members of the liberal professions—424; non-working elements—1034. In 1926, in the RSFSR, a maximum rate of 4 rubles, 40 kopeks per square meter was set, which represented a figure 80 times that of the minimum rental for workers. The literature on Soviet housing of this period even cites rents of 15 rubles per square meter of space or 300 times that of the minimum for workers.

[24] Until the All-Union rent law of June 4, 1926, each republic could set its own maximum and minimum rates for the rental of dwelling space.

[25] The percentage of "non-workers" residing in municipal dwellings in 1924, for example, was under 2 percent.

[26] No attempt was made to deny that the dwellings which remained under municipal care had fallen into an even worse state of disrepair than cooperative housing.

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Soviet housing policy has undergone many changes since the end of the cooperative period in 1937.[27] The present article, however, will continue to center attention on the continuing dual nature of that policy as manifested by developments in the post-1937 period.

Problems of Management

One of the major innovations was the placing of a progressively larger fraction of the housing fund (over 25 percent by 1953)[28] under enterprise jurisdiction. It became common practice to permit factories to lease or build apartment houses for the accomodation of certain classes of their employees.[29] The main purpose of this has been to arm enterprise directors with a potent economic weapon for assuring the fulfillment of production norms. The key to the arrangement lies in the provision that the right of occupancy stems from the employment contract: workers gain access to an enterprise apartment by virtue of the job they hold. By the same token, they are forced to relinquish their quarters once their employment contract is terminated.[30] Enterprise-controlled housing has thus served as a means of curbing labor turnover[31] and absenteeism, encouraging higher productivity, and drawing workers into certain industries or areas as required by the economic plan.

But whatever positive effect the placing of over one-fourth of total housing under enterprise control may have had on production, it had only a neutral, if not a negative, impact upon the over-all housing situation. In fact, as official Soviet sources have recently admitted, the enterprises have done a very inferior job of administering housing facilities under their care. Consequently, the trend toward enterprise-controlled housing is currently being reversed on the correct assumption that enterprises are primarily concerned with their specific production tasks and are neither interested in nor equipped to manage housing properly.[32]

The poor quality of managerial personnel in the public housing sector has been another factor responsible for aggravating the housing shortage. Until quite recently house managers and their subordinates have been poorly trained, haphazardly selected, underpaid, and denied the status accorded to other professions involving no greater talent or education. The very fact that housing has had such a low priority for so many years has tended to keep qualified and ambitious personnel away from managerial jobs in that field. Further, the perpetual shortages of materials for maintenance and the

[27] The most important of these is the drive for new housing construction under the current Seven-Year Plan. Khrushchev has promised an end to the housing crisis within ten to twelve years. This question, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

[28] As of 1953 the Soviet housing fund was divided as follows: public sector—66⅔ percent (local soviets—40 percent, enterprises—26⅔ percent); private sector—33⅓ percent.

[29] Since 1948, when the Soviet regime renewed its drive to encourage private housing construction, enterprises have also been permitted to build one- and two-story houses which they can sell to their workers through the extension of long-term credit.

[30] The question of occupancy rights in enterprise housing has had a long and complicated history. In general, the practice has been forced administrative eviction (within ten days and regardless of the time of year) without obligation by the enterprise to find the tenant alternative housing in cases where the employment contract has been terminated by the action of the worker. This includes voluntary resignation as well as dismissal for violation of labor discipline.

[31] Abysmally bad dwelling facilities, especially in the industrial centers, have contributed to the high rate of labor turnover. Workers would often change jobs in the hope of finding more tolerable living circumstances. An assurance of improved housing by an enterprise has tended to keep workers on the job and better disciplined.

[32] A. Zhuraviev and M. Fyodorov, "The Microdistrict and New Living Conditions," *Nauka i zhizn*, No. 9, 1960; also *Izvestiia*, April 4 and 17, 1961, and *Pravda*, January 29, 1961.

Рисунок А. ВАЖЕНОВА

— Счастливчик, получил квартиру, переезжает в новый дом!
— Чего же он убивается!
— Прощается с телефоном!

—Lucky fellow, he got a new apartment and he's moving!
—Then why is he grieving?
—He's bidding farewell to the telephone!

—From Krokodil (Moscow), October 10, 1960.

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constant squabbles among tenants suffering from abysmally poor living conditions has made positions in housing management even less attractive. The few somewhat better equipped personnel who entered such positions did so either to obtain access to better housing for themselves or, if party members, as a steppingstone to more attractive positions. The result has been a very high rate of turnover of managerial personnel at the expense of experience, stability, and proper care of housing facilities.

One particular feature of Soviet housing policy deserves special note. Ever since 1918 the party has relied heavily on housing managers for political surveillance of the population, and to this day these administrators continue to be saddled with a great many tasks of a police nature. The direct link connecting the managers and their subordinates (janitors, night watchmen, etc.) with the secret police (today the KGB) is well known to every Soviet citizen. Appointment to and removal from any position in housing management has always been subject to police authorization, and since 1937 only party members have been allowed to hold positions as house managers. Surveillance, record-keeping, and reporting on the activities of all tenants and their visitors take up, of course, a very sizable portion of the time and energy of house-management personnel. In addition, monetary rewards, public recognition, and promotion for these personnel are tied more closely to the quality of the police work they perform than to the efficiency with which they discharge their managerial duties. Thus party control over the population had been strengthened at the expense of the proper upkeep of existing housing facilities.

Rent and Allocation Policies

Rent policy, too, continues to be inspired by nonhousing objectives. Since 1928 the following (not always consistent) policies have dominated rent determination in the Soviet Union: 1) Rental rates have been made to depend primarily on the tenant's income, the number of his dependents, and other considerations not pertaining to the housing unit he occupies.[33] 2) No tenant's total rent payment has been allowed to exceed a very small percentage of his income. 3) The range of rental rates between the poorest and the best housing has been kept very narrow in order to facilitate the use of housing allocation for political purposes.

The first two policies derive from ideological considerations. Both were inspired by the notion, not without some basis in fact, that in a capitalist society the poorest workers are hardest hit by the burden of rent, and that in a socialist society rentals ought to be related to ability to pay. Having always associated the high cost of housing with capitalist exploitation,[34] the Soviet government decreed by the rent law of January 4, 1928, that the net payment for average dwelling space should not exceed ten percent of the tenant's income. This figure was later gradually reduced until today it stands under five percent—a fact of which Soviet propaganda never tires boasting. Keeping rents low and relating them to the ability to pay may be legitimate social policy if the government's concern for consumer welfare is strong enough to ensure provision of adequate funds for housing maintenance and development from other sources in the national budget. This, unfortunately, has not been true in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it is difficult to explain why Soviet housing should be singled out for subsidization, but not food, clothing and other essential consumer goods.

Concrete evidence of the third policy—limiting rent differentials between good and poor housing—has often been observed by visitors to the Soviet Union. While it is true that privileged Soviet families living in five or six-room apartments pay more rent than the average family occupying cramped quarters, rent differentials are so small as to be nowhere near commensurate with the enormous differences in size and quality of dwellings.

These glaring inequalities are a direct result of Soviet methods of housing allocation. In order to exploit the housing shortage for a variety of political objectives, grave injustices have been perpetrated. There seems to be a general presumption in the Soviet philosophy on housing rights that everyone who is not an enemy of the state should be housed as well as possible. But it is the law defining *status*, and not the law of property or contract, which determines these rights. Within such a juridical framework, the Soviet regime has been able to distribute dwelling space in reward for real or presumed service to the state. The techniques employed are many and varied and space permits mention of only a few. The feature that is least disturbing to the Soviet people is the practice of awarding larger and better housing to workers who excel in production.

[33] Factors such as the quality of the apartment house in question, distance from the urban center, extent of modern conveniences, location of the particular room, etc. enter into the determination of the "apartment tax." The personal circumstances of the tenant determine the rent itself, which together with the apartment tax constitutes the total rent payment.

[34] Current Soviet propaganda insists (erroneously) that the American people pay, on the average, 35 percent of their income for housing accommodations.

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Beyond that, however, party membership or influence is a vital factor in determining the amount and quality of housing made available. Soviet citizens freely admit, even to visiting Americans, that as new housing becomes available those with "influence" get immediate occupancy at the expense of others who may have been on the waiting list for as long as seven to ten years.

Part of the problem is that housing administrators are not given a free hand to devise a fair method of allocating space. Housing managers are obliged to accept "suggestions" from the party and must cede space to trade unions as well as scientific and literary organizations which are empowered to place their members in the more desirable housing. Much injustice also stems from the human weakness that leads some to offer bribes and others to accept them. Every so often the government bears down on such practices, but thus far without appreciable results.

What Price Housing?

Thus the net consequence of the dual Soviet housing policy has been to accentuate the perennial housing crisis. When this author raised some of the points made here with a Soviet official in the USSR last summer, he received the reply that "one cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs." It was all part of the price that had to be paid for socialist construction; and besides, with the fulfilment of the housing targets of the current Seven-Year Plan, the shortage and its accompanying problems would be overcome. However, the American economist Leon Herman reports that he was told otherwise by another Soviet authority:

> **Let us look at the target in housing through the eyes of the venerable Soviet economist Nemchikov. As he sees it, 55 percent of all the additions in urban housing to be made by 1965 will be "swallowed up" by the growth in city population. At best, he reasons, the net added new housing will raise the average amount of dwelling space to eight meters . . . per city inhabitant. This will leave the situation five years hence still below the official "minimum sanitation requirement" of nine square meters per person established by the Soviet government some three decades ago.**[35]

This appears to be a more realistic appraisal. And since there is no evidence in sight that the dual nature of Soviet housing policy is to be abandoned, one can only conclude that the cost of socialist construction has not yet been fully met.[36]

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[35] See Leon Herman, "The Labor Force: Who Does What," *Saturday Review,* (New York), January 21, 1961, p. 60.

[36] Some of the principal sources used in the preparation of this article were: Timothy Sosnovy, *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union,* Research Program on the USSR, New York, 1954; John Hazard, *Soviet Housing Law,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939; D. L. Broner, *Ocherki ekonomiki zhilishchnovo khoziaistva g. Moskvy* (Essays on the Economics of the Housing Economy of the City of Moscow), Moscow, 1946; A. M. Goldenberg, *Osnovnye voprosy organizatsii finantsov sotsialisticheskovo zhilishchnovo khoziaistvo* (Basic Questions in the Financial Organization of a Socialist Housing Economy), Moscow, 1950; *Zhilishchnoe zakonodatelstvo* (Housing Legislation), Moscow, 1950; *Slovar-spravochnik po sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi statistike* (Dictionary-Handbook of Social-Economic Statistics), Moscow 1944 and 1948.

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"Catching Up and Outstripping": An Appraisal

By Imogene Erro

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV has repeatedly boasted that the USSR will not only demonstrate to the world Soviet superiority in science, in heavy industrial output, missile capabilities, and space exploration, but will also show that the Soviet economic system can surpass that of the United States in the production of consumer goods. Before the Supreme Soviet in May 1960, Premier Khrushchev said:

> **We are setting the following task: after implementation of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), to catch up within five years, and then to outstrip, the United States in per capita consumption of consumer commodities including textiles and footwear.**
>
> **I want to stress once more that in the production of all consumer goods, *all that man really needs,* we shall in the immediate future reach the production and consumption level of the United States, the wealthiest country of the capitalist world, which is the standard of capitalist prosperity. . . . And then we will enter the open sea in which no comparisons with capitalism will anchor us.[1] (Italics added.)**

The propaganda value of such Soviet statements both at home and in many countries abroad cannot be minimized. The world image of the United States as the land of consumer plenty and the birthplace of the affluent society is well-established. That the Soviet Union may overtake the United States in consumer goods within a relatively short time cannot fail therefore to make a deep impression on the underdeveloped countries, as well as on some of the more mature Western nations whose consumption standards remain far below those of the United States.

Khrushchev's blatant challenge profits from the fact that it is possible, by comparing carefully selected statistics, to give his claims an air of authenticity; this authenticity turns out to be spurious, however, if one takes into account quality considerations, consumer preferences, and differing statistical measures, some of which make comparisons between consumer patterns in the Soviet Union and the United States either difficult or meaningless—or both. A better understanding of the Soviet challenge—its magnitude and likelihood of success—can be obtained if Soviet and American outputs of a number of basic consumer goods are compared by applying statistical measures which have been carefully evaluated. Although quality factors cannot be measured in a statistical output series, enough is known about the average quality and character of various Soviet consumer goods to put the statistical comparisons in better perspective. This article will compare Soviet and US production of textiles, clothing, footwear, and selected consumer durables,[2] calling attention to various factors which have a bearing on comparability. But first, a few general aspects of the problem may be considered.

Trends and Definitions

That the Soviet consumer is better off today than he was in 1950 or even 1955 is open to little doubt. Although consumer prices are still high, the price trend has been downward, while production has registered

[1] *Pravda,* May 6, 1960.

Mrs. Erro is an American student of the Soviet economy. This is her first contribution to Problems of Communism.

[2] Soviet production data used in this article are officially announced figures as published in the press and in handbooks. Production figures for 1960 appeared in *Pravda,* January 26, 1961. Definitional information is from *Tovarovedeniye promyshlennykh i prodovolstvennykh tovarov* (Science of Staple Commodities as Applied to Industrial Goods and Foodstuffs), Moscow, 1955; and from *Promyshlennost SSSR* (Industry USSR), Moscow, 1957. Data for the United States are from publications of the US Department of Commerce: *Survey of Current Business,* January, 1961; *Statistical Abstract of the United States,* 1959; and *Facts for Industry,* M22T, 1958, 59.

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annual increases. Nor is there any doubt that the gap between Soviet and American outputs of consumer goods has narrowed. There is little likelihood, however, that the gap will be closed by 1970 as Khrushchev has pledged—even for a minimum number of basic commodities. Indeed, neither past Soviet performance nor the production targets of the Seven-Year Plan support Khrushchev's optimism. Even if the increases called for by the plan are achieved, Soviet per capita outputs of consumer goods in 1965 will on the whole remain far below even the present US production levels for goods of comparable quality. Probably, in a few instances, the Soviet Union will be able to claim that it has surpassed the United States in total production, if not in production per capita. In wool fabrics, for example, the Soviet Union claims to have surpassed the United States already (though the Soviet production figure includes fabrics not classed as wool in the US). But in the vast majority of basic consumer goods the United States will continue to outproduce its Soviet competitor.

In setting up consumption standards for textiles, clothing, and footwear, Soviet planners have based their norms on "complete satisfaction of need," taking into account regional differences of climate. But the list of commodities considered "really necessary" is extremely limited by comparison with the wide range of goods available, for example, in the average American department store. Although the Soviet norms approach US consumption levels for food items, they are generally lower for textiles and clothing. The following data for 1958 (when the norms were announced) compare the norms for these latter items with actual Soviet consumption and with US consumption of the same commodities, on a per capita basis:

	Consumption		*Soviet Norms*
	USSR	US	
Textiles (sq. meters)	28.3	66.5	58.1
Leather footwear (pairs)	1.8	3.4	3.5
Knit underwear (pieces)	1.9	8.3*	6.6
Knit outerwear (pieces)	0.5	2.9*	1.6

* 1959

Khrushchev has pointed out that "satisfaction of need" means meeting all "the healthy requirements of a culturally developed man" but does not include catering to individual whims and desires for luxuries, a definition which severely limits the Soviet consumption pattern. The Soviet government thus visualizes the citizen as a culturally developed person (or expects him to become one), clinically prescribes his requirements for consumption, and seeks to stimulate production in consumer industries so as to supply these narrowly-defined needs by 1970, or sooner if possible. But the norms require more goods than are planned for 1965, and to achieve the required levels even by 1970 would necessitate a sharp step-up of present rates of growth in consumer industries.

Limited Consumer Satisfaction

In textiles, clothing, and footwear, the Soviets aim in general at emulating American consumption standards. In other commodities, however, such as home furnishings, appliances, and automobiles, they are developing consumption patterns peculiarly their own. For example, the cramped living space typical of Soviet housing (less than 400 square feet in the average urban apartment) restricts both the number and types of furniture and household appliances which can be utilized within the family unit. As for automobiles, Khrushchev has made it clear that the Soviet Union does not intend to emulate the "excessively wasteful" American pattern.

It is far more economical and ideologically correct, says Khrushchev, to provide public service facilities (such as taxi "pools") for transportation, rental centers for home appliances, and communal services for laundry, rather than attempt to supply each family with its own automobile, washing machine, and vacuum cleaner. In addition, the regime is encouraging the use of restaurants and public facilities providing carry-out food in order to restrict the need for kitchen appliances and equipment in the home. Thus, while Soviet officials speak on the one hand in terms of catching up with US production levels in basic consumer goods, they denounce American consumption practices on the other as grossly wasteful and extravagant.

Certain problems inherent in a planned economy directly affect consumer purchases. Without the stimulus of competition, Soviet consumer goods production lags behind not only in quantity but even more in design, quality, and range of commodities, all of which limits consumer selection. Retail outlets are ancient in methods and approach; sales personnel are uninterested in customers' desires; and only recently has installment buying been introduced even on a limited scale. Furthermore the system of production quotas gives rise to serious imbalances in consumer goods. For example, where the quotas are fixed in units, as for shoes, the number of models produced tends to narrow because the quotas are more easily met with fewer models; where they are fixed by value, as for overcoats, the tendency is to concentrate production in the more expensive styles; and where fixed by weight, as for cooking utensils, heavier items often are favored at the expense of the lighter.

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TABLE 1

Soviet and US Textile Production, 1960

	Cotton	*Wool*	*Silk**	*Linen*
Total production:	(in million sq. meters)			
Soviet Union **	4,800	439	675	516
United States	9,335	417	2,782	(a)
Production per capita:	(in sq. meters)			
Soviet Union	22.4	2.1	3.2	2.4
United States	51.7	2.3	15.4	(a)

* Also includes rayon and synthetic fabrics.
** In 1959 the Soviet Union changed from linear to sq. meters in reporting textile outputs; hence, comparison of pre-1959 with later figures requires conversion of the former into sq. meters by multiplying by the following width factors (derived from 1959 data): cotton, 0.75; wool, 1.27; silk, 0.82; linen, 0.91.
(a) Negligible.

Resort to such expedients by production managers often results in the accumulation on retailers' shelves of goods for which there are no buyers, either because they are in excess of demand or because they are luxury items too expensive for most consumers to afford. Some of the devices that have been adopted in order to resolve these retailing problems—such as price-cutting, advertising, and limited installment buying—appear remarkably close to capitalistic retailing methods but are nevertheless becoming accepted procedures in the Soviet distribution system.

So much for the broader aspects of the problem. The following sections will be devoted to a closer examination of relative Soviet and US performance in the basic areas of consumer goods production.

Textile Production

In both quantity and quality, the Soviet Union still has far to go to catch up with the United States in this category of consumer goods. Total Soviet production of textiles in square meters is only about half the American volume—a level that is far from adequate to supply, at anything approaching the consumption standards of most Western countries, the needs of a population about 20 percent larger than that of the United States. Where the two countries stand in relation to each other in total and per capita production of the major types of textiles is shown in Table 1.

Besides the volume of production, certain aspects of quality must also be considered since they affect both appearance and utility. Quality in textile products is related principally to the technical efficiency of the various processes of manufacture—spinning, weaving, dyeing, and finishing—and to the characteristics of the raw fiber used. Although comparisons of this nature between Soviet and American textiles are seldom possible, the shabby appearance of Soviet wearing apparel and household fabrics, as reported by foreign travellers to the USSR, is at least *prima facie* evidence of the relatively low technological efficiency of the Soviet textile industry.

As shown in Table 1, cotton fabric is the basic textile in both the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet production per capita is less than half the US figure, and the ratio is approximately the same for the per capita supply available for domestic consumption since it is not appreciably altered by imports and exports. However, Soviet prospects of catching up with the United States in cotton fabrics are enhanced by the fact that US production has tended to level off during the last ten years—even declining in some years—in response to a moderation of consumer demand. In this period the American industry has concentrated on research and development aiming at special improvements in fabric characteristics, such as increased wrinkle-resistance, the "drip-dry" finish, and interesting new textures in yarns and weaves. The development of improved fabrics made from synthetic fibers or from blends of natural and synthetic fibers has contributed to the slackening of demand for cotton fabrics, and this in turn has been reflected in a marked shift from natural to synthetic fibers in mill consumption. As more new kinds of synthetic fiber with improved characteristics are developed, this gradual trend may be expected to continue. In spite of the leveling-off of US production and the planned expansion of Soviet output of cotton fabrics, however, the Soviet target for 1965 production, as shown in Table 2, is only 61 percent of US output in 1960.

Soviet interest meanwhile has centered largely on boosting total production of cotton fabrics to meet expanding consumer needs. Improvements in quality and surface characteristics have received relatively little attention, and cotton-like synthetic fibers are not yet available in appreciable quantities.

Several factors relating to measurement and quality are of basic importance in comparing US and Soviet production and consumption data. American-made cotton fabrics are both wider and heavier than their Soviet equivalents, having increased in average width by about 9 percent in the past 20 years, with the largest proportionate increase in fine-quality fabrics. In the Soviet

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Union, the average width and weight of cotton fabrics have tended to remain fairly constant, suggesting that Soviet mill managers dislike width increases which reduce linear output.

IN THE PRODUCTION of wool fabrics, the Soviet Union boasts that it already surpassed the United States in 1957. This claim is true only if such important factors as fiber content, quality, and consumer preference are completely disregarded, and the propaganda implication that the Soviet consumer actually fares better in wool textiles than his American counterpart is definitely false. At present, the United States still leads in both production and consumption of wool fabrics per capita, even without taking into account quality factors and consumer preferences for wool substitutes. Moreover, although Table 2 suggests that the Soviet Union may outproduce the United States in wool fabrics by 1965, an important qualification is how the term "wool fabric" is defined.

Some fabrics statistically reported as "woolen" in the USSR are not so classified in the United States. Wool fabric by Soviet definition includes anything containing at least 30 percent wool as compared to a US minimum of 50 percent wool, although the most common blend in the Soviet industry appears to be about half wool and half cotton or rayon. Moreover, pure wool fabric accounts for less than 10 percent of the total Soviet production, suggesting one reason why good-quality suits and coats for both men and women are scarce and extremely expensive. The Soviet practice of blending in non-wool fibers is mainly designed to augment production, whereas US blending is more often directed toward achieving a specific type or quality of fabric.

The claimed Soviet gains in wool fabric production as compared to the United States have been significantly aided by the fact that US production of these fabrics has been continuously declining since 1947 as a result of the development of synthetic substitutes such as Orlon, Dacron, and Acrilan. Although the Soviet Union is now making plans for the large-scale production of these synthetics, it presently does not produce any wool-like synthetic yarns or fabrics in substantial quantities and remains dependent on wool-based fabrics for its warm clothing.

American-made wool fabrics are wider, but of lighter weight, than those made in the USSR. The heavier weight of the Soviet fabrics may be attributed in part to the use of coarser wool, which has a greater fleece weight than fine wool; to the use of heavier substitute fibers in wool blends than are used in the United States (*e.g.*, cotton is generally heavier than synthetic fibers); and to the fact that the colder Soviet climate requires heavier fabrics. The predominance of part-wool fabrics in Soviet production reflects inadequate domestic supplies

TABLE 2

Soviet 1965 Production Targets for Consumer Goods Compared with 1960 US Production

Commodity	USSR 1965		US 1960	
	Total	*Per capita*	*Total*	*Per capita*
Textile fabrics [a]				
Cotton	5,700	24.7	9,335	51.7
Wool *	635	2.7	417	2.3
Rayon, synthetic fiber, and silk	1,218	5.3	2,782	15.4
Linen	578	2.5	(negligible)	
Hosiery [b]	1,250	5.4	1,814	10.0
Leather footwear [b]	515	2.2	604	3.3
Refrigerators [c]	1,450	6	3,750 [d]	21
Washing machines [c]	2,570	11	4,210 [d]	23
Radios [c]	6,000	26	11,090 [d]	61
Television sets [c]	3,300	14	5,716	32

[a] Total production in million sq. meters; per capita, sq. m.
[b] Total production in million pairs; per capita, pairs.
[c] Total production in thousand units; per capita columns show units per 1,000 of population.
[d] 1959 figures.
* Soviet figures include wool-like fabrics of synthetic fiber; US figures do not.

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of raw wool and a preference for making up the deficit by blending with non-wool materials rather than by raw wool imports.

IN SOVIET USAGE, "silk fabrics" include all fabrics that are silk-like in appearance, whether woven from natural silk or from rayon and other synthetic fibers. Heavy consumer demand for clothing and household furnishings made of rayon and other silk-like synthetics has stimulated the development of these industries in the USSR, but the Soviet rayon industry still remains far behind its American counterpart, while the production of most other synthetic fibers is not yet past the experimental stage. Total Soviet production of "silk fabrics" is at present about one-fourth the US output (Table 1) and is scheduled, by 1965, to reach a planned level equal to only 44 percent of 1960 US production (Table 2).

Nevertheless, if the presently planned expansion of these industries is continued, chances are that Soviet consumers will eventually enjoy an abundance of rayon and other silk-like synthetic fabrics. The raw materials (cellulose for rayon; coal, petroleum, and natural gas for synthetics) are cheap and plentiful in the Soviet Union, and the necessary machinery, processes, and technology are available from abroad, mainly the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Although the Soviet Union has already begun producing *kapron* (nylon 6) and, on a smaller scale, two other types of nylon (*anid* and *enant*), *nitron* (Orlon), and *lavsan* (Dacron), much

Above: In a store everyone is equally attentive. Below: I can't for the life of me understand which are the mannequins, and which are the sales-girls! . . . (Sign reads "Ready-made dresses.")

—From Krokodil (Moscow), March 20, 1960.

of this production is presently going into military and industrial items and very little into fabrics for consumer use.

Whereas in the United States linen is usually an expensive luxury fabric imported from abroad for use in the manufacture of quality dresses and table linens, in the Soviet Union it is a more commonplace fabric devoted to utilitarian rather than luxury uses. This is no doubt related to the fact that the Soviet Union has a centuries-old linen industry producing rather ordinary grades of cloth, while the United States has none. Seventy percent of Soviet linen production is for industrial purposes, mainly packaging material, the rest going into clothing and household fabrics for consumer use.

Clothing, Hosiery and Footwear

Soviet-made clothing, as a rule, is notoriously shoddy, ill-fitting, and unattractive, reflecting both the poor quality of the textile fabrics used and the inexperience and lack of fashion-consciousness of the so-called "fashion" designers. Its low quality, lack of durability, and poor appearance have evoked widespread complaints from the buying public, and defective merchandise reaching the retail market has resulted in a high rate of factory returns. Though not accustomed to fine quality in personal apparel, Soviet consumers have become keenly aware of the plainness of their attire as a result of the increasing flow of Western visitors to the USSR. They also are sensitive about the high prices they have to pay for clothing, and in return they expect at least a modest response to consumer taste and a reasonable measure of durability, if not fine quality and style. Since Khrushchev himself has recently criticized the backwardness of the clothing and related industries, Soviet consumers can probably look forward to some increase in the availability of wearing apparel and possibly some improvement in quality.

Soviet clothing factories are equipped with machinery which, though not of the most modern design, is adequate for the fairly uncomplicated methods in use by the sewing industry. Production, however, is geared to volume rather than quality, and certainly not to fashion, the same models being duplicated monotonously year after year. A large part of the Soviet clothing supply comes from producers' cooperatives, which are soon to be integrated into the state industrial system, and from private tailors—one of the very few groups of private entrepreneurs still permitted to function.

Hosiery is mostly a cheap cotton product lacking in durability and unattractive in appearance, comparable to American-made hosiery of 30 or 40 years ago. Of the

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total Soviet output in 1955, 79 percent was of cotton, and the remainder of rayon, nylon, or wool. By contrast, 67 percent of US hosiery production in 1958 was of nylon, and elasticized yarns are widely used, whereas these are still in the experimental stage in the Soviet Union. If the target fixed by the Seven-Year Plan is met, total Soviet output of hosiery by 1965 will still be only about two-thirds of US production in 1959.

Turning to leather footwear, not only is Soviet production still inadequate to meet consumption needs, but lack of durability and poor selection of styles and sizes are constant sources of consumer complaint. Shoes of quality materials and good construction are available but so excessively priced as to be inaccessible except to the upper income groups. Pig and goat leathers, relatively less durable than other kinds of real leather, are widely used, especially for children's shoes; and artificial suede and other simulated leathers, which are extensively used as substitute materials, are far less durable, although the composition soles in common use appear to be an acceptable substitute. Poor durability also results in part from fabrication methods that are often either outmoded or geared to achieving maximum output rather than quality. Many Soviet shoe factories are poorly equipped; some are consolidations of small handicraft enterprises using extensive hand labor.

Even disregarding quality factors, the per capita supply of footwear available to the Soviet consumer is not much over half that available to the American buyer. Production of leather footwear in the two countries in 1960 was as follows:

	Soviet Union	*United States*
Total production (in million pairs)	418	604
Production per capita (in pairs)	1.9	3.3

Planned Soviet production of leather footwear by 1965 is scheduled to reach 85 percent of US production in 1960 (Table 2). While this may narrow the quantitative gap, there is little question that catching up with the United States in per capita production of leather footwear of equal quality is still a distant goal for the Soviet Union.

Durable Consumer Goods

Soviet preoccupation with building the country's industrial base and expanding its scientific frontiers is reflected nowhere more strongly than in the scarcity of consumer durables such as refrigerators and household laundry equipment. The low priority of such items is evidenced by the fact that they have largely been produced as side-line products of automobile, aircraft, and other heavy industrial plants. Soviet officials recently admitted that there is not a single plant in the Soviet Union specializing in the manufacture of refrigerators, and this situation is typical of the production of most major appliances.

Although supplies of most consumer durables in the USSR have increased somewhat since 1950, these commodities are still scarce and expensive. Radios and television receivers, because of their value as means of propaganda dissemination, enjoy a relatively favored place in consumer goods production and can be bought fairly cheaply. On the other hand, such household appliances as refrigerators and washing machines remain in the luxury class, and many others that are common in the United States—*e.g.*, freezers, dishwashers, and clothes dryers—are still virtually unknown to the Soviet public. Shortages also exist in supplies of ordinary household furniture and have been accentuated by the increasing availability of apartment housing.

A comparison of 1960 Soviet production of major electrical appliances with the latest available US production (or sales) figures (1959) is given in the following table:

	USSR	US
	(*in thousands of units*)	
Refrigerators	529	3,750*
Washing machines	953	4,210*
Radios	4,200	11,090
Television sets	1,700	6,270

* Sales

The lead held by the United States is even greater when these figures are translated into ratios of output to population. Thus, for each 1,000 of population, the United States produced 11 times as many refrigerators, 7 times as many washing machines, 3 times as many radios, and 6 times as many television sets, as the Soviet Union. (It should be noted also that these large production differentials are only a partial indication of the over-all difference in the volume of appliances in actual consumer use as they ignore appliances already installed and operating.) As shown in Table 2, the planned Soviet output goals for these consumer items by 1965 are still far below the actual US production levels of 1959.

While admitting the shortages of durable household goods, Soviet officials have tried to twist them to propaganda advantage by claiming that the growing public

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demand for durable goods is itself evidence of a rapidly rising standard of living. As one such statement put it,

. . . the desires of the working people today radically differ from those of yesterday. They [the workers] say . . . that it is still difficult to buy a television set, a household refrigerator, good furniture, an upright piano. Undoubtedly this . . . shortcoming serves at the same time as a striking illustration of the rising standards and higher requirements of the Soviet people.[3]

To outside observers this statement, on its face, is ridiculous and only serves to underline the sacrifices of personal comfort, well-being and freedom of choice that are still demanded of Soviet citizens.

IN CONCLUSION, although each year is bringing some improvement in the lot of Soviet consumers, the Soviet Union will not—in spite of Khrushchev's boasts—surpass the United States in *per capita production* of consumer goods by 1970. Even assuming successful fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan targets, Soviet production of most major consumer goods in 1965 will still remain far below the US production levels.

While the Soviet leadership has committed itself to providing a more adequate supply of basic consumer items such as textiles, clothing, and footwear, it clearly does not intend to emulate Western consumption standards in the broader range of consumer goods. In a few commodities of the Soviet planners' choosing, the USSR may possibly surpass the United States in over-all production (for example, in wool fabrics), but such gains will not be impressive on a per capita basis because of the expected increase in population. Moreover, quality improvements are not likely to be commensurate with production increases, and most consumer items will probably remain well below the quality levels of these goods in the United States. As for the hitherto grossly-neglected area of consumer durables, there will undoubtedly be a substantial increase in the availability of some household appliances, but Soviet consumption standards will continue to be far below those of the United States even in this narrowly circumscribed sector.

[3] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* October 7, 1960.

Personal Property — A Bourgeois Prejudice

Sometimes one hears the opinion that Communist abundance of goods will be attained by means of increasing the personal wealth of working people. But . . . do such proprietors, covered with a heap of their own belongings, correspond to our picture of future man? He has his own summer house, his own car, his own cultural and everyday appliances; in brief, he has a lot of everything and all of it is his own! Such a person is more like a prosperous bourgeois than a toiler of Communist society. The future man, who will be active, keen, drawn to creative toil, art, and sports, will hardly agree to waste time and effort on such an abundant personal household.

If you look attentively you will notice that already serious contradictions are arising between certain elements of private property and the requirements of public development, of the interest and the morality of Soviet people. Our very life and reality eliminate and weed out such private property as turns man into a slave of things, deprives him of free time, of a cultured recreation and rest, and diverts him from matters of public interest. The Soviet people are opposed to private property which gives birth to loitering and revives private ownership trends.

Naturally, all this must not be understood as a negation of private property. Some of its elements, for example clothes, footwear, some utensils for daily life, and so on, will undoubtedly be retained under communism. But it is quite clear that personal property cannot be the basic form of satisfying the requirements of the people under the conditions of Communist abundance.

—From "On the Roads to the Sources of Plenty," by Academician S. G. Strumilin, *Red Star* (Moscow), March 31, 1961.

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Hostile Coexistence

By G. F. Hudson

"MARXISM-LENINISM," writes Wladyslaw W. Kulski in the opening sentence of his book, *Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy,* "is as important a key to the understanding of the Soviet Union and its foreign and domestic policies as Christianity is for the comprehension of medieval Europe, or Islam for that of the Arab Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire." It is just as well to begin a work of 600 pages on Soviet foreign policy with such a statement, for it is precisely this claim that is most challenging to what are still the basic—though usually unconscious—assumptions of a very large part of popular thinking about the Soviet Union.

Ever since the early days of the Bolshevik regime, there has been the expectation abroad that it was just about to settle down, discard its fantastic ideas of world revolution, and revert to the normal habits and usages of a national sovereign state in its international relations. First it was the New Economic Policy that was going to bring Russia back to normality; then it was "socialism in one country" and the repudiation of Trotsky; then, the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations and the various European non-aggression pacts which preceded the one with Nazi Germany. After that, it was the non-ideological nationalism of the "Great Patriotic War" and the public language of the Soviet ally at Teheran, Yalta, and San Francisco; and most recently it has been "peaceful co-existence" as proclaimed by Khrushchev. Yet, every time the world has become convinced that the original creed of Lenin no longer governed Soviet actions and that the policies of the Soviet Union could be interpreted simply in terms of national interest and security, like the policies of non-Communist states, events have provided fresh evidence that the ultimate aim of the rulers of Russia continued to be the destruction of all "bourgeois" governments.

The crucial question today is, indeed, what significance is to be attached to Khrushchev's famous remark, "We will bury you." Is it merely a prediction of an inevitable historical process of which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be the foreknowing but inactive spectator, or does it mean that the energies and resources of the Soviet state and its allies will be devoted to the task of *making* it come true? And if it means the latter, what basis is there—even if a general shooting war can be avoided—for the friendly relations and relaxation of tensions which Khrushchev professes to desire? For two men may quarrel bitterly on particular issues and still hope for a reconciliation, but it is hard to see what kind of amity is possible between them if one regards it as a matter of duty to kill the other whenever he can expediently do so.

ALL THE BOOKS mentioned in this essay [see box on p. 32] deal in one way or another with the concept of peaceful co-existence and the Soviet interpretation of it. The one that presents this interpretation in the most favorable light is—as might be expected—the study by Isaac Deutscher, which embodies the Dafoe Foundation Lectures given by him in Canada in the autumn of 1959. Deutscher believes that there really has been a fundamental transformation of Soviet politics and society since the death of Stalin—whom he tends to blame for everything that he admits was bad in Russia in the recent past—and that the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence reflects not merely fear of the consequences of nuclear war, but an aspiration to achieve a level of economic development and social welfare that will soon render violence superfluous. He holds that the contest between East and West really has now become one of fair and peaceful competition to convince mankind, and particularly the underdeveloped countries, that one

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or the other economic and social system has more to offer for the satisfaction of human needs—just as two business firms, operating within the framework of the law, compete to sell their products to the public by salesmanship, advertising, better quality and price.

In this contest Deutscher thinks that the West still has important advantages if it will only make use of them, but he finds the Soviet system superior on so many points that one cannot help feeling at the end of the book that he expects the Communists to have the last word. Even freedom, which he admits to be "absent from the Soviet Union and the Communist-ruled countries" now, will soon cease to be the distinguishing characteristic of the Western democracies, he suggests, for "the new Soviet generation longs to see the goddess of freedom in its camp, and it may yet tempt her over there." He foresees, after this hypothetical reconciliation of communism with political liberty, that "the moral advantage the West has so far enjoyed may dwindle."

Deutscher has much that is cogent and convincing to say about the efficiency of Soviet industrial development, the appeal which Soviet methods have for impatient industrializers in underdeveloped countries, and the hopes of future abundance which now animate large sections of the Soviet population. But when he tells us that this somehow implies a painless transition of a Communist-directed society to an era of political freedom—apparently without any challenge to the party's right to govern—he appears to be indulging in a form of wishful thinking for which nothing in the contemporary Soviet scene provides effective supporting evidence. The outrageous terrorism of the later Stalin era may have abated, but the Soviet regime remains an ideological party dictatorship in which not only any organized political opposition, but also any criticism of the party's basic theoretical propositions are prohibited. In the Soviet Union today there is no possibility of either a writing of history or a presentation of current news free of control by the ruling party; indeed, there is less intellectual and literary freedom now than there was during the "thaw" that followed Stalin's death.

Whence then is the anticipated freedom to come? Deutscher says that the Russians will "clamor" for more and more freedom and "the rulers will have to meet the demand." But he implies that the rulers will nevertheless go on being rulers. He does not speculate on what might happen if political freedom were to reach the point where the people could choose whether or not they would accept permanent rulership by the Communist Party.

If there is one thing which appears certain from the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, it is that no Communist party, once established in power in a sovereign state, will give up its dictatorial authority unless it is violently overthrown. Of course, if the ruling Communist parties—contrary to all probability—were to renounce their dictatorships and the Communist states were to evolve by steady increments of virtue into free democracies, the problem of co-existence would automatically be solved, for the "great contest" between Russia and the West—contrary to what Deutscher seems to suggest—is not one in which the West merely happens for the time being to have the "goddess of freedom" on its side; the Western dislike and fear of the Communist system are due essentially to the fact that it is a system of political and intellectual tyranny which is striving to extend its domain over the parts of the earth it has not yet conquered. If the goddess of freedom were indeed to take up her abode in Moscow—in reality and not in mere propaganda show—the "great contest" would be at an end. There might still be differences between groups of countries in the degree of state ownership or national economic planning they adopt—just as there already are among non-Communist

Mr. Hudson's essay is based on the following books:

WLADYSLAW KULSKI—*Peaceful Coexistence—An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy,* Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1959.

LORD LINDSAY OF BARKER—*Is Peaceful Coexistence Possible?,* Michigan State University Press, 1960.

ISAAC DEUTSCHER—*The Great Contest: Russia and the West,* Oxford University Press, New York and London, 1960.

GEORGE KENNAN—*Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin,* Little, Brown & Company, Boston, Mass., 1961.

LOUIS FISCHER—*Russia, America and the World,* Harper & Brothers, New York, 1961.

HUGH SETON-WATSON—*Neither Peace Nor War,* Frederick Praeger, New York, 1960.

FRANK GIBNEY—*The Khrushchev Pattern,* Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1961.

FREDERICK BARGHOORN—*The Soviet Cultural Offensive,* Princeton University Press, 1960.

HEINZ FIEDLER—*Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie und Praxis,* Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, Cologne, 1959.

MILTON KOVNER—*The Challenge of Coexistence,* Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1961.

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countries—but nobody would feel that fundamental human values were at stake because one free democracy chose to nationalize certain industries which another left to private enterprise.

IT IS BECAUSE the Communist regime in Russia, as built up by Lenin and Stalin, was and still is a system of all-embracing despotism, and because it has persistently sought to propagate this system outside Russia by internationally organized political action, subversion, and—on occasion—military force, that the "cold war" has come about. The best corrective to Deutscher's reassuring forecasts is provided by detailed surveys of the past Soviet record such as are given in the books by Kulski, Louis Fischer, and Michael Lindsay. If that record reveals a certain pattern of behavior which has so far remained fairly constant in spite of changes in tactics, and if this pattern broadly corresponds to the requirements of Marxist-Leninist theory, then the burden or proof is on those who wish to persuade us that there has been a radical change in the Soviet regime and that we can expect the pattern to be quite different in the future from what it has been in the past.

Lindsay in his book puts the case in the form of questions to be asked in discussion with an imaginary Soviet debater who is rebuking the West for unjustified suspicions of Soviet aims. He actually tried, somewhat naively perhaps, to get such questions answered—for, proceeding on the assumption that the free competition of ideas which the Communists say they want should mean a reasoned dialogue between the defenders and critics of communism, he addressed proposals for discussion first to the Chinese People's Institute of International Affairs and later to the Institute of World Economics and International Relations set up by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. As an old friend of some exalted personalities of Communist China—he served as a communications adviser at Yenan during the war against Japan—he had a certain standing within the Communist camp, at least in China, and initially received some encouragement, being informed from Moscow that "you may be absolutely sure of the heartfelt readiness of Soviet scholars to collaborate with scholars of other lands in the high moral aims of maintaining and strengthening peace." After Lindsay sent in his questions, however, silence descended on all these peace-loving scholars and he could get no replies to letters either from Moscow or Peking.

The book he has now published contains his original memoranda offered for debate with the Communists, and in reading them it is not difficult to see why the party authorities in both Communist countries must have taken the view that trying to answer them would not help the cause of "maintaining and strengthening peace," for they add up to what is perhaps the most telling exposure of the discrepancy between Communist propaganda and the facts of the record that has ever been written. The method of innocent request for explanations is more damaging to the Communist position than any rhetorical indictment could be. Lindsay gravely considers such Soviet propaganda themes as the claim that "striving to seize foreign territory and subjugate other nations is alien to the Socialist State," compares it with the Soviet record in the Baltic states, Poland and Hungary, and then asks what kind of behavior by a Socialist state *could* be counted as aggressive if the epithet may not be applied to any Soviet actions of the past two decades.

Lindsay makes the extremely important point that, while claiming that peaceful co-existence means an open competition in political ideas, the Communists in fact "are only willing to compete under conditions which would allow them to gain power but not to lose it." There must be no interference with revolutions in the Congo or Cuba, but any revolt in a Communist-governed country will provoke an intervention by Soviet forces, as the Soviet Union made clear in a warning to all malcontents at the time of the Hungarian rising. The democracies and the underdeveloped countries must be kept wide open to the most lavishly subsidized campaign of political advertising ever promoted, but the peoples of Communist-governed countries must be carefully protected from any news, arguments or cultural projections which might impair their faith in the official creed or in the rulers who have appointed themselves to control their destinies. The syllable "co" in "co-existence" suggests some sort of parity or mutuality in the relation, but there is nothing equal about it as the Communists conceive it; is it designed as a game in which they can win, but never lose, because conversion in one direction, by any means short of outright war, is legitimate, but conversion in the other direction is prohibited.

As far as the free democracies are concerned, it is of course inherent in their nature—as systems guaranteeing freedom of speech—that they must open their doors in time of peace to every kind of ideological propaganda, whether their adversaries reciprocate or not. But in present circumstances the best prospects for Communist or fellow-travelling revolutions are not in the established democracies, but in countries where democracy does not exist or rests only on very recent and insecure foundations; it is these countries which present the most difficult problems to Western statesmanship, for Western political sentiment is averse to opposing revolutions which seem to have the character of popular risings and has scruples about interfering in the domestic affairs of

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other nations such as Russia did not have about Hungary. The Soviet principle is to claim the right to protect any promising revolution anywhere against American imperialism—as in Khrushchev's threat to use rockets in defense of Cuba—while reserving Russia's right to suppress a rising in any state where communism has once established itself.

IN CONTRAST to books that are primarily concerned with the contemporary situation, George Kennan's *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* is a historical study, formally ending its story with Stalin's death, but much of it is highly relevant to current affairs, and some of the generalizations arising from analysis of Soviet policies in 1920 or 1939 could be applied today without alteration. The book has been made up from courses of lectures given at different times at Oxford and Harvard and retains the marks of its origin, lacking the unity which should belong to a fully planned historical approach; there is, however, a broad view of the whole development of Soviet-Western relations which is never obscured by the detail of events. On the basic attitude of the Soviet regime towards the Western democracies, Professor Kennan—who combines the experience of a former Ambassador in Moscow with the results of his historical research—is refreshingly forthright and sharply adverse to that school of commentators who have always tried to explain Soviet hostility to the West as a response to provocative behavior from the Western side.

Although Kennan considers it a great mistake on the part of the Western Allies to have tried to keep an exhausted Russia in the war in 1917—indeed he holds that their greatest mistake was not to have sought a compromise peace with Germany in 1917, as then waged in Britain by Lord Lansdowne—he recognizes that Russian Communist hatred for Western and all non-Communist governments was a matter of principle from the beginning and not a result of any of the acts of those governments in dealing with Russia. Such hatred was "psychologically and politically equivalent to that which would prevail towards an enemy in time of war." The Western world, writes Kennan, was confronted on the Russian scene at the end of World War I "with a group of fanatics profoundly and incurably hostile to Western ideals and traditions." Further, all non-Communists were ultimately in Communist eyes—whatever might be said during the "united front" phases of Soviet policy—equally damned as opponents of the one revolutionary cause that was both just and historically predestined to prevail; hence there could never be any genuine preference for a democratic or even a socialist regime in a foreign country over a dictatorial or conservative one.

Kennan's clear view of the nature of Communist foreign policy has enabled him to interpret with comprehension the behavior of Stalin's government before, during and after World War II. Unfortunately the intensity of his moral disapproval of war—and in particular, his aversion to the use of atomic weapons—sometimes obscures his normal clarity of vision with a peculiar kind of wishful thinking, which, from the premises that the Soviet threat to the West is not merely a strategic one, goes on to suggest that it is not military *at all*. When he declares dogmatically that world domination by one power is "technically impossible," he is taking refuge in a reassuring belief that it really would not matter much if the West no longer had an effective deterrent. But there is no rational ground for maintaining that, although it was possible in the past to hold together vast empires over long periods of time with no weapons but spears and swords and no transport but horse and sail, it would be technically impossible to rule the world from a single centre in the age of inter-continental rockets and supersonic aircraft.

The same tendency not only to enlighten, but also to moralize, is evident in Louis Fischer's *Russia, America and the World*. Mr. Fischer writes as a journalist who has spent a lifetime as a foreign correspondent in most of the countries of the world and has been an eyewitness of some of the most stirring events of our century. From being once an admirer of Stalin's Russia he has passed by way of being a disciple of Gandhi to a position from which he gives noble, but not always practical, advice to the government of the United States. The President, he writes, "should have a weatherman always at his elbow." By this he means that American policy should always cut its ties with governments which are becoming unpopular with their own peoples and assist in their removal so that the Communists do not get in first. Unfortunately it is not at all a simple matter to conduct foreign policy on such revolutionary principles without incurring a general responsibility for other nations' internal affairs which comes near to imperialism; it is not even enough to make democratic liberties the test, for in under-developed countries a corrupt democracy can become as unpopular as any dictatorship. But Fischer's heart is certainly in the right place; he has a passionate sympathy for "the angry continents of the poor, the defeated and the weak," and he sees that the remedies offered by communism to the under-developed countries cannot give them genuine solutions to their needs. As a critic of the humbug in Soviet self-advertisement in matters of human welfare—as distinct from sputniks and men in space—Fischer is scathingly to the point; of Khrushchev, the product of a Russia Fischer knew well,

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he writes in a brilliant characterization that "he is a combination of inborn temperament and the restraint he had to learn under Stalin's brutal school; he therefore blows hot and cold, alternates toughness with softness, is first firm, then folksy, and at all times, both at home and abroad, plays the ham actor on tour."

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON has taken the title of his book, *Neither War Nor Peace,* from the phrase used by Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 to describe the policy which the Soviet government at that time intended to pursue towards Germany. That it should so well fit Soviet foreign policy since 1945, the history of which is the theme of Seton-Watson's book, is the effect of the basic attitude of the Bolsheviks as the rulers of Russia. The author draws a fundamental distinction between the foreign policies of totalitarian and democratic governments in that the former "have fixed aims, which they pursue unrelentingly, but if necessary with great patience," whereas the latter "have no long-term aims other than the security of their countries as traditionally understood" and try to deal with problems practically as they arise. Since the ultimate purpose of the foreign policy of a Communist party holding state-power is to promote the destruction of non-Communist political systems, there cannot be any peace in the sense of a real will to cooperate, even though there may be a wish to avoid a direct armed conflict. Professor Seton-Watson surveys all parts of the world where there have been revolutionary movements since 1945, and he concludes that the existence of mass poverty in most of the countries of the globe continues to provide a vast potential for political exploitation against the relatively small group of societies we call "the West." In a striking phrase he declares that "the question is not how much more affluent these societies can become, but whether they can survive at all."

How the cold war is actually waged is the main theme of Frank Gibney's book *The Khrushchev Pattern.* Its range is narrower than Seton-Watson's, but it affords a more detailed picture, especially with regard to Latin America, and while Seton-Watson concerns himself more with the impact of large political forces, Gibney concentrates on the operational techniques of Soviet subversion. In a very interesting chapter entitled "Spies with a Difference" he points out that the Soviet espionage organization abroad is not confined to obtaining information, but is actively engaged through local front organizations in promoting sabotage, demonstrations and riots which further Soviet interests. These activities are linked with a lavishly subsidized propaganda which includes among its methods an uninhibited use of forged documents. "From January 1, 1957, to July 1, 1959, the Russians put out a total of thirty-six forgeries—letters purporting to be from American or European officials, faked orders or circulars of the State Department and the like." Many of these documents contained flaws by which their falsity could be proved to a well-informed reader (or listener), but as Gibney remarks, "unfortunately they are not aimed at the well-informed reader."

THE EXPANSION of cultural contacts under conditions of peaceful co-existence is the theme of Frederick Barghoorn's book *The Soviet Cultural Offensive.* The very title, however, is a reminder that we are not dealing with the kind of informal and unofficial intercourse between nations that used to be regarded as normal and desirable. Fifty years ago, when travel was free even to Russia—Russia and Turkey were then the only European countries requiring visitors to have passports—scientists, writers and artists made personal contacts as they pleased and acquainted themselves with one another's works without having any governmental organizations to control and direct their activities abroad. That even democratic governments now feel it their business to project favorable images of their national cultures in foreign countries is a sign of the impact of totalitarian politics on our age; even though it is to some extent unavoidable, it is to be deplored that it has to be so. But cultural relations as conducted by a democracy need not be combative and the most varied goods can be put in the shop window. A Communist state, on the other hand, must carry on a perpetual war against "bourgeois" culture, for the doctrine requires that no branch of culture can be independent of politics or divorced from the universal class struggle. Cultural relations, therefore, from the Communist side can only have the character of a campaign—not an exchange of ideas or an increase in mutual appreciation, but a missionary enterprise.

In spite of this, there can be no legitimate objection to such activities in a democratic society; Soviet scientists, musicians and sportsmen are, and should be, welcome in our midst, and if their appearances are often combined with political propaganda to build up a favorable image of the USSR in the public mind, that would be all to the good if only a corresponding image of the democratic countries were being projected simultaneously in the Soviet Union. But it is not; and official monopoly of publicity and a vigorous selection of what may be shown or heard in Russia as representative of current Western thought and literature ensure the maintenance of the party's theme that the Soviet Union alone upholds

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the cause of peace against "the imperialists," who still rule, though with decreasing power, the degenerate Western world, and that all vital and creative forces in the West admire the Soviet Union and support its policies.

Nevertheless the increase of contacts with the West, however controlled and limited, has its dangers for the Soviet Union. Its leaders have certainly foreseen the possibilities of contamination, and they have accepted them as a calculated risk for the sake of the influence to be gained in the West and also for the sake of acquiring the knowledge that had been threatened by the extreme diminution of foreign contacts in the last phase of the Stalin era. The Soviet leaders probably reckoned that small relaxations of Russia's self-seclusion would not bring any serious harm as long as the image of the imperialist West is maintained in the mind of the masses. What would be really dangerous would be publicity which modified this. The intended Eisenhower visit to the USSR might have had an important effect in this direction, and one of Khrushchev's principal gains from the U2 incident was that he was able to cancel it. The First Secretary of the CPSU got his very successful innings in America, but the President of the United States never had his in Russia.

NEUTRALITY IS ANOTHER Communist theme closely connected with the concept of peaceful co-existence. A useful historical account of it, and also of Communist theory with regard to national rights, is given by Heinz Fiedler in *Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie und Praxis.* Fiedler is specially interested in proposals for disengagement in Europe and the neutralization of a reunited Germany. Neutrality has a special significance in Soviet usage; it is not simply the right of a nation not to take sides in an international conflict, but a kind of first step in virtue, which ought to lead on to higher things. Any combination among non-Communist states is necessarily aggressive and criminal; the first duty of a nation is to abstain from such evil, but having gone so far in the right direction, it should pass on to the next stage, one of active resistance to imperialism.

In under-developed countries which remain "uncommitted," this second state corresponds to the "further advance of the liberation movement," whereby the proletariat—*i.e.,* the Communist—takes over the leadership of the national-democratic revolution because it alone can carry the struggle against imperialism to a successful outcome. As Milton Kovner points out in *The Challenge of Co-existence,* the swing of Soviet policy in Asia and Africa away from leftist and insurrectionist tactics towards support for internationally neutralist national leaders has now been largely reversed in favor of pressure for more radical measures of "social progress," and the manifesto of the eighty-one Communist parties gathered in Moscow in November 1960 defined a new category of states of "national democracy," which can only qualify for the support of the Sino-Soviet bloc if they are not merely neutral, but "fight" against all forms of imperialism. For this purpose Russian and Czech arms will always be available to help them.

WHAT, THEN, IS the meaning of peaceful co-existence? The consensus of opinion of the books listed, with the exception of Deutscher's, is that it is really the cold war under another name. It is peaceful in so far as it involves on the Soviet side a genuine fear of nuclear war; the bitter controversy with Mao Tse-tung—who appears to have clung to Stalin's belief in the secondary strategic importance of the nuclear arm—is evidence of the reality of this fear, and indeed we may give Khrushchev credit for reorganizing the unwisdom of playing with atomic fire. The new co-existence is peaceful also in that the cold war is now more than ever before carried on with economic weapons; the Soviet Union today can export capital tools and technical advice on a large scale to underdeveloped countries as instruments of its political activity. This is certainly peaceful competition, and a case can be made for regarding it as ultimately beneficial to all concerned, since the under-developed countries stand to gain from the bidding for their favor and the West is put on its mettle to increase its productivity and improve its methods of rendering aid.

But the new emphasis on economic diplomacy does not imply any spirit of cooperation from the Soviet side; it is economic warfare directed to a political end which remains fundamentally the same as in the days of the Comintern or the Cominform. What remains constant is the basic hostility of the Soviet Union and of all Communist states towards the entire non-Communist world—a hostility due not to any particular resentments or grievances, but to the ideology by which alone the rulers of Communist countries justify their right to govern. What peaceful co-existence does *not* mean is a Communist will to establish genuinely friendly relations between "countries of different social systems." For indeed how can there be such relations if an essential part of one system is the belief that its "historic task" is the revolutionary overthrow of the other?

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Ready for Extinction

On Thermonuclear War,
by Herman Kahn.
Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1961.

Reviewed by Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff

MR. HERMAN KAHN has dared to gaze into the Gorgon's face of thermonuclear war and has not been struck dumb. For that he deserves respect, indeed honor—for if nations will play this sort of game, some men, like executioners, must do their duty and calculate the consequences. This huge and rambling effort to make thermonuclear war "thinkable" has been attacked as immoral, even as evil. It is not. It is informative, in some respects brilliant, a little tiresome, curiously unrealistic for all its calculated effort to shock, and, in a dreadful way, funny. So grotesque is the imbalance between the author's brisk acceptance of radioactive horrors and his commonplace and *kleinbürgerlich* scheme of political values that the reader must laugh. One might then be tempted to dismiss the book, except that the twentieth century has taught us that middle-class assumptions and military frightfulness are not irreconcilable in practice. And Mr. Kahn is not, in any event, an individual voice. He speaks for a class of men, those civilian and quasi-civilian experts who are legion and who provide the cadres of the military and ideological agencies that have been engendered by the cold war.

Mr. Kahn's failure is the failure of his class: the political failure—the inability to grasp the true passions and motives in the lives of men and nations. The Soviet Union is not governed by a digital computer, nor is the West. If that were so, then Mr. Kahn's would be an exercise in pure reason. Facts being what they are, Mr. Kahn tells us about everything except reality.

Mr. Kahn's purpose in this book is to shock both governments and public out of the fatalistic assumption that thermonuclear war would be a catastrophe on such a scale as to be beyond planning, even beyond serious analysis. He directs his argument particularly against advocates of "minimum deterrence"—*i. e.,* those who believe that the ability to carry out a thermonuclear strike of any kind is sufficient to deter an enemy attack. The author contends that this is not so: that while thermonuclear war is terrible, it is also feasible, and that even with the most destructive of exchanges "objective studies indicate that . . . though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendants." That passage has understandably gained a considerable notoriety.

CALLING for analysis of what this kind of war might bring, and how it might be fought, Mr. Kahn insists that it makes quite a difference whether two million persons are killed in a nuclear attack, or 160 million. He argues further that even if 160 million were killed, life itself would not end; civilization would eventually recover. He provides, characteristically, a table entitled "Tragic but Distinguishable Postwar States" estimating that the United States could recover economically one year after an attack in which two million died, five years after an attack taking ten million lives, fifty years after an attack killing 80 million. He asks: "Will the survivors envy the dead?" The implicit answer is the heart of his argument: they will not; and the number who would survive will be determined by the kind of strategic planning that is done today, by the character given to the deterrent force and by the civil defense preparations.

Mr. Kahn, then, is concerned with exploring what can be done to mitigate the effects of thermonuclear war and

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Mr. Pfaff is a former editor of and correspondent for The Commonweal *(New York); Mr. Stillman is a lawyer and a former US diplomatic officer in the Balkans and Western Europe. Their joint* The New Politics: America and the End of the Postwar World *was published earlier this year by Coward-McCann, New York.*

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to bring the use of such weapons into the area of rationally calculated and controlled force. It is this that earns him attack, the opposing argument being that to treat thermonuclear war as just another kind of war is to hasten the day in which it will casually be invoked—with catastrophic effect. The argument is that while the survivors may not envy the dead, they again may. Generations of genetic mutations and a primitive struggle to build huts amidst the rubble might prove less attractive than the sleep of peace—objective studies notwithstanding.

Mr. Kahn's central argument is comprehensible and responsible—if harrowing. One wonders if he would have done better to leave it at that. He can contend that by opposing the widespread public indifference to the consequences of invoking the terrible machinery of the nuclear deterrent, he is in fact defending humane values, the power of reason, and is attempting to limit what otherwise would be wholly indiscriminate destruction.

The author's problems arise from the fact that most of his work—originally a series of three long lectures, accompanied here by nearly a hundred pages of appendices and index—is taken up with strategic and politico-strategic speculation of the kind which is the specialty of those organizations which devote themselves to the analysis of national problems through mathematical and statistical techniques. This is an interesting school but a severly limited one, employing a scientific method on materials that are not always susceptible to such analysis. The economic recovery of a decimated nation may be calculable; the recovery of the nation, *qua* nation, is not. The methods of social science falter at such problems, tending to give spurious scientific authority to quite unscientific conclusions about the behavior of men and nations, and also to a kind of strategic speculation that rapidly leaves the real to soar in a free space of perfectly adjusted forces functioning according to the law of probabilities. But the computer at best produces a very unsatisfactory approximation of national panic.

ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR, then, is a non-Euclidean exercise in the mathematics of nuclear war, not much, if at all, related to the genuine cut and thrust of international politics. The author does not pretend to political authority; he is a scientist and military man (or at least a civilian expert employed as a military thinker—the implications of the distinction are worth pondering). For him political reality is a painful intrusion: if taken up at all, it is done at second hand. "Friends" and "colleagues" supply the necessary data. Thus:

> **Colleagues tell me it is also quite possible that we lost China unnecessarily. . . . They argue plausibly that the critical problems the Chinese faced in 1947 and 1948 were inflation and corruption, the latter being of special importance in the Army. . . . These colleagues believe that if we had sent a relatively small number of enlisted men and officers, some number in the neighborhood of 10 to 20 thousand, to handle the problem of logistics . . . added some air support, and finally some additional financial aid . . . it would have been quite possible for Nationalist China to have survived the Chinese Communist attack.**

Evidently illusions die hard.

Commenting that NATO's problem "seems to be lack of motivation on the part of [its] citizens and governments," Mr. Kahn recommends that "perhaps instead of spending for a counterforce capability, the same kind of money put into NATO would tend to solve the European part of our defense problem. In addition large sums for SEATO and other alliances might be effective against both subversion and threats from neighboring Communist countries." Mr. Kahn's proposals for dealing with other political problems are of much the same order.

As for Russia as a nation, the proper judgment on Mr. Kahn's discussion might be that once made by John K. Moriarity (in *Morality and Modern Warfare,* edited by W. J. Nagle, Helicon, 1960): The military man tends towards an attitude in which "the opponent . . . looses the character of flesh and blood and becomes in effect a set of performance specifications which one's latest weapons system does not quite meet." Mr. Kahn's blueprint for a war which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, with a certain wisdom of the blood, quite dares to fight, all but ignores the character of the enemy. Mr. Kahn's beliefs about Soviet society, about the whole thrust of Soviet national policy, are quite simple: a genial assumption of total malevolence. Is Russia a society? Has it a quality, a seeking, a growth of its own? Does it bleed when pricked? In this book, Russia is the Opponent: resourceful, unchanging, intransigent.

Now as a military theorist, Mr. Kahn is obligated to consider Soviet capabilities rather than intentions. But the limitations of this kind of exercise badly need to be understood, for implicit in it is a deep anti-realist bias. Consider this piece of speculation: Do the Russians wish to divide the Western Alliance? Let them "at some time in the future . . . deliberately detonate a nuclear weapon on NATO territory in such a manner as to appear that one of our own weapons had acci-

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dentally exploded. It would be even more serviceable to them if they could get a saboteur to shoot a NATO or European atomic weapon at one of the Soviet satellites or perhaps the Soviet heartland. Their extreme demands would then appear to be justified. For example, if the weapon came from West Germany, the Soviets could say that the West Germans had thereby shown that they could not responsibly have weapons."

It is not easy to suppose that any nation would choose to atom-bomb itself. Yet even if that were conceivable, we may be sure that the consequences would be a great deal larger than apologies and a chiding of the West Germans. Presumably a mere hole in the ground would not be enough to outrage world opinion (to play this game of presumptions a little further); but would a smoking and radioactive Budapest or Cracow or Smolensk result merely in the splintering of NATO and congratulations in Soviet policy offices? One wonders. The Eastern alliance is not so solid as all that; and the Russians have shown no special taste for suicide these days—Mr. Khrushchev's calculated rages notwithstanding.

IF IT IS HARSH to attack Mr. Kahn in this way, it must be said that he invites harshness. Thus, in discussing Soviet ideological attitudes towards nuclear war, he says that Malenkov, who argued "the inevitable collapse or destruction of all civilization" in a nuclear war, was forced by Khrushchev and others in 1954 to recant after a " 'great national debate' "; "henceforth, it was only the capitalists that would be destroyed." According to Mr. Kahn, "with some important modifications [these] views seem to have prevailed." This obviously is an absolutely central issue, and a nervous qualification or two do not keep Mr. Kahn's treatment of it from being jejune and positively misleading.

The genuine virtues and importance of this book are severely compromised by this kind of political incompetence, and by a second factor for which Mr. Kahn cannot be blamed: the willingness of many of his readers to treat this book as more than the limited military calculation that it is. It is a general staff paper in the great tradition of a general staff paper for every conceivable eventuality. Almost every eventuality: what is traditional, too, is that what really happens is ordinarily the one thing for which there is no general staff plan—such as how Austria might punish Serbia without involving the Germans, Russians and French in a war that was to destroy a generation of European men and shred the fabric of European civilization.

The allusion is not so strange. *On Thermonuclear War* is a self-conscious treatise in the tradition of Clausewitz's *Vom Krieg*. It has, one supposes, a claim to that impatience with mere sentiment that marked the planning of the Imperial German General Staff. But this really is not a very satisfactory precedent for military planning. The German General Staff was thorough and unsentimental in its planning, rightly deciding that the most efficient way to fight the First World War was to attack France through neutral Belgium and to conduct unlimited submarine warfare. It overlooked only that these two acts would cause a revulsion of world opinion, provoke American intervention, and bring Imperial Germany to ruins.

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What Price Industrialization?

The Soviet Industrialization Debate 1924-1928,
by Alexander Erlich.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
and Oxford University Press, London, 1960.

Reviewed by Calvin B. Hoover

THIS MOST UNUSUAL BOOK covers in detail a theoretical controversy which took place during a very brief period just before the inauguration of the first Soviet Five-Year Plan. The controversy concerned the problem of how to achieve the maximum rate of capital formation for the industrialization of the USSR. In spite of the doctrinaire aspects of the dispute, which inevitably complicated his task, Professor Erlich has produced a brilliant analysis of the theoretical positions of the antagonists. As he points out, the extent to which the participants were able to deal effectively with the issues and to carry on a discussion in terms that not only were meaningful then, but remain relevant to this day, is remarkable. By illuminating the current relevancy of the questions fought over in Moscow between 1924 and 1928, he has lifted his subject from the confines of history and enhanced immensely the value of his enterprising study.

The remarkable economic recovery induced by the introduction in 1921 of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) had momentarily obscured the immense difficulties which the industrialization of a country so predominately agricultural as postrevolutionary Russia was bound to encounter. During the war years the industrial plant had suffered serious depreciation, and replacements were not available. Railway and other transport had been reduced to a ruinous state. The peasants had reacted to state requisitioning, which took all their surplus and often more, by refusing to raise more produce than their own needs required, and famine had resulted. It was only due to the restoration of peasant incentives through the introduction of a fixed tax and the right to sell agricultural surplus on the free market, plus the other elements of the NEP, that consumer goods once more became available both in the country and in the cities.

IF THE economic progress which characterized the early years of the NEP had continued, the industrialization debate probably would not have been so sharp since all parties to it were agreed that rapid and large-scale industrialization was desirable. It was only when the improvement in production began to slow down and stagnation or even retrogression began to threaten agriculture that a policy crisis arose. As Erlich points out, the peasants had ceased expanding the supply of foodstuffs once their minimum needs for the products of industry were satisfied. Thereafter, they preferred to consume more of their own products and to feed grain to livestock or to hoard it rather than sell it on a market where the basis of exchange for industrial products was so unsatisfactory. This disparate movement of farm and industrial prices became known as the "scissors" effect. (In the later days of the New Deal in the United States the parity concept was developed to deal with a similar problem.)

The "scissors" crisis was interpreted by Bukharin to reflect a lack of demand on the part of the peasants, which could best be cured by a further extension of incentives to the peasantry. Therefore, prices of industrial products were to be lowered as a means of stimulating peasant demand and production of foodstuffs for the market. At the same time the more industrious peasants were to be permitted to rent land allotments left idle by their holders, and to hire labor for cultivating them. This was the program of what came to be called the Right. Bukharin, its principal spokesman, went so

Mr. Hoover, Professor of Economics at Duke University (Durham, North Carolina) and former President of the American Economic Association, has written extensively on the interaction of political and economic systems. Among his books are The Economic Life of Soviet Russia *(Macmillan, New York, 1931), and* The Economy, Liberty, and the State *(20th Century Fund, New York, 1959).*

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far as to exhort the peasants to "get rich," a phrase which was later to be used with devastating effect against him.

LEV SHANIN AND GRIGORI SOKOLNIKOV provided remarkably sophisticated theoretical support for Bukharin's position. They maintained that the expansion of fixed capital was limited by the availability of commodity reserves produced in the preceding period or imported on the basis of foreign loans. It was their view that because of the goods famine that existed in the USSR in 1925-26, the Soviet economy could not afford the long-term diversion of resources from consumer goods production which would be required if priority were given to the construction of capital goods industries. To attempt such a diversion, they argued, would only accentuate the consumer goods scarcity. Instead, what was needed was investment in agriculture and light industry, where capital requirements in relation to output were much smaller than in heavy industry. Because of the higher ruble output of agriculture and light industry in proportion to capital invested, more could be saved, larger funds would be available for capital formation, and in the long run a higher rate of investment in heavy industry itself would be made possible. The fact that such arguments based on capital/output ratios were advanced in the 1920's strikingly supports Erlich's contention that Marxist doctrine did not hopelessly impair economic analysis in the USSR as well as his view that the Soviet industrialization debate of that period has relevancy to the present problems of the underdeveloped countries.

Shanin and Sokolnikov further supported their argument in favor of priority investment in agriculture by contending that the USSR, through the production of grain for export, could reap the advantages of international specialization. That is to say, the Soviet Union could obtain more heavy machinery, in terms of value, by purchasing it from the advanced capitalist countries in exchange for Russian grain than it could by building new machine-producing industries of its own. Shanin and Sokolnikov conceded that foreign markets might not be able to absorb the requisite amounts of Russian grain, but they argued that these markets could be expanded when necessary through industrial processing of agricultural raw materials for export. In advancing this argument, they could legitimately claim that such had been the actual order of economic development in the already industrialized countries.

Against this thesis in favor of priority for agriculture and light industry, Evgeni Preobrazhenski defended the necessity for a drastic increase in the volume of investment in heavy industry. He held the existing "systematic underproduction" to be rooted in the egalitarian redistribution of income and a shortage of capital stock rendered acute by many years of underreplacement. He maintained that increased investment in new industry would make possible a greater product per unit of capital than before, since the new plants could incorporate the technological innovations which had been developed in the industrialized West while the capital equipment of Russian industry had been wearing out and becoming obsolete. Preobrazhenski further argued that massive new investment in industry was needed in order to meet the increased consumption demand of the peasantry, who, in contrast to prerevolutionary days, no longer had to pay rent to landlords or high taxes to the government. As he saw it, the trouble was that peasant demand was too high, not too low, as Bukharin had maintained.

PREOBRAZHENSKI'S ARGUMENT remains to this day strikingly applicable to the problems of capital formation in underdeveloped countries. India is a case in point. That country's Zamindari landlords have complained bitterly about the government's policy of expropriating land for the benefit of the peasants. They maintain that historically they acted as tax collectors for the government—even after they had been technically deprived of this function—for even though they consumed part of their rent income, the surplus went into taxes and investment. Now, to the extent that the Zamindari have been eliminated as a landowning class, the government of India must try to extract from the peasants sufficient funds to meet government expenses as well as necessary capital investment. But modern democratic governments notoriously find it more difficult to collect funds from peasants than do landlords, and accordingly the proportion of tax revenues derived from agricultural income has been declining steadily in India since independence, just as it had already been declining for a long time under British rule.

Preobrazhenski saw quite clearly the necessity of tapping the Russian peasantry for investment funds. His approach suffered from a serious drawback, however, in that he relied almost exclusively upon the price system to achieve his aim. But the price squeeze—put into effect by keeping the prices of industrial consumer products high and the price paid the peasant for agricultural produce low—simply could not effect the same suction upon the peasant surplus above bare subsistence as the prerevolutionary Russian economic and

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administrative system had been able to do. Only Stalin's forced collectivization of agriculture, begun in 1929-30, was to provide an effective alternative to the Tsarist method of peasant exploitation and capital accumulation.

Vladimir Bazarov, a leading economist of the Gosplan, attempted to resolve the theoretical deadlock which the contestants had reached. He recognized the difficulty of reducing the Soviet population's high propensity to consume so long as the regime adhered to an egalitarian doctrine. Furthermore, he did not believe that much of the income that had once gone to the expropriated Russian industrialists and landowners would be available as a source of social capital saving, since he foresaw that the bulk of that income would be absorbed by a greatly expanded bureaucracy. Nor did he think that substantial gains in production could be attained simply by expanding output in the existing industrial plant, which already was operating at near capacity level. Consequently, new factories had to be built, but he advocated restricting capital investment in consumer goods production largely to industries where mass production methods could be used and hence the advantages of a low capital/output ratio as well as the latest technology could be best exploited.

None of the participants in the controversy who favored priority investment in heavy industry adequately realized the inflationary effect of this policy, especially during the initial period when the new heavy wage payments would not be matched by an increased supply of consumer goods. Nor did the authors of the first Five-Year Plan recognize that a rate of capital investment which would permit doubling the capital stock of heavy industry within five years could not possibly be attained without a reduction in per capita consumption. Instead an increase in consumption of 70 percent was planned for the period! Furthermore, it can be seen in retrospect that the rate of capital investment and industrialization contemplated under the plan could not have been attained within the economic and political system as it existed prior to 1929-30 or within the limitations which Soviet doctrine placed upon the development of a prosperous peasantry and small business.

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING the period covered in Erlich's book Stalin repudiated the policy of encouraging agricultural production as the most effective method of capital accumulation (just as he rejected the opposite approach relying upon absorption of the peasant surplus through high prices of industrial consumer products). He pointed out that an increase in grain prices would have unfavorable effects on real wages. But even more important, he was unwilling to see progress toward socialism undermined by the growth of small-scale industry and a prosperous kulak class, and party supremacy weakened by elements of political pluralism. Yet, without positive encouragement of these *petit bourgeois* elements, a levelling off of grain production and an economic stalemate were certainly to be expected (as this reviewer can testify from personal observation and analysis). In 1929 Stalin therefore embraced an economic policy which included forced collection of grain from the peasants, a stepped-up tempo of forcible collectivization of agriculture, the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" and the limitation of consumption by rationing. In so doing he abandoned the premises upon which the analytical arguments of both the Right and the Left had been based. There followed then in catastrophic sequence the peasants' slaughter of their cattle, the deportations of millions of peasants, the famine of 1932-33 in the countryside, and eventually the purges and the condemning of millions of Russian people to the forced labor camps.

PROFESSOR ERLICH has used this short period of Soviet economic history as a model to demonstrate the kind of problems an underdeveloped country bent on rapid industrialization must face. At the present time economically backward countries have the opportunity to avoid the dilemma which Stalin faced. If they are willing to rely upon the possession by the state of the "commanding heights" of heavy industry, to encourage the free development of small and middle-sized private enterprise, and to allow the peasants to join or not to join cooperative farms, the device of pricing high the products of industry might serve as a useful and effective method of social capital accumulation—providing they can keep industrial wages in check. All this is not easily accomplished under a democratic system; but the challenge must be faced, for failure to act is no longer acceptable and the cost to humanity of the totalitarian alternative is intolerably high.

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The Goals of Education

The Changing Soviet School,
Edited by George Z. F. Bereday,
William W. Brickman, and Gerald H. Read.
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1960.

The Politics of Soviet Education,
Edited by G. Z. F. Bereday and Jaan Pennar.
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1960.

Reviewed by Robert A. Feldmesser

IN THE SUMMER OF 1958, two groups of very different kinds were at work studying the Soviet educational system. One was a cosmopolitan gathering of eleven people; all of them spoke Russian (four had lived in the Soviet Union, and two were graduates of Soviet universities), and all had been doing research on some aspect of Soviet education. They met for three weeks at the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich to continue this research and to discuss it with one another. *The Politics of Soviet Education* is the result. The other group consisted of seventy members of the Comparative Education Society—mostly schoolteachers, educational administrators, and professors of education, nearly all of them Americans—who spent one month in the Soviet Union conferring with their counterparts and observing schools in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Tashkent. They used interpreters, since only twelve of them had "sufficient command of Russian to follow the proceedings with some understanding"; and only four had been to the Soviet Union before. *The Changing Soviet School* is the group's report of what they heard and saw. I shall not speculate on why it is so, but the professional educators, rather than the scholars of Soviet affairs, have produced the more significant work.

Assistant Professor of Sociology at Brandeis University (Waltham, Mass.), Mr. Feldmesser has done most of his work on the Soviet social system; his "Equality and Inequality under Khrushchev" appeared in the March-April 1960 issue of this journal.

The overall impression given by *The Politics of Soviet Education* is one of superficiality. The best that can be said of most of the essays is that they make available in English some facts, figures, and quotations from the Soviet press that are useful as raw material for an interpretation of Soviet education. But where the authors attempt a more searching appraisal, they are unconvincing. For example, Richard V. Rapacz asserts that the changes in the educational structure introduced by the 1958 reforms "will probably sharpen class distinctions," but he is not sure how. He mentions one possibility—that "loopholes in the law could provide *de facto* recognition of the demand" for higher schools not requiring work experience as a condition of admission—but adds vaguely, "If this avenue is blocked, then other means certainly will be found . . ."

George Z. F. Bereday, writing on "Class Tensions in Soviet Education," likewise offers no adequate defense of his thesis that the "gulf between the intelligentsia and the masses . . . is widening." It is to his credit, however, that his argument is more carefully qualified: he notes that Soviet education has been shaped by both egalitarian and anti-egalitarian forces, and he makes some perceptive comments on the forms in which they have manifested themselves. Incidentally, although Bereday and Rapacz treat similar topics, there is no sign that they exchanged ideas. Indeed, the book shows no trace of the proceedings of the Munich "seminar" at all; it consists of eleven self-contained, independently written essays.

THE SECOND VOLUME under review, *The Changing Soviet School,* was compiled in quite a different manner. The seventy Western observers divided up into committees, each assigned to study a particular aspect of education in which its members had special competence—educational administration; pre-school, primary, secondary, and higher education; teacher training and organization; education for the handicapped and for the gifted; education outside the school; and "moral education." The written notes of each committee were

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later organized into a chapter by one person. Except in their findings on "moral education," which suffer from some naivete, the visiting specialists proved themselves keen observers, and their study contains fresh and revealing information on almost every facet of Soviet education they covered. (This is, regrettably, less true of the first four background chapters, which were written in the conventional way and do not rest on the data gathered on the trip. One is on "general characteristics," again by Bereday; and the other three, by William W. Brickman, review the history of Russian and Soviet education. Half of the remaining fourteen chapters, by the way, were written by Ina Schlesinger, who would thus seem to deserve more than the credit for "assistance" accorded her by the editors.)

One valuable corrective supplied by this book is that Soviet education does not receive the degree of material and financial support that the outside public has generally been led to believe. Classes in Soviet elementary and secondary schools usually contain 30 to 40 pupils, and the classrooms are "bare and cheerless." Soviet educators themselves acknowledge that existing school equipment is inadequate, but, as one of them told the visitors, new desks, for example, cannot be installed "before the overcrowding in the schools is abolished." Two pupils share each inkwell, and quill pens are in general use, "although a recent reform permits the use of fountain pens." "Not a single piano was observed" in the general education schools, and equipment was often seriously lacking or too old, especially in the polytechnical courses. There are no special school transportation facilities.

One group was told that the "great demand for better-qualified staffs" in the elementary schools "will not abate until elementary-school teachers get better pay." In Kiev, the maximum basic salary in the top three grades, where pay is higher than in the lower grades, was 935 rubles a month for a teacher *with 25 years' experience.* Let it be noted, furthermore, that the group did not visit any rural schools, where conditions are known to be worse. And it is also important to remember that the Soviet Union—as Bereday points out in his introduction—has never made secondary education universal.

Such facts may come as a surprise to those who have been impressed by figures showing the proportion of the Soviet national income spent for education. This seeming contradiction is resolved when we realize that the Soviet educational system, starting with very limited facilities, has had to cope with a large and widely scattered population, of which millions have moved from countryside to city and from west to east. Whatever the amount spent, it was not enough to overcome these handicaps. This is not to say that it was *impossible* to do more for education; rather, the regime decided against giving priority to further expenditure.

The Changing Soviet School also provides enlightening glimpses of the variations in actual practice which exist behind the facade of the monolithic state. Some teachers improvise their own materials and methods, and others stick to the letter of the prescribed texts; some are warmly sympathetic toward their pupils, and others drive them to tears. Work and education are combined in different ways, and there are differences in the extent of segregated education for boys and girls. Prospective teachers receive varying amounts of instruction in methodology, and stipends in the higher schools vary from one institution to another, even among schools of the same type.

NEVERTHELESS, despite these variations, the visitors perceived the leveling effect of rigid state control over the educational program. It is the oppressive uniformity of the system and the lack of individual initiative in both teacher and pupil—observed not merely in the ideology and school regulations, but also in classroom behavior—which form the main theme of *The Changing Soviet School.* Most teachers rely on mechanical repetition, often in the form of class recitations in chorus, as their main technique of instruction. If a pupil does not understand a point, he has little opportunity to seek clarification, and the teacher, his schedule in mind, rarely offers it. Children do not speak unless asked a question, and they are expected to give a fixed answer and are graded accordingly, whether in grammar, physics, geography, or history. They "wait for the teacher's command before taking out their pencils and paper," and are even told "exactly where to put" their materials on their desks; they take notes "only on the express command of the teacher." There is very little recognition of individual differences. Every child, for example, is required to learn singing, and those who have no talent are simply expected to devote extra effort to it. As Bereday recognizes in his essay in *The Politics of Soviet Education*—without, I think, giving it sufficient weight—it is this uniformity in education which acts as one of the most powerful class-leveling forces in the system.

The pedagogical effects of the formalism characteristic of Soviet education are clearly seen in foreign-language courses. Emphasis is placed on rules of grammar, pronunciation, and literal translation; and there is no effort to encourage the student to say something

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of his own in the foreign tongue, lest he make a mistake. Little wonder that the visiting observers found the students unable to converse in the foreign language they were studying, even in schools where it was supposed to be—but often wasn't—the language of instruction. David Burg, himself a product of Soviet schools, concurs in this unfavorable evaluation of language training in one of the more interesting essays in *The Politics of Soviet Education.* He ascribes the backwardness in this field to the political cloud that has hung over the teaching of foreign languages in Soviet schools. As a consequence, he writes, the objectives of instruction were defined in such a way as to mean, in effect, "that a foreign language was to be taught but not learned." The Comparative Education Society reports that Soviet educators are "optimistic" about improving instruction in this area, but in view of the existence of such a fundamental deterrent, as well as the increasing stress on vocational training, it would seem more likely that foreign languages will instead tend to disappear from the general education program.

A RELATED CHARACTERISTIC of Soviet education has been the virtual absence of provisions for gifted students, except in the performing arts. Every student follows the same sequence of courses at the same pace. (This is only slightly less true of handicapped students: they attend special institutions, but the content of instruction is varied as little as possible. "Even in a hospital dealing with the seriously ill and psychotic, regular school classes continue.") It is assumed that any student who has unusual talent will demonstrate it in the ordinary course of scholastic competition or in one of the national contests that are conducted in various academic subjects. There is no effort to discover a student's "native capacity" or to identify those who are "under-achievers." However, George A. Roeper, who wrote the chapter on education for the gifted in *The Changing Soviet School,* makes the plausible suggestion that extra-curricular circles and clubs are the real talent-cultivating organizations, and he gives striking instances of the "initiative and ingenuity" displayed by them. Although this point is countered by other evidence cited in both books, the case of Major Yurii Gagarin, who got his start in aviation as a member of the Saratov Aeroclub, is in a sense dramatic corroboration.

The case of Major Gagarin should also serve as a warning against miscalculating the consequences of what, from the Western point of view, appear to be serious defects in Soviet education. In his introduction to *The Changing Soviet School,* Bereday argues that "rigid educational planning" is unworkable in modern circumstances, that a uniform system of education "is not a suitable alternative [to] a free-wheeling, individual-oriented system" such as that of the United States, and that the Soviet educational reforms of 1958 are symptomatic of these deficiencies. The rest of the book refutes him, however, if only by bringing out a great many things about Soviet schools which are today—and will be tomorrow—as accurate and significant as they were before the reforms. In this respect, the book's title is misleading.

One is led to conclude that what Herbert C. Rudman says of Soviet educational administration also holds true for Soviet education as a whole. "Unquestionably, for the attainment of Soviet aims," writes Rudman in the Comparative Education Society's study, "the school administrative structure is effective." The key phrase in this statement is "for the attainment of Soviet aims." A society which is not "individual-oriented" has no need for an educational system which is. Soviet education, in other words, is consonant in form and in content with the character of Soviet society. In this society, it matters little that education is shallow and mechanical, or that learning is by rote; on the contrary, this sort of education may well provide the best preparation for life in the Communist totalitarian state. It matters little, even, that the schools do not receive generous material support and that full education is still denied to a large proportion of Soviet youth; the system is nonetheless adequate to the task of turning out the requisite volume and variety of occupational skills (how many space pilots does a nation need?). The grim fact is that the Soviet educational system has worked all too well in furthering national goals. The pedagogical (as distinct from the social) implication of the 1958 reforms is that Soviet schools had been doing *more* than they were required to do. It is doubtful that democracy, at least in the short run, is requisite to education in the modern world, any more than it is to industry. It is however—as it always has been—the preferable arrangement for those concerned with the realization of humane values.

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The Soviet Cinema

Kino, A History of the Russian and Soviet Film,
by Jay Leyda.
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1960.

Reviewed by Paul Willen

IN THE ARTISTIC HISTORY of the Soviet Union the art of the film, at least in its early heyday, occupies a uniquely important position. In no other media have Soviet artists met with such international success and made so lasting an impression. Even today a number of Soviet films made between 1925 and 1945—especially those of the "golden age" of Soviet cinema in the late 1920's—are regularly shown in film revivals throughout the world.

The impact of *Potemkin* (1925), directed by the famed Sergei Eisenstein, has been so great that, as the author of the excellent study here reviewed points out, "one of the curious effects of the film has been to replace the facts of the Potemkin mutiny with the film's artistic 'revision' of those events in all subsequent reference, even by historians. . . ." Similarly, for a whole generation Eisenstein's 1927 epic *October* (shown abroad as *Ten Days that Shook the World*) formed *the* image of the October Revolution and the storming of the Winter Palace. No memoir or historical research could dislodge the vivid impressions created by Eisenstein's film: the wine-caskets bursting in the cellars, the chandeliers of the palace shaking above, the *Aurora's* guns booming in the Neva.

The onset of "socialist realism" in the 1930's—a period witnessed first-hand by Mr. Leyda as a foreign student of Soviet film art—marked the start of a twenty-year decline in the caliber of Soviet films, with certain notable exceptions. Still, they continued to have a strong impact on Soviet audiences. An ironic note on the power of cinematic propaganda was provided by Khrushchev in his 1956 anti-Stalin speech, when he charged that the *Vozhd* himself "knew the country and agriculture only from films. . . . Many films so pictured collective farm life that the tables groaned beneath the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently Stalin thought it was actually so." Khrushchev added that Stalin in particular "loved to see the film *The Unforgettable Year 1919* [produced in 1951], in which he was shown on the steps of an armored train and where he practically vanquished the foe with his own saber."

In the case of the latter film, success represented little more than the victory of brazen propaganda over indisputable fact. But the success of Eisenstein's early films reflected inventiveness of quite a different sort—they were the product of a brilliant and independent artistic mind intent on fusing the revolutionary message with extraordinary cinematic innovation. His achievements (and those of equally famed colleagues) suggest, perhaps, a peculiar affinity between the dramatic extravagance of the film world and the psychology of a revolutionary state.

LEYDA'S THOROUGH and scholarly volume does not raise this question directly, but it offers all the background needed for conjecture. The author brings together a wealth of material, ably organized and presented, offering the reader a broad picture of Russian cinematic development from the earliest days of experimentation.

The history begins at the turn of the century, when the first film companies, mostly French in origin, initiated operations in Russia. Significantly, the first films made in Russia were confiscated by the police: they were shots of the panic accompanying the coronation of Nicholas II, in which 5,000 people were trampled to death. But if censorship discouraged the early operators from making documentary films, there were other areas open to them, exploiting the tremendous range for visual illusion afforded by the new mechanism of motion pictures (the impact of which led a Russian poet of the period to muse: "For those whom life has

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cheated/Open up the electric paradise"). An opportunity for "imaginative" effort was provided, for example, when Ukrainian Jews in 1898 expressed their disappointment at not having been shown films of the Dreyfus case: a touring producer met the crisis with dispatch, putting together out of his regular stock of films

. . . a scene of a French army parade led by a captain, one of their [regular] street scenes in Paris showing a large building, a shot of a Finnish tug going out to meet a barge, and a scene of the Delta of the Nile. In this sequence, with a little help from the commentator, and with a great deal of help from the audience's imagination, these scenes told the following story: Dreyfus before his arrest, the Palais de Justice where Dreyfus was court-martialed, Dreyfus being taken to the battleship, and Devil's Island where he was imprisoned, all scenes supposedly taking place in 1894.

The film was a great success, in spite of occasional "embarrassing questions about Dreyfus' height and the lack of foliage on Devil's Island."

The fine line between reality and fakery continued to intrigue Russia's film makers. The issue was amusingly underscored during the making of a film in 1913, celebrating the 300th Jubilee of the Romanov Dynasty: the "shooting" of an abdiction scene was held up for some time because local peasants, seeing the actors in colorful costume and assuming them to be *bona fide* royalty, advanced on the scene with petitions setting forth their grievances against the local government.

THE 1917 REVOLUTION brought film production to a virtual standstill, except for agitational films (*agitkia*) which were given a high priority by the new regime. In the years of war communism and initial social reorganization, the cinemas were filled with a flood of popular European and American films. The great period in Russian film history begins in 1925 when, after several years of experimentation, three outstanding and original film directors emerged to make a sequence of unforgettable films: besides Eisenstein, the trio included Alexander Dovzhenko and Vsevolod Pudovkin. Dovzhenko was known for his sensual and poetic portraits of land and people; Eisenstein for the dynamics of mass motion; and Pudovkin for his individual characterizations within a mass movement through the medium of montage.

Montage, the art of film editing for artistic effect, was not an exclusive Soviet development (a heavy debt was acknowledged to the American D. W. Griffith and others), but nowhere else were the techniques of montage so fully understood and so magnificently exploited as in Russia of the mid-1920's. "We learned," wrote Pudovkin, ". . . that the chief strength of cinema lies in montage, because with montage one can destroy, repair, or completely recast material." The emphasis on montage meant that the film was composed, not in the field, but in the cutting room, where hundreds of shots were put together in terms of cumulative effect. "The foundation of film art is editing," wrote Pudovkin; "the film is not shot, but built, built up from the separate strips of celluloid that are its raw material."

Montage satisfied both the artistic and political requirements of the period. It lent itself brilliantly to the portrayal of large dynamic mass movements, making the audience aware, in a series of quick striking images, of a wide range of events and sentiments converging in simultaneous development: a gesture of hands here, a flicker of eyes there, the crash of cannon, a movement of birds, the press of hundreds of desperate bodies. The aim, comments Leyda, was to fill "every moment the spectator spends in the threatre . . . with the maximum shock and intensity." The sense of electrifying change, with whole worlds dissolving before one's eyes, could be created in an instant, the images jostled and clashed, creating their own powerful "story line." "Reality must be recorded not by imitating it," one Soviet theorist declared, "but by broadening the range ordinarily encompassed by the human eye."

These techniques may have served broad political ends, but their origin was in the artistic temper of the times. A contemporary British critic (quoted by Leyda) compares the cinematic montage of Eisenstein with T. S. Eliot's "The Waste Land," which also "operates through the rhythmic relationship of scattered images, each of them precisely concrete yet also symbolic, the juxtaposition of which startles and surprises. . . ."

THE "GOLDEN AGE" of cinema came to an end around 1930, partly as the result of natural causes (for example, the introduction of sound, reducing the reliance on visual effects) and partly as the result of the administrative changes initiated in Russia at the time of the first Five-Year Plan. The inherent friction in the relationship between film artist and administrator, more or less submerged in a spontaneous alliance during the mid-1920's, came to the fore as administrative controls began to increase. The alliance had never been without its difficulties: Leyda recounts, for example, an argument that took place in 1925 between the famed poet Vladimir Mayakovsky and the bureaucrat-president of Sovkino, Konstantin Shvedchikov. The volatile Mayakovsky pleaded at length for a foreign showing of *Potemkin,* which had just been completed. When he

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was asked by an exhausted and bored Shvedchikov if he were through with his harangue, Mayakovsky replied:

I'm not through yet and I won't be for at least five hundred years. Shvedchikovs come and go, but art remains. Remember that!

Potemkin was, of course, shown abroad, and became the first of several films of the period that received their initial praise in western Europe, rather than in Russia itself—a fact which heightened existing tensions. The then Commissar of Education, Lunacharsky, who greatly influenced Soviet cultural policies of the 1920's, admitted that

. . . only after the German public enthusiastically greeted *Potemkin* was it properly shown here. Its greatest publicity came from the wish to see a film that had brought us our first victory in the foreign film market.

THE PERIOD following the "golden age" was one of intermittent warfare, characterized by increasing administrative interference in the creative process. Yet a distinction should be made between the motion pictures and the other arts, where the early 1930's witnessed a sharp onslaught against artistic independence. The distinction may lie in the fact that the production of a film is necessarily a group activity, combining the talents of many people under some kind of administrative arrangement, and making individuals less vulnerable to dictate. Hence the imposition of increased external controls was not, initially at any rate, as damaging as was intervention in other fields. All the same, a conflict was developing. Writes Leyda:

This conflict would be expressed variously, in terms of money, or form, or social function, but beneath the argument would be heard a fundamental clash between the natural need of any industrial administration for efficient continuing uniformity, and the natural need of the responsible artist for patience and trust—time to try the untried. . . .

One of the major incidents in this "fundamental clash" was an interview between Stalin and Eisenstein in the spring of 1929, in which Stalin—in what may be viewed as a forewarning of "socialist realism"—cordially but firmly advised the youthful director to revise the finale of a film then in production (*The General Line,* later released as *Old and New*) to reflect Soviet life as it was: "You should not invent images and events while sitting in your office. You must take them from life—learn from life. . . . Life must prompt you to find the correct end for the film." Noting the importance of Soviet films in foreign countries, where "our books are seldom known," he added a complaint that Soviet artists, including those in the film field, "still show insufficient understanding of the great strength of Marxism." Whether this interview had anything to do with Eisenstein's subsequent and ill-fated proposal to make a film of Marx's *Capital* is not known (nothing ever came of the preposterous idea, needless to say). It is quite plain, however, that this interview and others like it, as well as the Kremlin's new practice of reviewing every film before its release, helped set a new tone for Soviet films.

The trend toward increased administrative control was due not only to the new emphasis on ideological conformity, but also to the increasing application of industrial techniques to film-making and the proliferation of technical apparatus necessary for each production. In fact, the bureaucratic "Tsar" of Soviet films in the 1930's, Boris Shumyatsky (who was universally despised by his colleagues) proposed the establishment of a Soviet "Hollywood" on the Crimean coast, where all operations could be organized and controlled from one center. Fortunately this plan, like Eisenstein's *Capital,* never came to fruition; Shumyatsky himself was purged several years later, in 1937.

Leyda's handling of this difficult period, much of which he witnessed personally, is written with sympathy and thoroughness. He records his own surprise and "confusion" at finding a certain creeping mediocrity in the film products of the mid-1930's, and he recounts the fear produced by the Moscow trials of 1936-37 (although only a handful of film people were touched). He also notes the infectious discouragement that resulted from the regime's shabby treatment of Eisenstein in the years of turmoil between his Mexican debacle in 1930 (when disagreements with American backers caused the collapse of his projected epic *Que Viva Mexico*) and his film *Alexander Nevsky* (1938). Leyda observes that in spite of the oppressive atmosphere, several good films did emerge in this period (most notably, *Chapayev,* with its superb handling of the tension between a political commissar and a native partisan leader). He also records his own sad decision to leave Russia when, in the late 1930's, foreign citizenship became an obstacle to many budding careers.

And yet there is something missing from Leyda's account: the author seems to lack a genuine comprehension of the significance of the totalitarian controls into which the cinema was being fitted. This failing is clearly suggested by his uncritical praise of the highly schematic and simplistic film, *Baltic Deputy,* released in 1937—a production which, probably more than any other, set the pattern for the deadly boredom of Soviet cinema over the next fifteen years. In spite of a good

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performance in the leading role (played by Nikolai Cherkasov), *Baltic Deputy* was characterized by those qualities of rigid moralizing, crude hero worship, and dramatic flatness that were to make postwar Soviet films the laughing-stock of the cultured world.

The same failure—or perhaps it is reluctance—to pass critical judgment detracts from the usefulness of Leyda's account of the postwar years. The Zhdanov era is treated as an accidental nightmare, bearing no integral relationship to the fabric of Soviet cultural policy. Developments since 1948 (the year of Eisenstein's death) are handled in a mere postscript which, given its brevity and superficiality, might better have been left out of the book altogether. The virtual paralysis of the Soviet film industry between 1949 and 1953, when only two or three feature-length films appeared annually, is dismissed by Mr. Leyda with a simple lament and with an air of gratitude that the worst has passed. The marks left by the cultural sterility of this first postwar decade cannot, unfortunately, be so easily erased.

The resurgence of the Soviet film industry since 1953 may, in some measure, justify Leyda's apparent confidence. Several fine films have been produced, indicating that the impact of the great talents of the past has not been altogether destroyed, and that the Russian gifts for high drama and broad visual panorama have largely withstood the stifling of creative imagination in the intervening years.

These are of course hopeful signs. But the handful of noteworthy films so far produced hardly compares in character or strength with the rich outpourings of the earlier epoch. Nor does it begin to match the tremendously rich harvest of films issuing from Italy, Sweden, and France since 1945. Considering the high pinnacle of prestige which the Russian film industry once occupied, one can only guess at how much Russia—and the world—has lost.

"Brainwashing": Fact and Fiction

Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism,
by Robert J. Lifton.
W. W. Norton, New York, Golancz, London, 1961.

Reviewed by Robert C. North

EVER SINCE THE KOREAN WAR the press and public in the United States have been deeply concerned over the phenomenon of Chinese Communist thought reform, or "brainwashing," but more often than not the published information about it has been sensationalist, distorted by inadequate knowledge, or obscured by the deep emotions which the very idea of "re-engineering" human loyalties and behavior seems to arouse in everyone. The consequent aura of mystery and fear which surrounds the subject has been more conducive to polemics than to genuine understanding.

The word "brainwashing" was first used by an American journalist, Edward Hunter, as a literal translation of the colloquialism *hsi nao* ("wash brain"), which he quoted from Chinese informants. Thereafter the term rapidly developed a lurid mythology of its own. Originally applied only to Chinese Communist indoctrination techniques, it was soon extended to explain such diverse and widely separated phenomena as the startling confessions which emerged from the Moscow trials of the 1930's and the actions of various persons of Western nationality who "turned coat" in Communist captivity.

What was this "brainwashing" all about? Was it a "mysterious Oriental device," a Communist adaptation of Freud, or a practical application to humans of Pavlov's experiments with dogs? Reading about it in the Western press, many were reminded of the methods of Ivanov and Gletkin in Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon,* and they wondered all over again where truth ended

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and fiction began. The more "brainwashing" was talked about, the greater became the confusion. A definitive study by a qualified investigator was badly needed.

Can a man be made to change his innermost beliefs? If a change does occur, how long will it last? How do the Chinese Communists obtain such fantastic confessions, and do the victims really believe their own confessions, even when false? Is there any defense against "brainwashing"? Do Asians and Westerners react differently to it?

In search of answers to these fundamental questions, the author—an American-trained psychiatrist—spent nearly two years in Hong Kong conducting a series of interviews in depth with people who had been through the thought-reform process in China. Dr. Lifton was admirably prepared for this undertaking, having previously taken part in the psychiatric evaluation of American soldiers captured by the Chinese during the Korean War and later released in the exchange of war prisoners known as *Operation Big Switch*.

Twenty-five of the persons interrogated by Dr. Lifton were Westerners who had undergone the reform process in Chinese Communist prisons, and fifteen were Chinese intellectuals who had been through thought-remolding courses at universities or so-called "revolutionary colleges." The author soon discovered that intensive examination of a relatively small number of individual subjects would be more rewarding than superficial contacts with many. "Thought reform," he explains, "was a complex personal experience destructive of personal trust; it took time for a subject—especially in an environment as full of suspicion as Hong Kong—to trust me sufficiently to reveal inner feelings of which he was not necessarily proud. And with the Chinese subjects this was intensified by the East Asian cultural pattern of saying (as both a form of propriety and a means of personal protection) what one thinks the listener wishes to hear."

Offsetting these difficulties, Dr. Lifton had one tremendous advantage in the immediacy of his access to the subjects of his study. In his words, "just a matter of days from their reform ordeal, these men and women still carried with them its entire atmosphere. They had not yet had time to place any distance between themselves and their experiences, or to initiate the distorting reconstructions which eventually occur after any stress situation."

DR. LIFTON'S investigations produced little evidence that there is anything particularly mysterious about Chinese thought reform procedures (or Russian indoctrination and confession-extracting techniques for that matter), or that they owe much to Pavlov's studies on conditioned reflexes or any other school of psychology. The Chinese techniques, in his opinion, derive from a convergence of certain Confucian concepts—such as "sincerity," "self-cultivation," "harmony," and "rectification of names"—on the one hand, and Marxist-Leninist "theory and practice" on the other.

The crucial phase of this convergence probably coincided with the *cheng feng* or "ideological remolding movement" conducted within the Chinese Communist Party in Yenan during 1942-44. The institutions that were set up in Yenan to carry out thought remolding were patterned after the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, which had served as an early training center for Chinese Communist intellectuals, but the methods employed were adapted to the "revolutionary style" which Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues had developed by trial and error in the Chinese countryside. The result was a system of brainwashing more effective than anything Koestler's Ivanov knew—and probably more subtle and pervasive than Gletkin's relatively unsophisticated reliance on deprivation of sleep and physical exhaustion.

Every human being, whatever his circumstances, devotes much of his life to the tasks of adapting to his environment and trying to shape that environment to suit his purposes. In childhood these adaptations largely take the form of a series of learning experiences in the course of which the youngster is subjected to the calculated deprivations and pressures of an adult-controlled milieu. The nature and patterns of these pressures and deprivations go a long way toward shaping the beliefs and behavior of the child. Subsequently, as he approaches maturity, he is expected to take more and more initiative in manipulating his environment—within certain established "moral" and "legal" limits—rather than merely submitting to it.

But what happens when a state achieves such power over its subjects and their immediate environments that, by manipulating the milieu surrounding any individual person, its agents can reshape that person's behavior and beliefs almost as though he were again an infant? To a considerable extent, as Lifton describes it, this is what "brainwashing" does: the strictly controlled milieu brings to bear upon the victim a series of overwhelming pressures and at the same time allows only a very limited set of alternatives for adapting to them. There is no side-stepping the pressures, no alley of escape. The victim must reshape himself in order to survive.

Whether performed in prison or in the tightly regulated environment of a revolutionary university or

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college, thought reform consists of two basic elements: *confession,* involving the admission and renunciation of past and present "evil"; and *re-education,* which seeks to remold the subject in the Communist image. In the view of the Chinese Communists, these two closely-related and overlapping processes constitute a "morally uplifting," "harmonizing" and "scientifically therapeutic" experience.

The Occidental subjects studied by Dr. Lifton included a physician, a scientist, a business man, a teacher, and several clergymen. In his close examination of their ordeals and of the lingering aftereffects, Lifton sought answers to two quite different questions. First, he tried to ascertain which individuals had emerged as apparent converts, which as apparent resisters, and which as "obviously confused." Second, he sought to determine which of his subjects suffered the deepest psychological trauma and permanent damage. In devising methods of preparing individuals (for example, military personnel who might be captured) to "resist" brainwashing techniques, it is obviously important to understand the separate implications of these two basic questions.

Generally, Lifton concludes that a person's susceptibility to thought reform depends more on the possession or lack of a well-integrated personality than on profession, formal training, or such factors as sectarian inclination. Father Luca, who emerged "confused," made a generally satisfactory adjustment after his release; Father Vechten, whose "stature [in prison] completely overshadowed the complicated hostilities and weaknesses which thought reform engenders," suffered deep emotional conflicts and an accident which may well have been psychologically induced, after his return to Europe; Father Simon, a Jesuit, was converted to communism and after his release continued somehow to live as both a Communist and a priest; Bishop Barker stood forth as an apparent resister, although there was clear evidence that "his theological structure had also been penetrated by significant thought reform influences." While in prison, Professor Castorp, the "submissive scientist," told the Communist reformers what they wanted to hear, but after his release he made a good recovery and "quickly and actively resumed his pre-thought-reform identity," his basic values remarkably unaffected.

THE THOUGHT REFORM procedures inflicted on the various Western subjects showed only minor variations. After a few preliminaries the victim usually finds himself in a small (8′ x 12′), bare cell already containing six or eight other prisoners, usually Chinese. These are a select group, each member "advanced" in his own personal "reform" and eager to cooperate in reforming others as a means of gaining "merits" towards his own release. The veteran prisoners take turns shouting invectives at the new victim, denouncing him as an "imperialist" and a "spy," and demanding that he "recognize" his "crimes" and "confess everything." For the victim to protest his innocence is of no use; the accusations merely grow more vehement.

After several hours of this treatment, the victim is summoned for his first interrogation. He finds himself in a small room facing a "judge" flanked by a secretary and an interpreter. The judge begins the session by flatly telling the prisoner, "You have committed crimes against the people, and you must now confess everything." The victim's declarations of innocence are countered with the angry assertion that "the government never arrests an innocent man." Much of what the victim formerly considered good in his life is now represented to him as evil.

As the interrogation proceeds, the judge's questions begin to focus more and more upon the prisoner's alleged connections with various groups—with his own embassy perhaps, with foreign military or government officials, with Chinese Nationalist agencies, or with Catholic or other church organizations. After ten or twelve successive hours of questioning, the victim, though still protesting his innocence, normally provides a certain amount of suggestive information. When the judge thinks that the interrogation has been pressed far enough, he orders the prisoner to be handcuffed again and returned to his cell to "think over" his "crimes."

By the end of two or three more days of confinement, during which he is continually harassed by his fellow prisoners, the victim in most instances is concerned only with finding relief. "You start to think how to get rid of these chains. *You must get rid of the chains.*" So, at the next interrogation, he tries to earn relief by making a "wild confession"—an admission of espionage activities which he knows to be fictitious. "If we show we are a big criminal, maybe we will get better treatment. . . ."

But the judge is not satisfied; on the contrary, he presents evidence to show that the confessed activities are spurious. The government does not want "wild confessions"; it wants only the "truth." So the prisoner goes back with his chains, his cellmates continue to treat him as an enemy, and "the struggle" goes on. "They don't assist you because you are too reactionary. . . . You eat as a dog does, with your mouth and teeth. . . . If you have to make water, they open your trousers and you make water in a corner. . . . In

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the W.C. someone opens your trousers, and after you have finished they clean you. You are never out of the chains."

The program of alternating struggle and interrogation continues for a week or more, frequently with no opportunity for sleep. The victim's cellmates tell him repeatedly that he alone is responsible for his plight. "You want the chains. . . . Otherwise you would be more 'sincere' . . ." The victim finds himself trapped in a Kafka-like maze of vague yet damning accusations; unable to comprehend exactly what he is supposed to be guilty of, he sees no possible way of establishing his innocence. His accusers meanwhile are beginning to locate deep levels of guilt which they work upon in order to subvert his personality from within. In this fashion, according to Lifton, the prisoner was rapidly "reduced to something not fully human and yet not quite animal, no longer adult and yet not quite the child; instead, an adult human being was placed in the position of an infant or a sub-human animal helplessly being manipulated by larger and stronger 'adults' or 'trainers.' "

AS THE ASSAULTS CONTINUE, the victim eventually "begins to experience one of the most primitive and painful emotions known to man, the fear of total annihilation." *He must survive; only those who successfully confess survive;* hence *he must confess—successfully.* He probes more deeply into himself until he finds something that is both real and evil. "I can tell one guilty fact . . . I can tell three guilty facts . . ." He finds that he can give real facts—and present them as bigger, more evil than they actually were.

The victim's cellmates continue to criticize him, always from the "people's" viewpoint. If he drops a plate, this is wasting the people's money; if he drinks too much water, he is draining the blood of the people; if he takes up too much room in his sleep, this is "imperialist expansion." Under this relentless pressure, the prisoner finally begins to look at himself from the same viewpoint and to feel that he is indeed a criminal, that "they" are right. "I did this, I am a criminal." There are still moments when the prisoner doubts his guilt, but he keeps these doubts to himself. More and more, from then on, he loses his old points of reference, his old convictions of truth, and gradually adopts the "people's standpoint." Now, at last, there is a miraculous improvement in his status: the handcuffs and chains are removed; he is comfortably seated while talking with the judge; he is permitted the luxury of eight full hours of sleep.

The prisoner has now reached a stage where he perceives more clearly his former "evil ways" and begins to work hard at his confession. Within a short time he is drawn into the *hsueh hsi*—the study group of cellmates—whose sessions take up the greater part of each waking day. In due course he joins them in conducting the "struggle" against a new victim admitted into the cell. His reformation progresses rapidly; he is well on the way to becoming the new man his indoctrinators intended to make him.

A portion of the long study session each day is devoted to "daily-life criticisms": a group discussion of general conduct, attitudes toward others, willingness to do one's share of work in the cell, eating and sleeping habits. Whenever a foreign prisoner is found wanting in any of these respects, the fault is attributed to his harboring of attitudes inspired by "imperialist" or "bourgeois" greed and exploitation instead of the correct "people's attitude" of sharing and cooperation. The prisoner begins to feel that he has been through a deeply moving, almost religious experience. Increasingly, too, he finds himself living in "harmony" with his cellmates.

So lasting are the effects in some cases that even years later, when the victim is back in his own free society, he misses this harmony and longs for the relatively simple, deeply "meaningful" prison experience glorified in his memory. For back in the Western world he finds himself still troubled by the kernel of evil truth around which his new prison identity had been fashioned, and at times he sees himself again from the "people's viewpoint" or suffers from confusion as his Western identity threatens to slip away in favor of his prison self.

CHINESE VICTIMS of "brainwashing" go through much the same sort of ordeal in a "revolutionary college" or university. At first the "students" are left very much to themselves. They eat, sleep, and talk together in an austere but friendly environment. Initial reserve soon gives way, and the students begin to reveal to one another details of their backgrounds, their frustrations, beliefs and aspirations.

Suddenly, the atmosphere changes. There is an important, highly-charged lecture by a prominent Communist Party official, followed by a series of *hsueh hsi* sessions of rising intensity. One of the students, hitherto quiet and inconspicuous, abruptly sheds his disguise and emerges as a trained "activist" of the party or the Communist Youth Corps. The other students discover that he has been listening to their loose talk and taking note of their vulnerabilities.

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From this point on, group pressures steadily mount, and the individual student finds himself subjected to a prolonged process of criticism, self-criticism and confession much like that experienced by foreign prisoners. The descriptions of their past and present attitudes which the students so freely exchanged with one another during the first days now come back to haunt them.

There are, or course, differences of approach. Whereas the Western victim of thought reform is attacked mainly for his association with "imperialism," the student at a revolutionary university is under fire mainly for his "individualism," for his "highly immoral" tendency to follow personal inclinations rather than the path charted by the party. Under mounting group pressure, the "individualist" student feels increasingly isolated and out of step. The very deepest pockets of hidden guilt feelings are skillfully tapped. The student is overwhelmed by remorse and a sense of isolation. "I was very confused. . . . I felt lonely. . . . I found it hard to be alone with all the world on the other side. . . . You feel like a stranger in that environment if you don't go over." The student doubts himself and all that he previously believed in.

After weeks of "struggle," with tension becoming almost unbearable, the students are directed to begin working on their final thought summaries or confessions. At a mass meeting, faculty members emphasize the importance of this undertaking as the crystallization of the entire reform experience, the final opportunity for the student to resolve his thought problems. Each student's confession must be a virtual life history beginning two generations back and extending through the reform experience. It must describe candidly and thoroughly how the student's thoughts have developed and influenced his actions; it must analyze also the effects of thought reform on his character and view of the world.

After a ten-day writing period the student reads his life history to the *hsueh hsi,* whose members tear it apart piece by piece. Each member of the group must sign the document, signifying his approval and responsibility for it, before the group as a whole can allow it to pass. The history is reviewed, of course, at higher levels and approved or sent back. As finally approved, the document becomes a part of the student's personal dossier and accompanies him throughout his subsequent career.

There is one more ordeal: the student must convincingly and irrevocably denounce his own father in public—both as an individual and as a representative of the old order. In a culture which for generations cultivated reverence and obedience to one's parents, this denunciation constitutes the ultimate symbol and proof of the student's rejection of his former self.

FOR BOTH THE Western prisoner and the Chinese "student," the thought reform process, despite its compulsory elements, assumes deep, almost religious connotations. This phenomenon, Lifton believes, is perhaps its most dangerous aspect. He writes:

During the past century, emotions formerly directed toward organized religion have been expressed in relationship to politics and science. This rechanneling of emotion is not without its dangers; as Camus said, "Politics is not religion, or, if it is, then it is nothing but the Inquisition." Such political inquisitions occur—as in thought reform—when ideological totalists set up their own theocratic search for heresy.

In any event, Dr. Lifton's study demonstrates beyond any doubt that it is possible to reshape a man's innermost beliefs by subjecting him to sufficient physical and psychological stress, or even just the latter. At what point the transformation finally takes place depends upon the personality structure of the individual victim. It matters little whether the techniques of thought remolding were devised by theoreticians or by practical people; what is important is that Communist totalitarian society—whether Soviet or Chinese—has proven itself a congenial environment for their development.

If there is any defense against "brainwashing," it undoubtedly lies in the cultivation of psychologically sound and healthy citizens through the preservation and further development of free, non-totalistic, politically and economically "healthy" societies.

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Leninists and Oppositionists

The Communist International, 1919-1934: Documents,
Volume II: 1923-1928; edited by Jane Degras.
Oxford University Press,
London, New York, Toronto, 1960.

International Communism,
edited by David Footman.
St. Antony's Papers, No. 9, Chatto & Windus, London,
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959.

Soviet Affairs, Number Two.
edited by David Footman.
St. Antony's Papers, No. 6, Chatto & Windus, London,
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959.

The Conscience of the Revolution, Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia,
by Robert Vincent Daniels.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

Reviewed by F. L. Carsten

THE COMMON DENOMINATOR of these four volumes is opposition to Communist (that is, Leninist or Stalinist) predomination or influence. Each book contributes to our knowledge and understanding of the manifold struggles which resulted in the triumph of one party, and ultimately of one man, over all opposition and all critics from within the party (or parties, in the wider field of the Communist International). Indeed, it is with the Comintern that two of the books are concerned, while the other two deal with opposition inside Soviet Russia.

The most useful from the point of view of the scholar is the second volume of selected documents of the Communist International, edited by Jane Degras. During the years 1923 to 1928 international communism suffered a series of shattering defeats, first in Italy, Germany and Bulgaria, later in Poland and China: in each instance, the growth of a movement of the extreme left brought about the establishment of a fascist or dictatorial regime which took strong measures against the local Communists and in some cases almost annihilated them (Mussolini in Italy, Tsankov in Bulgaria, Pilsudski in Poland, Chiang Kai-shek in China). Even in those countries where the Communists continued as a legal mass party, their development was hindered by fierce quarrels among rival leaders and by the heresy hunts and purges conducted by the Russian leadership. This was the period of the "bolshevization" of the Communist parties, proclaimed as "the most important task of the Comintern" by its fifth congress in 1924; its sections were ordered to permit "no fractions, tendencies or groups," and to "take over for themselves everything in Russian bolshevism that has international significance." Thus the fight against "Trotskyism" was transferred to the international field by Zinoviev and other Comintern leaders; later Zinoviev, fallen from grace in Russia, was dismissed as chairman of the Comintern; there his place was taken by Bukharin, who in turn fell when Stalin turned against the right-wing Bolsheviks. During this period Comintern politics were closely attuned to the struggle for the succession inside Russia: up to 1928 united front tactics were followed with certain variations, but then they were abandoned and replaced by the slogan of "class against class," and "the right-wing danger" became the chief concern.

As Mrs. Degras has pointed out in her essay on united front tactics in *International Communism,* this change

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was due to the failure of the experiment in cooperation between the Russian and the British trade unions and the British withdrawal from the Anglo-Russian trade union committee, as well as to the breakdown of the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, who were massacred by their former allies—a catastrophe for the Russians who, in spite of many warnings, had clung to the alliance to the bitter end. Yet, as in many other cases, the leaders argued that Comintern policy and the directives issued by the Executive Committee had been correct, and that the debacle was due "to the faulty application of a correct policy, for which the Chinese [Communist Party's] central committee and some of the Comintern's representatives in China were responsible." It was always easy to find scapegoats, for the Comintern leaders could do no wrong.

THE CHANGE of Comintern policy, however, was due above all to the new course in Russia and Stalin's fight against the right-wing opposition. Throughout this period Comintern discussions were overshadowed by the factional fights among the Bolsheviks, as amply evidenced in Mrs. Degras' volume. What had once been independent Communist parties became satellites of the almighty Bolshevik party, and all more independently-minded leaders were expelled or silenced. As Bukharin put it in 1928 to the sixth world congress:

We have learned how to conduct operations against every kind of deviation; we do it brilliantly. But as for real study of the problems, genuine argumentation and not a mechanical fight against opponents—that we still have to learn.

All this may have been inevitable because the Russian revolution remained isolated and the defense of Soviet Russia and of Russian interests became the primary duty of the Comintern sections, to which other aspirations had to be subordinated. Hence, even after Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Chinese Communists, the latter were enjoined by Moscow "to keep the agrarian revolution within the limits necessary to preserve the alliance with the Kuomintang." Under such conditions a *putsch* might be organized by tiny militant groups—as in Hamburg in 1923 and in Canton in 1927—but no genuine revolutionary movement could develop. And even during this period of comparatively moderate Comintern tactics no realistic analysis of the political situation was possible: for in 1924 the fifth world congress asserted that "fascism and social-democracy are the right and left hands of modern capitalism," and in 1926 at the seventh plenum of the ECCI Kuusinen laid down that the "chief task was to liberate the masses from social-democracy, which was more dangerous than fascism." If that was so, any united front, any common defense against fascist attack, was indeed pointless—and those advocating it were traitors to the cause of communism. More valuable even than the carefully selected documents printed here are detailed introductions and summaries of the editor, which make this volume a mine of information for anyone interested in the subject.

THAT "BOLSHEVIZATION" was not an issue new to the post-Lenin period is shown by Mr. Richard Lowenthal's substantial and well documented essay on "The Bolshevization of the Spartacus League" in *International Communism,* describing the intervention of the Comintern in the affairs of the German Communist Party during the years 1919-21; the outcome was the KPD's attempt at revolution by taking the "offensive" (the "March action" of 1921), which led to a crushing defeat and the expulsion of the ablest leaders. To the author the basic problem facing the Communist parties is whether they should become mass parties or be satisfied with being a core, an elite—which would lead to their constant purification but would destroy their mass influence. Yet his argument becomes more doubtful when he claims that

. . . the separate revolutionary mass party could survive in the long run only if it became as fundamentally "classless," as capable of changing its "social basis" according to the situation, as all totalitarian parties; the working class character of the party could only be preserved in the long run if the split was abandoned (p. 67).

Yet the reality of pre-1933 Germany, or of contemporary France, does not seem to support this general assertion. While the membership of the KPD (and of the French CP) did remain predominantly working-class, that of the Nazi party was predominantly petty-bourgeois (only the SA recruited large numbers of the unemployed). Apparently Mr. Lowenthal wants to prove that—because all totalitarian systems are alike—the Communist and Fascist parties must have the same social basis, that of "the uprooted and disaffected." But is that really the case? This approach would neglect the differences which exist, for example, between underdeveloped and industrially advanced countries, and between the conditions of boom and slump.

Some of the other essays in this volume are much less valuable and original. Mr. Guy Wint's essay on "Communism in India" is mainly based on P. Spratt's *Blowing up India,* and contains little that is new. Three times he mentions "the Comintern Congress of 1920 at

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Turin"—which never met. He alleges that this Congress enjoined Communists "to boycott parliament or to try to destroy it"—an assertion contradicted by the theses adopted by the second Comintern congress in Moscow in 1920. The author compounds his error further in saying that these theses were repudiated by the Indian Communists when they took office in Kerala in 1957 (does Mr. Wint really not know that Communists have at times taken office in many countries, even in coalition governments with "bourgeois" parties?).

The late Mr. Carew Hunt's paper on Willi Muenzenberg relies mainly on the recollections of Muenzenberg's widow and her sister, Mrs. Buber-Neumann; it adds nothing to the story of this well-known German Communist and later oppositionist, nor does it unravel the mystery of his death in occupied France.

The three essays in *Soviet Affairs, Number Two* deal with certain aspects of the civil war. All make fascinating reading, especially Mr. David Footman's study of Nestor Makhno, a little known figure of the civil war in the Ukraine, whose personal story serves to demonstrate the hopeless position of a little peasant republic between white and red, and its ultimate disaster caused above all by red duplicity. Equally interesting is Mr. George Katkov's paper on "the Kronstadt rising," which proves that the Kronstadt sailors were not aiming at the recall of the Constituent Assembly or the overthrow of the Soviet constitution, but rather at the reestablishment of Soviet democracy through free and secret Soviet elections and the recognition of all left-wing parties. As Mr. Katkov puts it, "the sailors had no quarrel with the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but they did not accept the leadership of the Communist Party." They did not want to return to the ideas of 1917, but were aiming at a "third revolution." The third essay, by Mr. C. H. Ellis, describes operations and British intervention in Transcaspia in the years 1918-19, a tale of missed military and political opportunities.

ANOTHER TALE of missed opportunities and political ineptitude is the history of the Communist opposition, told by Mr. Daniels in the *Conscience of the Revolution*. The author tends to play down the importance of the right wing, taking for granted that its defeat was inevitable, and to concentrate instead on the history of the left opposition. He asserts that "in early 1923 Trotsky held most of the trumps" (p. 207): but was that really the case? Since Stalin dominated the party apparatus, the dice were heavily loaded against Trotsky from the outset. Furthermore, as Trotsky himself wrote later:

Independent action on my part would have been . . . represented as my personal fight for Lenin's place in the party and the state. The very thought of this made me shudder.

Can it really be held that a man, who "did not lift a finger to secure it," "had victory within his grasp" (p. 206)? The struggle for the succession was a struggle for power—a fact which Trotsky never learned to understand, but which Stalin had grasped long before Lenin's death. Mr. Daniels rightly quotes Bukharin's words to Kamenev:

Stalin . . . is an unprincipled intriguer who subordinates everything to the preservation of his power. He changes his theories according to whom he needs to get rid of at any given moment.

The author does not dispute this interpretation, yet his own is quite different, for according to him, "the oppositionists were typically Westernized émigrés, both Bolshevik and Menshevik, who had assimilated basic Western assumptions of socialism as a democratically constituted system based on prior industrial development (p. 408). Or as stated at the beginning:

These currents can best be termed as they usually knew themselves—"Leninist" and "Leftist." In essence, the difference between the two tendencies was that of power and principle—of revolutionary pragmatism and revolutionary idealism (p. 4).

This interpretation, which permeates the whole volume, oversimplifies the issue by dividing the many, frequently changing and shifting groups and factions into two large camps, which were opposed to each other not on grounds of tactics, but on grounds of principle. It amounts to a plea for the "Leftists" who emerge as socialists of a western, democratic type. Logically, it would follow that no party dictatorship would have been established in Russia if they had been victorious. Mr. Daniels goes so far as to claim that "Molotov was correct in saying, 'Trotskyism . . . was and is a remnant of the Social Democracy within our own ranks'" (p. 409)—an acceptance of the charges brought against the opposition by its enemies, although his motive clearly is to exonerate Trotsky.

Quite apart from the rights and wrongs of Trotskyism, however, it is highly doubtful whether it is possible to write the history of the Communist opposition without writing the history of the Bolshevik party, and that Mr. Leonard Schapiro has just done in a far more competent and scholarly fashion.* Mr. Daniels' volume

* *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Random House, New York, and Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1960.

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contains above all copious extracts from the writings and speeches of the oppositionists and the replies of the "Leninists"—arid, theoretical exchanges on the true meaning of Marxism and Leninism which do not explain anything, neither the story of the Bolshevik party and of its factions, nor the reality of Soviet politics. Was this exercise in semantics really worth all the effort? But what has puzzled the reviewer most is the graphical representation of "The Two-dimensional Political Classification" and "The Evolution of Soviet Politics," both divided into "soft" and "hard," and into "Mass-interest" and "Class-interest," according to "Scale of Methods" and "Scale of Program" respectively (p. 435); these are followed by another six graphs on the cleavages in the Bolshevik party. Mr. Daniels states: "The field analysis can be further employed to map out a visual approximation of the factional history of the Russian Communist Party" (p. 434); yet in truth these graphs do not add anything to our understanding of the very complex problems posed by that history.

CORRECTIONS: Lines 11 and 23 in Poem V of the "Poems from the Underground" (Problems of Communism, *May-June 1961, p. 4*) *should read "We all walked under god," rather than "We all were under god."*

In the same issue, the publisher of Mr. Barnet's book, Who Wants Disarmament *(p. 32), is Beacon Press, rather than Harvard University Press. We also regret the omission of the note acknowledging Mr. Barnet's indebtedness to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for its support of the research on which his article was based.*

NOTE: Due to lack of space, the fourth installment of our series "Russia, China and the World" was not included in this issue. It will appear in a forthcoming number, and will deal with Soviet and Communist activities in Africa.

—THE EDITORS

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The Criminal Reconsidered

RECENT ENACTMENTS in the Soviet Union, extending the application of the death penalty and establishing new procedures for prosecuting certain minor offenders, have led to speculation about reactionary tendencies in the Soviet administration of justice. The news awakened memories of the legalized terror that dominated Soviet criminal law during the greater part of the Soviet regime. These apprehensions are misplaced: they exaggerate the extent both of the current retreat and of the earlier progress.

Two and a half years ago the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation and Criminal Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the accompaniment of self-congratulatory speeches and articles. The Fundamentals marked the height of the reforming wave of 1955-57. Essentially, they provided an outline which was to be filled in by special legislation in the USSR at large, and by new codes in the individual republics. They concentrated criminal jurisdiction in the regular courts, enlarged somewhat the functions of defense counsel, restricted the scope of appeals from acquittals, and stated or re-stated a number of important procedural guarantees.

While the Fundamentals were being drafted and discussed, however, an ominous new device was promoted through officially inspired draft legislation, under which certain "parasitic" offenders could be convicted by public meetings without judges, counsel or procedural guarantees and sentenced to as much as five years of deportation and forced labor. The sentence would go into effect upon confirmation by the executive committee of the local soviet and there was no provision for judicial review.[1] Despite some public and perhaps more private opposition, the measure was enacted into law during the late 1950's in several republics, though not in the RSFSR or the Ukrainian SSR.

The anti-parasite procedure was sometimes defended as a necessary substitute for the abolished *troiki,* the administrative tribunals under the NKVD and MVD from 1934 to 1953. More often, it was associated with the renewed emphasis on the role of "society" (*obshchestvennost*) in maintaining public order. Speeches by Khrushchev, Suslov, and others in 1958 and 1959 stressed the theoretical importance of transferring more and more functions from the state to society. The ideological and psychological importance of collective moral suasion was celebrated in theoretical articles. "Comrades' courts" were revived and expanded by legislation in 1959 authorizing them to hear several types of cases generally subsumed as "cases of violations of law and other deviations from the norms of public behavior if the offender, to judge from the nature of his offense and from his personality, can be reformed through the application of measures of public influence." These informal, locally elected tribunals could rebuke the offender with various degrees of obloquy, impose a small fine, ordain compensation for damage, or recommend job-changes or eviction. The public was supposed to take a more active part in the administration of justice for petty crimes and lead the offender back to virtue through shame, work, and remorse.

THE MOST IMPORTANT of the recent statutes show a continuation of the tendency (already visible in the Fundamentals) to widen the gulf between the treatment of first offenders or petty criminals on the one hand and the treatment of repeaters or organized gangsters on the other.

The Fundamentals of 1958 had retained the option of applying the death penalty, "pending its complete abolition," for a short list of crimes including high treason,

[1] The power given to local party officials by this scheme caused the present writer to speculate in 1958 that the resulting threat of haphazard or irregular administration might have to be met by some reviewing mechanism in party or administrative channels. (See "The New Face of 'Socialist Legality,'" *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1958, p. 30). The speculation seems to have been justified. In June 1960 a Soviet jurist reported orally that, in at least one of the republics where the anti-parasite law had been enacted, the public prosecutors were taking the position that the executive committee's action in confirming the sentence fell under the supervisory jurisdiction of the public prosecutors and so could be protested *by them* to the next higher soviet. There was still no judicial participation, and the defendant had no right of appeal.

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espionage, sabotage (*diversiia*), terrorist acts, banditry, murder under aggravating circumstances, and certain wartime offenses. On May 5th of this year, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR [2] extended the option of applying the death penalty (still "pending its complete abolition") to cover also the business of making or issuing counterfeit money; the theft of state or public property in especially large amounts; and "the case of especially dangerous habitual offenders and persons convicted of serious crimes who in places of deprivation of freedom terrorize prisoners who have taken the path of reform, commit assaults on the administration, or organize or take an active part in criminal groupings for that purpose." A corresponding change was made in the provisions for parole and commutation. Under the Fundamentals, especially dangerous recidivists were not eligible for parole or commutation. The new Decree extends ineligibility to two other classes: persons who, having previously benefited from parole or commutation, commit new premeditated crimes before the expiration of the original term; and persons convicted (though first offenders) of any of a list of especially serious crimes,[3] including among others those newly covered by the possible death penalty.

At the other end of the continuum, minor offenses continue to be withdrawn gradually from the jurisdiction (and safeguards) of the regular courts. In a compromise decree issued on May 4th, the RSFSR has at last resolved the debate over the anti-parasite legislation. The description of the offense does not substantially vary from the original conception of 1957, but the procedure by which the determination is made is more complex and may allow for a more orderly application.

In the RSFSR version, "the exposure of persons leading an antisocial, parasitic way of life and the verification of all the relevant circumstances" are carried out by the police and the public prosecutor, who had no such role in the earlier versions. Though the decree is not explicit on the point, it appears that this operation must be preceded by two other events: a warning, with a time-limit, administered by a public organization or a state agency to the "parasite" to "take to the path of an honest life of labor," and the parasite's disregard of that warning. If the prosecutor decides to forward the case, he sends it to one of two institutions: either a regular people's court, or a "working people's collective of an enterprise, shop, institution, organization, collective farm or collective farm brigade." The people's court may pronounce sentence of deportation and forced labor to specially designated localities for a period of from two to five years; its sentence is final and unappealable. If the case has gone to the collective, the same sentence may be pronounced but requires approval by the executive committee of the local soviet; the decision of the latter is likewise final, nothing being said of the possibility of administrative review.

TAKEN TOGETHER, the new measures appear to reflect a penological assumption that offenders are classifiable into two categories, to which society should make two increasingly differentiated responses. The hardened criminal, recognized by the magnitude of his crime or his recidivism, is to be pursued relentlessly; the death penalty is now to be applied somewhat more widely, and stringent restrictions are placed on the dispensation of paroles and commutations. For this class of criminals the chances of rehabilitation are apparently considered slim. The assumption is either that the increased severity of the sanctions will deter more effectively, or that the defense of society requires longer sentences and more executions. There are indications that here and there the reforms of the fifties were taken more seriously than the authors intended them to be taken; [4] the new legislation rectifies this error. It also enlarges the arsenal of official weapons against the major economic crimes, which apparently had been handled with inappropriate laxity by some courts.[5] To impose the death penalty on the professional counterfeiter or the large-scale embezzler seems drastic, but it must be remembered that under Soviet conditions the borderline between economic crimes and crimes against the state is necessarily blurred.

The minor or first offender, on the other hand, is still amenable to social suasion. It is he for whom the benefits of parole and commutation are now reserved. In the RSFSR, if his offense falls within the categories of the anti-parasite laws (which of course embrace also many

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[2] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta,* No. 19 (1054), May 11, 1961, item 207.

[3] ". . . banditry, the making and issuing of counterfeit money or securities, violation of the regulations on currency transactions, the theft of state or public property in especially large amounts, premeditated murder under aggravating circumstances, rape entailing grave consequences or rape of a minor, robbery, and the receiving or giving of a bribe or acting as intermediary in bribery committed under aggravating circumstances."

[4] ". . . quite a few workers in the court, the public prosecutor's offices and the police have an idea that once the party line has been directed toward a restriction of the scope of coercion and the employment of many diverse social forms of response to violators of the law, it is thereupon possible to weaken the application of measures of state coercion. In practice this leads to a situation in which some workers focus their main attention on just one side of the business—on re-education, with society's help, of persons who have committed unimportant violations—and fail to wage the essential struggle against dangerous criminals." N. R. Mironov, "Concerning Some Questions of Deterrence of Crime and Other Antisocial Manifestations and the Struggle with Them under Contemporary Conditions," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* No. 5, p. 1.

[5] See "Directive No. 1 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, March 31, 1961, on the Work of the Judicial Panel on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR," *Sovetskaia yustitsiia,* No. 8, April 1961, p. 27.

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acts that would not elsewhere be treated as criminal) he may now be taken before a workers' collective or a people's court, and he will quite possibly have already defied the pressure exerted by a comrades' court.

The procedures under the anti-parasite laws or before the comrades' courts are not, in Soviet terminology, regarded as criminal, though the maximum penalty that may be imposed on a parasite is more severe than the penalty for many conventional crimes. The safeguards of the Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to the non-courts; it is unclear whether any of them will apply to the defendant who happens, by the choice of a public prosecutor, to be brought before a people's court on parasite charges.

At this stage it is not possible to predict the effect of the new measures on Soviet criminal or quasi-criminal behavior. The range of sanctions and machinery available to the public authorities seems to have been widened; whether a humane and discriminating use will be made of the new possibilities is questionable. Soviet criminology has barely begun any serious public study of the causes of crime; given the doctrinal obstacles to the recognition of some of the factors determining criminal behavior, it is hardly likely that the USSR will see the emergence of an enlightened penology in the near future. Whatever penological theory underlies the present profusion of tribunals and sanctions is in any event obscured by the requirements of political control, which have once again worked to the disadvantage of criminal procedure.

Leon Lipson

(Professor Lipson, who teaches at the Yale University Law School, is one of the foremost American authorities on Soviet law.)

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